Researching how people experience emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression by Pilkington, Vanessa
Pilkington, Vanessa (2013). Researching how people experience emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University Online) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Pilkington, Vanessa (2013). Researching how people experience emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University 
Online) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/14513/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
RESEARCHING HOW PEOPLE EXPERIENCE EMOTIONAL SUFFERING 
SUBSEQUENTLY DIAGNOSED AS DEPRESSION. A QUALITATIVE 
INVESTIGATION FOLLOWED BY A CASE STUDY AND A LITERATURE 
REVIEW. 
Vanessa Pilkington 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the Professional Doctorate in 
Psychology 
City University London, Department of Psychology 
September 2013 
 
 
 
  
THE FOLLOWING PART OF THIS THESIS HAS BEEN 
REDACTED FOR DATA PROTECTION/CONFIDENTIALITY 
ISSUES: 
 
pp 166-189: Part C. Case Study. 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
“My depression set in the following February. It hit me and I withdrew from life. 
The word depression is bandied about, but I don’t think some people really 
understand what it is like. I am not an angry person, but I was so angry. I 
couldn’t read; I couldn’t watch television; I couldn’t listen to music. I took 
sleeping pills and antidepressants. For two years I became this other person’. 
(Woman and Home, July 2012  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this study was to qualitatively explore experiences of emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression from the perspective of adults 
who had been diagnosed with depression at some point in their lives. The focus 
of the study was to unearth some of the rich experiences participants underwent 
at the time of their pre-diagnosed depression, with particular attention being paid 
to experiences not documented in depression classification manuals.  
 
Ten adults who had been diagnosed with depression and treated within the last 
three months participated in this study. Data was gathered through individual, 
face-to-face, semi-structured and recorded interviews and analysed with an 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). 
 
Eight superordinate themes emerged from the data relating to how participants 
experienced pre-diagnosed depression and to the connection of possible life 
events to it:  
1. Totality of life at the time  
2. Embodied distress  
3. Trapped in head  
4. Severed social and emotional connections  
5. Transformation of identity  
6. Dissociation  
7. Belief in a higher force  
8. Disciplining the self 
 
The research also discussed these themes in relation to possible triggers and 
maintaining factors in the participants’ pre-diagnosed depression, how pre-
diagnosed depression was experienced and those aspects which led to 
development of coping strategies.  
 
This study has provided an insight to lived experiences of emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression and can, therefore, be useful for 
counselling psychologists when working therapeutically with those emotionally 
distressed clients diagnosed with depression.  Further studies can use the 
knowledge gained to further theory development in this area.  
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PART A: PREFACE 
 
 
 
The thesis comprises four parts consisting of this preface and three remaining 
parts described below with a summary explaining how they inter-relate.  
 
Part B: Main Thesis 
 
The main part of the thesis consists of a qualitative investigation. The research 
is concerned with how people experience the emotional suffering that is 
subsequently diagnosed as depression. This part contains four chapters.  
 
Chapter 1- INTRODUCTION includes a literature review of distress 
experiences commonly associated with a depression diagnosis. The terms 
emotional distress or suffering are used throughout to refer to phenomenon the 
clinical term depression is often used to designate. The terms depression and 
symptoms invariably arise when discussion is given to relevant studies, theories 
and classification manuals on the matter of such distress. Symptoms of 
depression as cited in diagnostic criteria are outlined followed by a discussion 
and evaluation of various theories on it. The introduction also considers some of 
the history, culture, biology, diagnosis, causal factors and possible interventions. 
The introduction aims to provide an empirical backdrop to the study findings and 
the chapter concludes with a rationale for the conducted research.      
 
Chapter 2 - METHOD presents the concept of Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and provides an overview of its 
epistemological position and methodological process. The chapter includes a 
section on researcher reflexivity and transparency thus providing an insight in to 
the researcher’s demographics and interests and experiences as they relate to this 
research. It also outlines any changes made to the study alongside the motivation 
for them. It notes areas pertaining to research evaluation and quality before 
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outlining the research procedure in detail.  
 
Chapter 3 – ANALYSIS consists of the presentation of the findings. Here, 
each of the themes that emerged from the analytical process is presented, 
discussed and analyzed. Illustrative extracts from the raw data are used 
throughout to ensure that the analysis remains grounded in the participants’ own 
voices. 
 
In Chapter 4 – DISCUSSION, the previously reviewed themes are discussed 
in relation to the existing literature and a further theme incorporating 
superordinate and subordinate themes identified in the analysis is considered. 
Further reflections on what the research findings mean and convey are discussed.  
 
Part C: Case Study 
 
Before beginning my work in private practice I worked in several National 
Health   hospitals, providing psychological therapy sessions to groups and 
individual clients. The groups I ran were for people who had been diagnosed 
with depression and anxiety respectively. These were Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) groups each consisting of eight sessions.  
 
I therefore developed considerable experience working with emotionally 
distressed clients using a CBT approach. By the time I began working privately 
in 2010 I was adopting a more integrative approach with clients who were 
presenting with emotional distress previously diagnosed as depression by their 
GP’s or psychiatrists. My work with client H, presented in the case study, 
reflects this.  
 
I tend to tailor my interventions to the client in question through consideration 
of their life experiences, personality, attitude and therapeutic expectation. This 
shift came about because I found that CBT interventions alone, whilst being very 
effective for some clients, were less so for others.   
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Where clients found it less effective this seemed to be linked to the fact that 
they were unhappy with life circumstances and the related choices they had 
made. In these cases I found alternative therapeutic interventions helpful such as 
person centered, solution focused, psychodynamic, compassion-focused and 
existential therapy.  I believe this case study is valuable in so far as it 
demonstrates how an integrative take can be insightful and flexible   
 
The case study was written around the time I was becoming more interested in 
other psychological and therapeutic interventions and adopting my more 
integrative approach. I feel that this is expressed in both the working alliance and 
therapeutic interventions I adopted. Alongside some person centered and CBT 
interventions there is an emphasis on the therapeutic relationship, transference, 
attachment and acceptance. With hindsight I felt that perhaps it was these aspects 
that turned out to be most helpful to H.  
 
This was a transformative time for me as a counselling psychologist, 
particularly with regards to the way I worked with experiences of emotional 
distress commonly associated with a diagnosis of depression. I began to feel that 
emotional suffering was not always triggered and maintained by thinking 
distortions that may or may not have been triggered by experiences as CBT 
theories suggest. I am more inclined to view emotional suffering as distress in 
relation to life, relationships and position in the social world and I think H’s story 
illustrates this well.  
 
Whilst the case study attempts to show how psychological theory and research 
on distress translate into therapeutic work, it also attempts to show how the 
professional recognition and understanding of an individual’s experience of 
emotional suffering can support and assist them in finding their own resources to 
overcome it. It also reveals some of the things in life that can cause people to feel 
emotionally distressed in the first place. It reflects themes that also emerged in 
the main thesis on emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression such 
as fear, loss, change and intrusive negative cognitions.  
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Part D: Literature Review  
 
One of the things that recur throughout my clinical work as well as in the 
thesis is the role of intrusive and repetitive thoughts. I have noticed in my clinical 
work, as was evident in the case study, that emotionally distressed clients often 
report rumination. H, like two other participants in my case study, described this 
as noise in the head. This stimulated my already existing interest in the role of 
unwanted intrusive thoughts.  
 
I decided to elaborate on this by conducting my literature review on the effects 
of mindfulness interventions for those experiences commonly associated with a 
diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This was because I was 
aware that a diagnosis of OCD would incorporate obsessive and intrusive 
thinking though perhaps from a different perspective. I felt it would be helpful 
for me as a psychologist who works with emotionally distressed clients to 
develop my therapeutic skills by helping them to manage and overcome their 
persistent intrusive thoughts.  
 
Whilst conducting the literature review I discovered that one form of 
mindfulness therapy used for OCD, mindfulness-based cognitive behavior 
therapy (MBCT), was in fact formulated specifically to treat emotional distress 
subsequently diagnosed as depression. This indicated a possible overlap between 
experiences of distress as noted by Wahl et al., (2011). Participants in the 
reviewed studies on mindfulness for OCD described a reduction in their tendency 
to worry and ruminate combined with an increased tolerance of, and an ability to 
detach themselves from, their intrusive thoughts. The fact that MBCT was found 
to be effective for those diagnosed with OCD only strengthened my interest in 
the role of persistent intrusive thoughts in emotional suffering. As participants in 
this study and clients in my clinical practice have often reported such thoughts I 
have decided to take a more mindful approach in my work with clients who 
report them.   
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A focus on the role of thoughts, feelings and behaviours experienced in 
emotional distress and consideration of coping strategies, whether internally 
generated or therapeutically encouraged, thus constitutes a thread that runs 
through each of the components of this thesis. 
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PART B: MAIN THESIS 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis explores the experiences of emotional distress in the lives of 
people who have been subsequently diagnosed as suffering from 
depression.  The terms ‘emotional distress’ and ‘emotional suffering’ are used to 
refer to these experiences. Usage of the terms ‘depression’ and ‘symptoms’ is 
avoided when possible as this might imply that the researcher is exploring 
matters in accordance with the disease/illness model. Whilst participants in this 
study did end up with a diagnosis of depression, the researcher does not 
necessarily adhere to that medical explanation. Nor does she believe that distress 
categorized as depression is appropriately conceptualized as a disease or medical 
illness.  
 
She will argue that emotional distress is a response to stressful and adverse 
life situations.  It is inextricably linked to the life we lead and the worlds we 
inhabit.  It may manifest in problematic, undesired, unwelcome and unusual 
experiences some of which have often been linked to the clinical term 
‘depression’.  Whilst experienced by many of us at various points in our lives, 
those who are suffering emotionally will experience them in an overriding and 
overwhelming manner. These experiences can include overpowering and often 
uncontrollable emotional states, that interrupt and disturb daily lives, preventing 
the individual from functioning and make life appear meaningless and lacking in 
purpose; habitual and repetitive patterns of behaviour that generate anxiety if not 
adhered to; the holding of beliefs that are considered unusual, untrue or extreme; 
seeing or hearing things that others do not; experiencing the world as flat and 
grey; feeling permanently agitated or indifferent to life and lacking any 
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emotions.  
 
As this thesis begins with a literature review of what this study explores, 
namely experiences that are subsequently diagnosed as depression, it is 
inevitable that the terms ‘depression’ and ‘symptoms’ will arise, notably when 
consideration is given to relevant studies, theories and diagnostic criteria. In 
using these terms the researcher is not buying in to the medical model of 
depression as an explanatory ‘thing’ with causal powers. Instead, the researcher 
has chosen to employ the terms emotional distress and emotional suffering to 
convey the set of experiences she intends to explore. 
 
The World Health Organization 2012 now recognizes a diagnosis of 
depression to be the lead cause of global disability and has estimated that by 
2020 emotional distress categorized, as depression will be second only to 
cardiovascular disease in the global burden of ill health. A diagnosis of 
depression affects 121 million people worldwide. At its most severe it can lead to 
suicide and is responsible for 850,000 deaths every year (BioMed Central, 2011). 
It affects people across the globe.  
 
In July 2011, the office for National Statistics revealed that doctors in the UK 
prescribed 39.1 million packets of antidepressants such as Prozac in 2009, more 
than four times the 9 million prescribed in 1991 (Ross, 2011). Distress 
categorized as depression is now the most common psychiatric disorder, even 
referred to as the common cold of psychiatry (Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011) 
and it appears to be on the rise. A recent American study conducted by Pederson 
(2010) found that, contrary to popular belief, there has not been a reduction in 
the stigma associated with a diagnosis of depression and that prejudice and 
discrimination against it have not changed in the last 10 years. A study 
conducted by Barney, Griffiths, Christensen & Jorm, (2009) found that 
emotionally distressed people experience considerable stigma while others 
believe that they are responsible for their own condition and are undesirable to be 
around. 
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1.2. My aims for the study 
 
The researcher aims to explore people’s experiences of emotional suffering 
that is subsequently diagnosed as depression. Depression diagnoses will be 
acknowledged in participants, with the aim of exploring how pre-diagnosed 
depression experiences play themselves out and how people’s lives are affected 
as a result. 
 
This research aims to capture and explore what goes on for people emotionally 
when they are experiencing the distress that is subsequently diagnosed as 
depression. It aims to chart the experiential journey from the time of realizing 
something is not quite right until the diagnosis of depression. It also looks at how 
people make sense of feelings they experience during this period, as well as 
investigating the extent to which the onset of the participants’ emotional distress 
was associated with any significant life changes or events. 
 
It has been noted by Jorn (2000) that the vast majority of the public do not link 
feelings of personal distress to a possible episode of a depression diagnosis and 
are unaware of the impact such distress can have on their mood and life situation. 
One of the aims of this research is to explore and reveal the impact emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression has on people’s moods, life 
situations and experiences. 
 
Lauber, Nordt, Falcato & Rossler (2003) state that not much is known about 
psychological disorders in the public domain and that there is a related need to 
increase mental health literacy. Much research has focused on triggers, causes 
and treatment-seeking behaviours in distress categorized as depression 
(Carragher et al., 2010; Lauber, Falcato, Nordt & Rossler, 2003). Jorm, Griffiths 
& Christensen (2003) state that there is a considerable lack of information 
regarding patients’ own understanding and experience of emotional distress. This 
research aims to fill this gap in the literature by bringing into focus patients’ 
experiences of emotional distress and the meanings people might use to make 
sense of it.  
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1.3. Between disorder and experience 
 
Misery and unhappiness are terms that have been used to describe the human 
condition, which in modern times is categorized as depression. There is still great 
debate as to whether the term depression describes difficulties individuals have 
with living their lives in certain circumstances or whether it is a physical illness 
with physical symptoms, which are accompanied by emotional and 
psychological ones. Gerome Wakefield (1992) believes that disorder lies on the 
boundary between the actual natural world and the constructed social world, 
claiming that a disorder exists when the failure of a person's ability to perform 
harms the person's well-being as defined by social values and meanings. 
According to Wakefield (1992) this disorder is simultaneously biological and 
social and neither alone is sufficient to justify the label. He suggests that for 
something to be an illness it cannot be explained by life circumstances alone. 
There must be an internal factor as in the case of Alzheimer’s, which is not 
environment related.  
 
1.4. Sadness and worry 
 
Most of us feel unbearably sad or tend to worry and ruminate at certain points 
in our lives. We experience distressing emotions of grief, regret or loss and are 
tearful.  Some may even describe the world as grey, tiresome, dull, flat and 
lonely. In her book, Depression, The Way Out Of Your Prison, Rowe (1983) 
likens the peculiar isolation people feel when they are emotionally distressed to 
being in a prison. Linked to this is a persistent feeling of detachment. Some have 
even described feeling separated from the outside world, as if they are watching 
life on a television screen or as if there is a plastic screen between themselves 
and the rest of the world. Some describe feeling emotionally disconnected from 
other people, a form of detachment that engenders terrible feelings of isolation.  
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Those experiences of emotional distress, such as feelings of sadness, are not 
unlike the normal feelings of unhappiness experienced by most people from time 
to time. Worry, too, is common. Everyone worries to some extent. Statistics now 
show that 38 per cent of people worry every day. Whilst worry is the central 
ingredient in all the anxiety disorders it is also a central component in distress 
categorized as depression (Lehay, 2005). Moreover, patients diagnosed with 
comorbid symptoms of anxiety and depression are common in clinical practice 
and continue to pose a diagnostic and therapeutic challenge to clinicians and 
researchers alike (Barbee, 1998). Those suffering emotional distress tend to 
worry and ruminate about things that are beyond their control.  
 
The researcher has often heard clients say things like “I cannot stop obsessing 
about this and I can’t understand why”. Do people ruminate because they are 
emotionally distressed or are they suffering emotionally because they ruminate? 
We find ourselves wondering what comes first. It seems that people have a 
greater propensity to worry and ruminate about such things when they are feeling 
unhappy, miserable or low. Indeed Smith, Lauren, Alloy & Abramison (2006) 
found that rumination and hopelessness were found to predict the presence of 
suicidal thinking.  
 
The ongoing worry and rumination experienced by intrusive and obsessional 
thoughts are often the complaint of non-psychotic patients who are given the 
diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  Thoughts may vary from 
trivial memories to fears about violating social norms, to the self-critical 
automatic thoughts of the emotionally distressed person (Bentall, 2004). 
Common to these thoughts is the fact they are unwanted and impossible to expel 
from the mind. The presence of repetitive intrusive cognitive phenomena is 
central both to a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder - typically as 
obsessive thoughts - and to a diagnosis of depression - typically as ruminative 
thoughts (Wahl et al., 2011).  
 
Beck cites unwanted and intrusive thoughts as a symptomatic of a depression 
diagnosis in his inventory and DSM-IV-TR (2000) also makes reference to 
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ruminations. Hoeksema (2003) coined the term ‘overthinking’ to describe the 
experience of being caught in a torrent of negative thoughts and emotions that 
overwhelm individuals and interfere with functioning and well being.  
 
As Cromby, Harper & Reavey (2013) note, sadness and worry are everyday 
words that depict feelings of transient emotional and psychological distress. 
When this distress is ongoing, distracting and disturbing to individuals, they tend 
to become diagnosed as suffering from anxiety or depression and are 
consequently subject to clinical and therapeutic interventions. It is interesting to 
note that individual experience of emotional distress diagnosed as depression and 
possible recovery might be different in the absence of a 21st century diagnosis 
with its psychological and pharmacological interventions.  
 
It is evident that those who experience ongoing sadness and worry for which 
they seek professional help or receive a diagnosis of depression are suffering at a 
more distressing and all-consuming level than someone who feels these things in 
a transient manner. For those who experience pervasive and persistent sadness or 
excessive worry, trying to identify the cause for their distress can be itself a 
confusing experience which may contribute further to their suffering.  
 
It seems that those who are bewildered by the ongoing presence of sadness and 
worry are the ones who are most likely to present to the health services and end 
up with a depression diagnosis. Smail (1993) observed that those who suffer 
profound, unexplained sadness and worry are most likely to be the ones who 
present to the mental health service for help.  
 
The researcher’s experience as a counselling psychologist in private practice has 
exposed her to individuals presenting with distressing levels of sadness and 
worry, which they cannot explain. They simply cannot attribute their low mood 
to anything in particular. They may say things like “I just woke up one morning 
feeling terrible and it just got worse and worse” or “I don’t feel I am the person I 
used to be and I don’t know why”. 
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1.5. Sadness and worry in history and culture  
 
Most would agree that whilst feelings of sadness and worry do not make a 
positive contribution to the well being of individuals, these feelings do have a 
purpose in life. For example, worry makes one aware of a possible threat, which 
may elicit caution in the presence of danger. Similarly, sadness encourages us to 
withdraw and disengage which may assist in managing and adapting to changes 
in social status (Cromby, Harper & Reavey 2013). There appear to be reasons 
why our biological systems are capable of inducing these experiences in us 
(Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013). 
 
The Bible, the Koran and the ancient Greeks all made references to 
experiences of emotional suffering. Shakespeare’s play Macbeth contains 
agitation, insomnia and guilt, not to mention the compulsive hand-washing of 
Lady Macbeth, an accomplice in the King’s murder, just weeks after he is killed 
(Cromby et al., 2013). 
 
In the Middle Ages monks were sometimes known to suffer from a condition 
called accidie, which consisted of feelings of boredom, misery and disgust. This 
was attributed to a loss of faith in God and the abandonment of their duties 
(Harre & Finlay-Jones, 1986). Though these signs of distress were not 
recognized as symptoms of psychological disorders in the way that they are 
today, it is clear that they were observed and the characteristics of emotional 
suffering noted. As Rowe (1983) has stated: “depression is as old as the human 
race, and rare is the person who has not felt its touch”. Though the emotions of 
sadness, misery, agitation and worry have been evident and noted from time 
immemorial, our understanding, experience and interpretation of them have 
changed a great deal.  
 
In his book Hysteria, Andrew Scull (2009) describes how, in the 19th century, 
many women were diagnosed with ‘hysteria’, derived from the Greek word for 
the womb. In the 20th century most doctors agreed that hysteria was a 
psychological disorder described as an affliction of the mind expressed through a 
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disturbance of the body. Prior to that, it had for centuries been recognized as a 
purely somatic disorder. The majority of patients were women and the illness 
was associated with female biology and resulted in gruesome treatments 
including clitoridectomy. This formerly recognized condition has now vanished 
and is not seen in modern-day psychiatric texts. It later came to be reclassified as 
post-traumatic stress disorder and was seen as a problem for weak men in 
wartime. The disease labelled hysteria has undergone a compelling cultural and 
historical change.  
 
The psychiatric notion of emotional suffering categorized as depression, used 
to be split between melancholia, a form of lunacy, and neurasthenia, the suffering 
of nervous exhaustion. In the 19th century mopishness was a form of 
melancholia attributed to the lower classes (Mac Donald, 1981). A diagnosis of 
depression as a unitary term for emotional suffering came after the demise of 
melancholia, neurasthenia and mopishness. 
 
Interestingly, neurasthenia is still a recognized condition in China and its 
symptoms include headaches, backache, muscular weakness, fatigue, noise in the 
ears, irritability, difficulty concentrating, hopelessness, morbid fears, phobias, 
dizziness, insomnia, poor appetite, indigestion and sweating. This reflects the 
cultural differences in our understanding of the relationship between somatic 
illness and distress diagnosed as depression (Cromby et al., 2013). Though 
neurasthenia as diagnosed in China includes symptoms of sadness and worry, the 
predominant symptoms appear to be of a physical nature.  
 
It has been found that not many people are diagnosed with depression in China 
but that those diagnosed with neurasthenia describe symptoms that mirror a 
diagnosis of depression. Kleinman (1986) found that diagnoses of depression 
were rarely given in China. Out of the 100 people who participated in his 
research in China who had been diagnosed with neurasthenia, 87 met the criteria 
for major depressive disorder. In addition, it was found that those suffering from 
neurasthenia also displayed symptoms of anxiety disorders as defined by DSM-
IV-TR (2000) (Cromby et al., 2013). 
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Kleinman (1986) proposed that western cultures tend to emphasize the 
cognitive aspects of sadness and worry. He distinguished between the notion of a 
disease, a condition that is biological and ongoing, and an illness, which may be 
more culturally shaped. He proposed that it was more beneficial to work with an 
illness than a disease, perhaps because the term illness denotes a more general 
state of poor health, which, unlike a specific disease, involves the subjective 
experience and perception of the sufferer. This more subjective and philosophical 
take on sadness and worry is pertinent to this research, which will be exploring 
people’s experiences of emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as the 
psychological disorder depression, a western objectively defined disease. 
 
An important thing to consider in the differences of experience and 
presentation is the influence of cultural legitimacies, values, expectations and 
even language. Claims for the universality of emotional distress categorized as 
depression have consequently been challenged by those who point out that the 
concept and language to describe it does not exist in many non-western cultures 
(CRE, 1993). 
 
The West is well known for its commitment to dualism whereas other cultures 
may be less likely to separate mind and body in their approach to illness. 
However, according to Rowe (1983), distress diagnosed as depression is a 
profound, emotional experience and this upsets the body’s functioning. She 
suggests that every emotion, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant, is accompanied 
by physical changes, which become more profound as the emotions persist. For 
example she notes that emotionally distressed people are more prone to catching 
colds and flu. She also points to the fact that some women feel distress in the 
lead up to menstruation. Mind and body, even if they can be theoretically 
separated, clearly do work together.  
 
Overall, it seems that the emotional suffering of sadness and worry has both 
historical and cross-cultural variations and this suggests that the character, 
meaning and distribution of sadness and worry can vary a great deal. This 
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research will explore the variation that exists across individual experiences of 
emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. 
 
1. 6. Diagnosis 
 
We have a modern system of classifications such as DSM-IV-TR (2000) and 
various theories and these will be listed below. Distress categorized as 
depression has been described by the medical model of DSM-IV-TR (2000) as 
five or more of the following symptoms being present during the same two-week 
period and representing a change from previous functioning. At least one of the 
symptoms must be either distressed mood or loss of interest in pleasure.  
 
            (A) 
• Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by 
either subjective report (e.g. feels sad or empty) or observation made by 
others (e.g. appears tearful). Note: In children and adolescents, can be 
irritable mood.  
• Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, 
activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either 
subjective account or observation made by others.  
• Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g. a 
change of more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or 
increase in appetite nearly every day. Note: In children, consider failure 
to make expected weight gains.  
• Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
• Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable 
by others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down). 
• Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
• Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which 
may be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt 
about being sick). 
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• Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly 
every day (either by subjective account or as observed by others). 
• Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent 
suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific 
plan for committing suicide. 
 
(B) The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode. (C) The 
symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning. (D) The symptoms are not 
due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g. a drug of abuse, a 
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g. hypothyroidism). (E) The 
symptoms are not better accounted for by bereavement, i.e. after the loss of a 
loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months or are characterized by 
marked functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, 
suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms or psychomotor retardation. (Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition, American Psychiatric 
Association).  
 
A fifth version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the 
American Psychiatric Association, or DSM-5 was published in 2013. A notable 
change from DSM IV was made regarding the ‘bereavement exclusion’.  Using 
DSM IV clinicians were urged to not to diagnose emotional distress as major 
depression in those individuals in their first 2 months suffering the loss of a 
loved one. This meant that grief was in a sense protected from major depression 
diagnosis. This bereavement exclusion has now been removed supposedly 
helping prevent a diagnosis of major depression from being overlooked.   
 
   This bereavement exclusion was removed from DSM-5 for several reasons. 
Namely, because of the suggestion that grief of loss of a loved one only lasts 2 
months when in fact bereavement counsellors and physicians claim it is more 
like 1-2 years, and as bereavement is recognsied as a precipitator of a depression 
diagnosis in vulnerable individuals, with the potential to begin soon after the 
loss. Moreover, when a diagnosis of major depressive disorder occurs in the 
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context of bereavement it  
adds an additional risk for emotional suffering and the prognosis is worse 
compared to bereavement alone. Such bereavement related distress diagnosed as 
depression is more likely to manifest in individuals with past personal and family 
histories of major depressive diagnoses.  Finally, the emotionally distressing 
experiences associated with bereavement may be alleviated with anti depressant 
treatment (Perper, 2013).  
 
  There is a concern that this removal could lead to pathologising normal grief 
and over diagnosing such appropriate distress as depression. There has been 
much controversy about this. There is however now more guidance in DSM-5- 
on how to separate normal bereavement from emotional distress diagnosed as 
depression. Ultimately, DSM-5- aims to provide a depression diagnosis for those 
deemed in need of one and no diagnosis for those who are supposedly not in 
need of treatment but appropriately sad grieving the loss of their loved one 
(Perper, 2013).   
       
 
  A diagnosis of depression can be mild, moderate, severe and psychotic. It can 
be deeply rooted in early developmental stages where there has been emotional 
deprivation or abandonment; it can be a reaction to stress or life events in which 
case it can be referred to as an adjustment disorder, plus there is evidence too 
suggest it can be a biological illness. All these theories will be considered and 
evaluated later on in this introduction. 
 
DSM- IV-TR (2000) claims to be purely descriptive and atheoretical, not 
relying on concepts that have their origins in pre-existing theories. For example it 
eschews a term such as ‘neurosis’ originated in psychoanalytic theory. DSM- IV-
TR (2000) claims to be a set of descriptions observed by clinicians. Related 
disorders are then suggested by panels of experts subject to consultation before 
being accepted and incorporated into the manual by a central committee.  
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    It has however been argued that DSM- IV-TR is far from being unbiased and 
impartial and that it furthers and supports the interest of the psychiatry profession 
as well as pharmaceutical and insurance companies, where a diagnosis is often 
needed to reclaim costs of treatment. A further concern is that DSM- IV-TR has 
medicalised everyday life by encouraging people to classify daily problems and 
tensions such as shyness as ‘symptoms’ of ‘illness’ such as social anxiety 
disorder that requires ‘treatment’ (Cromby, Harper & Reavey 2013).   
 
 
    Can clinicians reach the same diagnosis consistently using the same diagnostic 
procedures? Reliability and validity have both been proven difficult to achieve 
(Carson & Butcher, 1992). The difficulty is encapsulated in the concept that 
subjective judgments, upon which diagnostic criteria are based, do not yield high 
levels of reliability. Unified agreement on diagnosis is also challenging for 
clinicians. For example, it has been found that clinicians only agree on a broad 
diagnostic category such as ‘personality disorder’ about 50% of the time (Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1994).  
 
There is also uncertainty regarding the strength of validity in relation to 
diagnosis.  Validity of diagnosis refers to receiving the correct diagnosis. This 
should result in the correct treatment and prognosis, known as predictive validity, 
which presupposes reliability of diagnosis.  Due to the subjective nature of 
diagnosis it is much harder to give an accurate diagnosis and prognosis to a 
psychological disorder than physical because of lacking objective signs.  It can 
be hard to make a valid diagnosis as some people have different experiences of 
distress linked to different psychiatric disorders.  The National co-Morbidity 
Survey in the USA discovered that over 50% of people with one diagnosis also 
qualify for at least one other diagnosis whilst 23% are assigned three of more 
diagnosis (Kessler et al, 2005).   
 
Overall, it seems the arbitrary nature of the manner in which emotionally 
distressing experiences, otherwise known as ‘symptoms’, are clustered into 
categories and diagnostic criteria are profoundly problematic.  One might argue 
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that psychiatry is too quick to classify anything but routine happiness as a mental 
disorder.   
 
1.7. Theories of distress categorized as depression 
 
 Various theories of emotional distress have been postulated, some of which are 
outlined below and are widely accepted. They include: the biological model 
(Pinel, 1997) which states that emotional distress diagnosed as depression is a 
result of a chemical imbalance in the brain and can be genetically inherited; the 
cognitive model (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) which proposes that such 
suffering is triggered by negative attitudes and beliefs that are shaped in 
childhood; the psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1917) postulates that loss of a 
significant person (such as a parent) or the withdrawal of love and affection at an 
early age can cause someone to experience emotional distress later on in life; the 
interpersonal theory (Sullivan, 1953) which emphasizes the importance of good 
connections and strong relationships in life and links distress to a lack of these; 
the social model (Bandura, 1977) which suggests that a lack of positive 
reinforcement from others evokes a negative self-evaluation accompanied by 
feelings of hopelessness; and, the learned helplessness model (Seligman, 1975) 
which argues that a perceived absence of control over situations triggers distress 
categorized as depression in some individuals. With the exception of the 
biological model the theories outlined below suggest that emotional distress is a 
result of environmental factors. They point towards social experiences people 
undergo that shape and maintain emotional suffering. The biological model 
however points to the chemical and neurological triggers in experiences of 
emotional distress.  
 
1.7.1. The biological model   
 
Biological factors have been thought to play a role in emotional distress since 
the 1970s. Experiences of distress are indeed both psychological and physical. 
Standardized depression measures enquire about both somatic and cognitive 
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elements of emotional suffering. Recognized somatic symptoms include weight 
loss, sleep disturbance and changes in appetite as stated in DSM-IV-TR (2000). 
These symptoms reflect some sort of biological dysfunction and neurobiological 
differences in brain structures such as increases in the volume of the amygdala 
(Roozendal, 2009) and decreases in the volume of the hippocampus (Campbell, 
2004). 
 
  Numerous studies comparing antidepressants to placebos in controlled blind 
trials report effectiveness in the reduction of emotional distress to be between 50 
and 70 per cent, which is 20 to 40 per cent higher than it is for placebos (Thase & 
Kupfer, 1996). Current guidelines recommend antidepressant treatment for 
people with a diagnosis of moderate to severe depression (National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence, 2004a) and these guidelines are based upon 
placebo-controlled studies indicating that antidepressants are superior to placebo 
in combating symptoms of distress categorized as depression. 
  
  For many physical illnesses there is sound evidence of cause and sometimes 
specific biological pathways have been identified. However, for psychological 
illness the evidence is not so strong. According to neurobiological theory, a 
serotonin deficiency in the brain causes experiences that come to be diagnosed as 
depression; similarly, emotional distress has been successfully treated with 
serotonin-boosting drugs such as Prozac and other serotonin selective reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs).  
 
However, it is not clear if increased serotonin levels are responsible for 
eradicating such experiences or are a consequence of their remission. 
Furthermore, some studies have found no significant difference in serotonin 
levels between people diagnosed with depression and controls (Meyer et al., 
2004) while others have even found significantly increased serotonin activity in 
those with a depression diagnosis. (Parsey et al., 2006; Reivich, Amsterdam, 
Brunswick, Shiue, 2004).  
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  Distress categorized as depression has also been linked to thyroid problems 
(Hage & Azar, 2011) and premenstrual syndrome and menopause (Freeman, 
Sammel, Lin & Nelson, 2006) indicating a possible link between distress and 
hormones. The fact that today many people are also successfully treated for 
emotional suffering with hormonal drugs lends support to the belief that its 
origins can be biological.   
 
A theory outlined by Cantopher (2012) provides clear evidence as to how 
biological aspects of emotional distress manifest and how life experiences 
interact with them.  According to Cantopher the limbic system controls many of 
the body’s processes such as sleep/waking cycles, temperature control, temper 
control, eating patterns and hormones; every hormone in the body is directly or 
indirectly under the control of the limbic system which keeps all of these 
functions in balance with each other. The limbic system is a reverberating circuit 
and in addition to controlling all functions its most important role is to control 
mood.   
 
A mood is generally stable and returns to normal quite quickly after life’s 
various ups and downs.  If someone wins a million pounds on the lottery that 
mood will rise for a few days and then return to normal with occasional peaks, 
mostly within the first few weeks after the win. However, a few weeks later the 
mood could be no different than how it was before this life-changing event 
occurred. This is an example of how mood is subject to control by the limbic 
system. The limbic system can thus be likened to a ‘mood thermostat’. However, 
like every other system and structure in the body it has a limit and can break.  
Factors such as viral illness, hormonal conditions, illicit drugs, excessive alcohol 
consumption and major life stresses or changes may bring about a disruption of 
the limbic system. The most common trigger, however, is stress. If the limbic 
system is taken beyond its design limits it will malfunction and the balance of 
transmitter chemicals in the brain such as serotonin is disrupted. When the limbic 
system malfunctions a characteristic set of experiences of distress arise often 
referred to by psychiatrists as symptoms of clinical depression  (Cantopher, 
2012).  
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 Cantopher’s theory demonstrates how biology interacts with life events and 
stressors. If correct then it would seem reasonable to conclude that biology plays 
some part in emotional distress but does not fully provide an explanation for it.  
Despite the fact that, as mentioned earlier, some people diagnosed with 
depression do not show changes in serotonin levels, it appears that life stresses 
and events have the ability to impact on the way the brain functions. It seems that 
whilst biology is not irrelevant to emotional distress, it may not be the primary 
cause of distress. It may be that our biology enables us to feel emotional distress 
rather than simply causing it.  
 
Having debated the influence of biological factors in emotional distress in 
more detail the researcher will now proceed to consider social influences in 
emotional distress. Environmental differences that have been identified 
repeatedly in a wealth of research include relational/social influences, early 
experiences, trauma and abuse. In particular the influence of family relationships 
has been linked to various forms of emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as 
depression, eating disorders and borderline personality disorder.   
 
1.7.2. The social learning and attachment theory 
 
Social learning theory models of human development emphasize the 
importance of early childhood experiences in the family environment. People 
given a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder are often seen as having a 
failure of early attachments leading to a life long difficulty in regulating 
emotions and forming stable relationships (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006).  
 
Evidence for the importance of family dynamics as a contributing factor in 
emotional suffering also comes from attachment theory.  The child psychologist 
Bowlby described how the effects of leaving a child for long periods without its 
mother were initially weepiness and withdrawal and, later, retardation of 
development and poor relationships with peers. He also claims that these 
children would often grow into adulthood feeling anxious, excessively needing 
love and attention, tending to feelings of anger and vengeance thereby becoming 
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prone to feelings of guilt and other experiences associated with a diagnosis of 
depression.  He argued that in such cases these children had been deprived of a 
need for attachment, which he described as an evolutionary need, keeping infants 
close to their mother for protection in a hostile environment.  It has however 
since been noted that children can manage quite well as long as they have a 
central, reliable and protective figure, whether this be the mother or someone 
else (Cantopher, 2012).  
 
Bowlby suggests that those children who are insecurely attached may be more 
likely to experience self-criticism, feelings of abandonment, hopelessness and 
helplessness and related depressive symptoms. There is a considerable body of 
empirical work validating Bowlby’s ideas about attachment security in infants 
and its consequences for healthy or maladaptive development (Blatt & Homann, 
1992). 
 
The cognitive social learning model proposes that adaptive skills and 
cognitions are learned during childhood and states that parent-child interactions 
that lead to the child’s acquisition of dysfunctional self-schemas or negative 
explanatory styles set the stage for vulnerability to distress diagnosed as 
depression in the face of stress. The modeling of emotionally distressed parents’ 
views of the self or world may enhance the cognitive vulnerability to experience 
such distress under trying circumstances (Hammen, 1998).  
 
A considerable body of research indicates that the effects of social support 
cushion the ill effects of stressful life events (Paykel & Cooper, 1992; Billing & 
Moos, 1985; Kessler & Mc Leod, 1985; Swindel, Cronkite & Moos, 1989) and 
this lends support to the theory that difficult social relationships or a lack of them 
can be significant contributing and maintaining factors to a diagnosis of 
depression. 
 
Studies of non-human primates permitting experimental control over mother-
infant separation and quality of care have provided clear evidence of the 
importance of mother-infant attachment to healthy development as mentioned 
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above (Suomi, 1991a). It was also found by Brewin, Firth-Cozens, Furnham & 
Mc Manus (1992) that recollections of inadequate parenting were often 
associated with self-critical tendencies and that such cognitions might predispose 
someone to depressive reactions.  
 
Relational difficulties are also central to distress, which is later diagnosed as 
depression and impact negatively on those around them (Hammen, 1998). A 
variety of controlled, simulated laboratory experiments documented that 
interacting with an emotionally distressed person often gives rise to negative 
emotional reactions in the other persons (Gotlib & Beaty, 1985), lending support 
to the notion that people’s feelings can be transmitted to those around them. Such 
distress disrupts relationships, which can in turn potentially exacerbate emotional 
suffering.  
 
1.7.3. The psychodynamic theory 
 
The psychodynamic model of distress diagnosed as depression was the 
dominant theory within psychiatry during the first part of the 20th century. The 
emphasis on the role of loss in emotional suffering similar to that of bereavement 
led in turn to Object Relations Theory (ORT). The loss of an important object is 
central to ORT, which suggests that the early experience of loss of an important 
person not only triggers sadness and mourning but also self-deprecation, guilt 
and anger turned inwards plus related distress experiences cited as symptoms of 
the depression syndrome (Hammen, 1998). 
 
  Studies have revealed that there are significant associations between early loss 
and later distress categorized as depression (Lloyd, 1980). However, later studies 
conducted by Harris, Brown & Bifulco (1986) revealed that it was not so much 
early loss of a caregiver that created a vulnerability to emotional suffering but 
rather the quality and the consistency of the care after the loss. Lack of such care 
was recognized to be a trigger for vulnerability to a diagnosis of depression 
rather than the loss itself. 
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  Though CBT has become the most popular method of therapy for treatment of 
emotional distress, a study conducted by Taylor (2008) showed that the benefits 
of short-term psychodynamic therapies are equivalent to the effects of 
antidepressants and CBT, and that whilst the benefits of CBT may occur more 
quickly, those benefits of short-term psychodynamic therapies may continue to 
increase after treatment.  
 
1.7.4. The interpersonal theory 
 
Interpersonal Therapy (IPT) has success rates for emotional distress diagnosed 
as depression founded on the assumption that emotional suffering can result from 
and lead to difficulties in the interpersonal relationships among persons 
diagnosed with depression and their significant others. The therapy aims to 
alleviate the experiences of emotional distress by improving interpersonal 
functioning through clarification, refocusing and the renegotiating of the 
interpersonal context linked to the onset of the diagnosed depression (Weissman 
& Klerman, 1990).  
 
  A study conducted by Parker & Fletcher (2007) comparing IPT and CBT 
approaches found that both therapies were effective treatments and that CBT was 
a more effective treatment for a diagnosis of severe depression. However, a study 
conducted by Freeman & Power (2007) set out to compare the efficacy of both 
treatments in people receiving outpatient treatment for diagnosed depression and 
found that both IPT and CBT were both equally effective, suggesting that the 
supportive nature of the therapy and the therapeutic relationship have a 
substantial effect on the outcome of the treatment of emotional distress.  
 
1.7.5. The learned helplessness theory 
 
It was observed by Seligman (1975) that animals subjected to uncontrollable 
aversive conditions failed to take action to escape such situations even when it 
was within their power to do so. This is because they had learned to be helpless. 
Seligman suggested that the same processes are at play in human emotional 
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distress, thereby proposing that if someone does not have control over a 
situation, for example, by being able to obtain a desirable outcome or preventing 
an unwanted one, they will fail to act at some later stage even when it is within 
their power to do so and may consequently suffer emotional distress leading to a 
diagnosis of depression.  
 
Research on the cognitive theory of emotional distress categorised as 
depression has shown that people who are suffering emotionally are particularly 
prone to struggle with feelings of hopelessness and helplessness (Sacco & Beck, 
1995). A sense of hopelessness reflects a negative view of the future, which 
includes expectations of personal dissatisfaction, failure and a continuation of 
pain and difficulty; ultimately it is a belief that nothing will get better.  
 
Feelings of helplessness reflect a negative view of the self.  Emotionally 
distressed individuals view themselves more negatively, their self-esteem suffers 
and consequently they have little or no self-confidence. They do not believe they 
have any control or that they can help themselves to feel better, resulting in an 
urge to give up on life.  
 
1.7.6. The cognitive theory 
 
Beck’s well known and widely recognised cognitive theory of emotional 
suffering diagnosed as depression (Beck et al., 1979) suggests that early 
childhood experiences shape the development of long-term dysfunctional 
attitudes, perceptions and beliefs about the self, the world and the future. As a 
result a negative triad of beliefs of a worthless self, perceptions of the world as 
unfair and feelings of hopelessness about the future. Beck proposed that enduring 
dysfunctional attitudes shaped in an individual’s early years can lie dormant for 
years and can subsequently become activated in times of stress or life difficulty. 
 
Beck emphasized the following dysfunctional thinking styles in emotional 
distress: unhelpful thought processes such as dichotomous, all-or-nothing 
thinking, where people tend to think in rigid black and white terms; filtering, 
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when one magnifies the negative details in a situation and filters out the positive; 
emotional reasoning, where one concludes that because one feels something it 
must be true; personalisation, thinking that everything people say or do is some 
kind of reaction to them as a person; and, catastrophizing, whereby one fears in 
many situations the worst possible scenario. 
 
In addition he emphasized how one’s negative thoughts influence behaviour. 
For example, if an individual believes they are stupid and boring, this may affect 
their behaviour and they may withdraw socially because of this; this social 
isolation may in turn lead to maintained or increased feelings of emotional 
distress. He concluded that dysfunctional thinking styles both triggered and 
maintained emotional suffering in those who are predisposed to it.  
 
The aim of cognitive therapy is to help the client develop more positive, if not 
realistic, thoughts and beliefs about themselves, others and the surrounding 
world. This can be done through Socratic questioning where the therapist 
encourages the client to question, challenge and modify unhelpful beliefs about 
themselves and their worlds. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is a 
structured and goal-directed therapy (Gilbert, 2009). 
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence for Beck’s cognitive theory of emotional 
distress categorised as depression is the success rate of CBT, now recognised by 
the current National Institute for Clinical Health and Excellence (NICE) 
guidelines as one of the most effective psychological treatments for a diagnosis 
of depression. The efficacy of cognitive therapy for such distress is well 
established, as can be attested in several outcome studies and reviews (Williams, 
1992; Blackburn, 1998; Stravynski & Greenberg, 1992) and meta-analytic 
studies (Dobson, 1989; Robinson, Berman & Neimeyer, 1990). Moreover, a 
recent study conducted by Brothers, Yang, Andersen & Stunk (2011) found that 
distress categorised as depressive symptoms in cancer survivors receiving CBT 
intervention declined significantly, as demonstrated using intent-to-treat 
analyses. Change was evident on both self-reported and interviewer-rated 
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measures of those distressing experiences and accepted indicators of clinical 
change.  
 
There is limited literature providing evidence against Beck’s cognitive theory 
of emotional distress. Perhaps the most compelling is a study conducted by 
Persons & Miranda (1992), which found that dysfunctional thoughts in 
individuals diagnosed with depression tended to remit as the emotional distress 
remits. This contradicted the belief that negative schemas are stable cognitive 
structures and suggested that negative thinking styles might be the manifestations 
rather than the causes of distress.  
 
Furthermore, a randomized trial of behavioural activation, cognitive therapy 
and antidepressant treatment in the acute treatment of adults with a major 
depression diagnosis found that the effects of cognitive therapy were not 
significantly different to placebo in treating a diagnosis of depression (Dimidjian 
et al, 2006).  
     
A study conducted by Longmore & Worrell (2007) found little evidence that 
specific cognitive interventions significantly increase the effectiveness of therapy 
and little empirical support for the role of cognitive change as causal in the 
symptomatic improvements achieved in CBT. Furthermore, Hayes (2004) found 
that CBT treatment is often associated with a rapid, early improvement in 
symptoms that most likely occurs before the implementation of any distinctive 
cognitive techniques and that changes in cognitive mediators (the thoughts and 
beliefs held by the cognitive model to underpin disorder) do not seem to precede 
any improvements in symptoms.  
 
Like other facets of human experience, causality in emotional suffering is 
various, intricate and over-determined.  Research and clinical experience have 
indicated that there are many interacting causal factors of cause in emotional 
distress, some of which have been outlined above. As noted by Cromby, Harper 
& Reavey (2013) the causation involved in emotional suffering is not as 
straightforward as that which occurs between the molecules in a test tube. To 
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explore and comprehend causal influences in distress we need to recognize that 
these causes will not operate in a straight forwardly mechanical fashion but 
collectively reflect the multitude or the factors that influence our lives.  The 
open-ended and often unforeseeable nature of the world allows the causal factors 
in emotional distress to operate in an unpredictable manner in such a way that 
any one influence on distress has the potential to trigger other influences in 
surprising and unexpected ways. There are many possible influences on distress 
each of which has the potential to trigger other influences in different ways.   
 
All the models of emotional distress, outlined in this thesis are meaningful in 
various ways to different people. After reviewing them the reader may feel an 
understandable uncertainty as to whether emotional distress is biological or 
social.  The non- biological theories point to environmental influences in the 
onset and maintenance.  It has been noted that clear and non-controversial 
evidence for primary biological causes of emotional distress (in the form of well 
designed, high quality reliable and valid studies) are hard to find (Cromby, 
Harper & Reavey, 2013).  As mentioned when outlining the biological theory, 
despite evidence supporting a serotonin deficiency in emotional suffering, there 
is also evidence to the contrary.  Whilst some studies have found reduced 
serotonin activity at relevant receptors (Sargent et al, 2000) some studies have 
found no significant differences between those diagnosed with depression and 
controls (Meyer et al, 2004). Moreover, some studies have found considerable 
increased serotonin activity in patients diagnosed with depression (Parsey et al, 
2006 & Reivich, Amsterdam, Brunswick & Yannshiue, 2004).  This might imply 
that low levels of serotonin are not a necessary or sufficient cause associated 
with a diagnosis of depression.   
 
Although there is a substantial body of psychiatric theory that claims that 
emotional distress is caused by biological influences, the distinction between 
functional and organic diagnosis is important. Depression, anxiety and other 
psychiatric diagnoses are recognsied to be functional in contrast to those where 
there is a biological cause (Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013). In those cases 
where a biological cause of dysfunction has been demonstrated, as in dementia or 
syphilis, the diagnosis is deemed to be organic.  
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The former adheres to behaviour deemed to be dysfunctional with no proven 
corresponding organic basis and the latter to conditions where a biological 
influence of dysfunction has been demonstrated. Depression, anxiety and many 
other psychiatric diagnoses are recognsied to be functional in contrast to those 
where there is a biological cause (Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013). 
 
Perhaps it is relevant to distinguish between necessary causes and sufficient 
causes. Necessary causes are those influences or events that must be present for a 
specific outcome. For example, if a serotonin deficiency were a necessary cause 
of emotional distress only those with this deficiency would become emotionally 
distressed. Sufficient causes on the other hand are influences or events that do 
not have to be present to cause emotional suffering but always result in such 
suffering if they are present. Therefore, if a certain sort of trauma were a 
sufficient cause of emotional distress then everyone who experienced such a 
trauma would become emotionally distressed.  It would not follow from this  
that everyone who is distressed would have to suffer the trauma in question.  
 
It may be more appropriate to suggest that biological factors rather than being 
necessary or sufficient causes, are germane to emotional suffering and not the 
main cause. None of the stated biological features such as increase in volume of 
the amygdala or serotonin levels or decrease in volume of the hippocampus are 
present in every person given a diagnosis of depression. They are therefore not 
necessary causes. Nevertheless, some of these features have been observed in 
people who have not received a depression diagnosis. Hence they are not 
sufficient causes either. For most common illness in physical medicine there is 
good evidence specific biological pathways have been recognized, their 
functions identified and effective relevant medical treatments are evidence based. 
However, for a depression diagnosis this is not the case. There are no precise 
links between particular types of distress and specific biological components. 
There is only a great mass of inconsistent evidence with no certain links between 
biological features and diagnosis (Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013).  
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This explains why there are currently no blood tests, brain scan, or different 
objective diagnostic procedures that can recognize, endorse or reject a depression 
diagnosis. Such a diagnosis is detected through interview and observation 
involving self-reports of experience and expert assessment of mood and 
behaviour. In light of all this it seems reasonable to conclude that biology plays 
some part in emotional distress while not fully providing an explanation for it. 
One might conclude that our biology enables us to feel distress and that our brain 
structures and process can reflect this when it happens.   
 
In conclusion it would appear that none of these causal influences are 
necessary or sufficient causes of emotional suffering as none of them appear in 
every case and none them always result in emotional distress subsequently 
diagnosed as depression.  There appear to be many ways in which social and 
biological influences play their part and their influences are always conditional 
and mediated by other influences. It would be extremely hard to foresee that 
someone would experience emotional distress as a result of his or her socio-
economic status, gender, ethnicity and family history.  The conclusion therefore 
must be that there is no easy answer as to what causes emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression.  
 
 1.8. Background perspectives relevant to this research 
 
As a counselling psychologist who has worked with distressed individuals, the 
researcher has observed how some view their personal distress as a transitory 
phase whilst others seem to view their confusion and uncertainty as permanent 
conditions. For some, emotional suffering seems to persist despite all the best 
therapeutic and medical treatment available; whilst for others as little as eight 
psychological counselling sessions successfully eradicates the distress.   
 
Although long-term severe emotional suffering is generally harder to 
overcome and treat than mild distress, the researcher has in her own practice seen 
people suffering from severe distress recover at the same pace as milder 
sufferer’s. Attitude, personality, social support and life satisfaction may play a 
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part in the recovery process; alternatively, there may be something not yet 
identified that enhances some individual’s recovery. Is it an illness for some and 
a transformative period for others? Might the idea that it is a transformative 
period itself be an aspect of emotional distress, one that could lead some down a 
self-destructive path motivated by a desire to make great changes in their lives 
they may later regret? Or could the emotional distress be a real warning to some 
that they need to turn their life around to find fulfillment and be content?  
 
1.9. Self-control - Inside and outside 
 
According to Smail (1993) the great flaw of psychology has been to see 
individual meaning systems as belonging to and being under the control of the 
people in whom they are present. All too frequently the assumption is made that 
attitudes and beliefs are located inside a person and subject to operations of his 
or her will.  
 
This suggests that one can decide to alter beliefs or attitudes, which may have 
become inappropriate or inconvenient. Smail suggest that people are an 
interaction of body and world and cannot control their attitudes and beliefs, as 
people are in fact their attitudes and beliefs. Attitudes and beliefs may be 
constituents of our personhood and there may be no person who can be objective 
to this constituency, adjust and return to it as CBT proposes.  
 
1.10. Emotional distress and existentialism 
 
Phenomenology is a research technique that involves the careful description of 
aspects of human lives as they are lived. Existentialism, deriving its insights 
from phenomenology, is the philosophical attitude that views human life from 
the inside rather than pretending to understand it from an external, objective 
point-of-view (Spiegelberg, 1965). As this research is concerned with recording 
and interpreting lived experiences of emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed 
as depression, I will now discuss some of the concepts behind existentialism.  
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Existentialism acknowledges that humans are thrown into a world of pain, 
frustration, sickness, contempt, malaise and inevitable death, and that these 
conditions alone are enough to evoke understandable feelings of sadness and 
worry in people. Existential psychiatry was developed in the 1940s and placed 
emphasis on the existence of humans in relation to a lack of purpose and 
meaning in life.  
 
Pilgrim (1999) suggested that clinical diagnosis does not enhance humanity. 
He proposed that it does not help people to find meaning whilst failing to address 
philosophical questions that are generated from human existence. Often, people 
who present with emotional distress feel that their lives lack meaning resulting in 
feelings of hopelessness. 
 
As the well-known existential psychotherapist Yalom stated, “self-awareness 
is a supreme gift. This is what makes us human. But it comes with a costly price: 
The wound of mortality” (Yalom, 2008).  Similarly, the proverb “Death alone 
can kill hope” recognizes that hopelessness, a manifestation of emotional 
distress, may be an understandable feeling about life and the inevitability of 
death.  
 
In his book Existential Psychotherapy, Yalom (1980) cites that all humans 
have an instinctive fear of death and, for most people, this increases with age. At 
the root of this fear is the thought of dying alone along with the extinction of 
one’s identity. Some people find religion helpful as it often promises life after 
death and it can promise some control over the experience after death in relation 
to heaven, hell, reincarnation and other alternatives. 
 
Hopelessness may well be an understandable feeling in this context and this 
line of thought may be said to denote a type of depressive realism, suggesting 
that people diagnosed with depression might have a more accurate perception of 
reality than those affected by optimism bias. Perhaps people who are not 
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emotionally distressed see things in an overly positive light whilst distressed 
people perceive things in a more realistic perspective. 
 
The utility of optimism has been supported by research on social cognition. 
Taylor & Brown (1988) theorized that positive bias is beneficial for people’s 
general well being and mental health, and found that people tend to show a 
positive bias when they perceive themselves and the world as being better than 
they actually are. One example of a positive bias is unrealistic optimism. Some 
people believe that the present is better than the past and, moreover, that the 
future will be even better than the present. This is in direct contrast to depressed 
beliefs that the future is hopeless and bleak  (Beck, 1979). Taylor & Brown 
(1988) found that positive bias, such as optimism about the future, can make 
people “happier, more caring and more productive” and that optimism is 
beneficial in many situations.  
 
However, research by Nordgren (2009) shows that optimism can sometimes 
lead to failure. In particular, people can sabotage themselves when they 
overestimate their capacity for self-control. If people believe they have high self-
control, they may subject themselves to more temptation than they can handle 
and consequently fail to resist it. Exhibiting what Nordgren calls the “self-
restraint bias”, depressed individuals on the other hand may be more likely to 
believe they are powerless and have little control over their life (Thompson, 
1999).  
 
1.11. The causal role of environment and social status 
 
Though it may be true that emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as 
depression has a biological and genetic component (Pinel, 1997) one cannot 
ignore the evidence suggesting that it is are also strongly linked to living 
conditions.  
 
The gulf between the poor and rich of the world is widening. Within the UK 
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itself the financial gap between the wealthy and the poor is growing and 
differences in health between social classes are becoming greater (Smith, Bartly 
& Blane, 1990). It has been established that poverty and social inequality have 
direct and indirect effects on the social, mental and physical well being of an 
individual (Murali & Oboyde, 2004). Moreover, it is important to note that 
poverty and inequality are closely linked. Poverty is a multidimensional 
phenomenon, encompassing the inability to satisfy basic needs, lack of control 
over resources, poor education and health. Poverty can be intrinsically alienating 
and distressing, and of particular concern are the direct and indirect effects of 
poverty on the development and maintenance of emotional, behavioural and 
psychiatric problems (Murali & Oboyde, 2004). 
 
Emotional distress is known to be more prevalent amongst those of lower 
social status and with lower income levels. Studies have indicated that poverty 
increases the risk for all forms of psychological disorder and whilst it must be 
acknowledged that the correlation is bi-directional - namely that those with 
disorders are often too impaired to sustain work and income - poverty is a stress 
that has the capacity to overwhelm coping and well-functioning people too. 
 
Bruce, Takeuchi & Leaf (1991) conducted a study which investigated people 
below the poverty line and looked for the onset and development of disorders six 
months later in those who were previously well. They discovered that the people 
in poverty were twice as likely to receive a depression diagnosis as those who 
were not.  
 
In addition to acknowledging that poverty is a predictor for emotional distress 
it is also interesting to note that unemployment is a contributing factor as are low 
status employment and occupation levels. It may not just be the status of being 
unemployed that is linked to emotional suffering but the lack of occupation itself 
as it has also been noted that being a homemaker (hence, not being employed 
outside the home) is also associated with higher levels of depression diagnoses 
(Brown & Harris, 1978; Blazer, Kessler, McGonagle & Swartz, 1994). This may 
be linked to lack of routine, social interaction, change of scenery and possible 
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objective praise or recognition. Depression diagnosis is found to be more 
common among those with lower levels of educational attainment and this is 
probably because these are more likely to lead to occupations with lower status 
(Hammen, 1998).  
 
From a social perspective, emotional distress is believed to result from 
individual responses to adverse social and environmental agents such as stressful 
life events, socioeconomic disadvantage and lack of interpersonal support 
(Brown & Harris, 1978; Nicolson, 1998; Oakley, 1980; O’Leary, Helgeson, 
Gallant, Keita & Royak-Schaler, 1997). The role of context in determining the 
impact of negative life events on adjustment has been documented in various 
work, namely Brown, Bifulco & Harris (1987) Brown & Harris (1978) Brown & 
Prudo (1981).  
 
Brown and Harris's (1978) model of distress categorized as depression 
includes vulnerability factors, which are defined as factors that increase the risk 
of depression diagnosis following a negative life event. These vulnerability 
factors reduce people’s ongoing ability to feel in control and optimism regarding 
their future.  
 
Thus, when a negative life event occurs, cognitions of hopelessness may be 
amplified and emotional distress may ensue (Brown & Harris, 1978). An 
example of a vulnerability factor is the absence of a supportive spouse or 
romantic partner (Brown & Harris, 1978). In light of this literature it will be 
interesting to see if vulnerability factors or significant negative life events 
emerge in the participants’ stories about their experiences of emotional suffering. 
 
1.12. Society and emotional distress 
 
The clinical psychologist David Smail cites society as a cause of distress. In 
his book The Origins Of Unhappiness (1993) he suggests that society is 
responsible for an individual’s distress. He proposes that individuals do not have 
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inherent weaknesses that predispose them to mental illness and that symptoms of 
distress should not be viewed from a medical perspective.  
 
Smail believes that individuals can become emotionally distressed as a result 
of the ways in which society forces them to live. This is in contrast to Beck’s 
cognitive theory of distress diagnosed as depression, which suggests people 
suffer emotionally as a result of their beliefs and interpretations of experiences 
and the world. Smail believes that if people are subject to too many adverse life 
experiences they can become psychologically and emotionally harmed. He 
proposed that some people are more perceptive and sensitive than others and 
may suffer in life in a way that more resilient people who might have had a more 
stable and caring start in life do not.  
 
He also suggests that people become whom they are as a result of how they 
learn to think about themselves as children and that confidence develops through 
the relationships they have with other people. Whilst Beck also considers early 
experiences to be pertinent to the development of distorted cognitions linked to 
emotional distress, he does not cite society as a trigger for emotional suffering in 
the same way that Smail does. Given that he believes distress arises as a result of 
adverse living experiences, Smail suggests that it is not always easy for family 
and friends to help those who are suffering emotionally as they are so often 
implicated in the problems. He proposes that people turn to other sources of help 
such as mental health professionals.  
 
He claims the value of therapy consists in: the demystification and clarification 
of the presenting problem; the received comfort of an hour of undivided attention 
from another person; and, the encouragement the client receives at having 
identified the problem and having established a relationship with a therapist 
which allows them to think together about what to do to bring about change. He 
places much emphasis on the support, time and opportunity to share a problem 
which therapy can offer distressed individuals. This suggests that emotional 
distress may not require medical or therapeutic expertise to treat it so much as 
the time and support that people struggle to provide each other in modern life. 
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His beliefs about the benefits of therapy reinforce his ideas that people suffer 
emotionally as a result of the strains of everyday living. 
 
Social factors play a significant role in generating feelings of entrapment. 
Entrapment is triggered and maintained by the ways in which people are forced 
to live by society and this in turn can influence their psychological and emotional 
well being (Smail, 1993). There are situations where escape is motivated but 
blocked or prevented. A known defensive mechanism common in many species 
is the fight or flight response with the latter emphasizing escape. It has been 
observed that particular emotional distress responses occur in highly stressful 
situations where escape is motivated but potentially thwarted, otherwise known 
as “arrested flight” (Dixon & Fish, 1998).  
 
Dixon & Fisch (1998) described an ethological paradigm for studying arrested 
flight in humans. Participants were interviewed while sitting in a chair fixed to 
the floor. The fixed chair signified the prevented escape from the interview 
situation when challenging or stressful questions arose. In this situation, a 
marked similarity was identified between the defensive behaviours exhibited by 
animals and those displayed by the human participants (Dixon & Fisch, 1998). 
Amongst these were gaze aversion, minimal scanning of the surroundings and 
few facial expressions. These behaviours are visible and recognizable in 
participants diagnosed with depression compared with healthy controls (Dixon & 
Fisch, 1998).  
 
The experiment lacked ecological validity due to an artificial and localized 
instance of blocked escape, yet it does suggest that similar defensive mechanisms 
may be evident in humans to those observed in animals. This suggests that the 
blocking of defensive motivations to escape stressful or defeating situations in 
life is central to the onset of experiences categorized as depressive symptoms 
(Gilbert, 2001a).  
 
Gilbert & Alan (1998) proposed that entrapment could be classified in two 
ways: external entrapment relating to life events and circumstances that may be 
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difficult or impossible to change, such as lack of resources, relationships, health 
problems and aversive emotions such as internal entrapment involving thoughts 
and feelings (Gilbert & Gilbert, 2003) which may be intrusive or unwanted. It 
could be considered that society inevitably entraps everyone, sometimes through 
personal choice, expectations and needs in situations such as marriage, parenting 
and employment to name a few.  
 
1.13. Life choices, events and crisis  
 
 Some of the life situations that may be capable of evoking feelings of 
entrapment may also have the potential to prevent emotional distress, thus 
maintaining happiness. There is a large body of research showing an association 
between marital status or quality and emotional distress. Whilst marital distress 
has the potential to trigger episodes of diagnosed depression and marital conflict, 
thus prolonging emotional suffering diagnosed as depression or precipitating 
relapse (Hooley & Teasdale, 1989; Gotlib & Hammen, 1992; O’Hara, 1986), 
other lines of research suggest that being happily married to a supportive partner 
protects against a depression diagnosis despite potential major stress factors 
(Bebbington, 1987; Brown & Harris, 1978; Gotlib & Hammen, 1992; O’Hara, 
1986).  
 
Work may also give rise to feelings of entrapment. However it is worth noting 
that whilst some people feel stressed and trapped by their jobs, many people are 
fulfilled and happy in them. Emotional distress is linked to poverty, 
unemployment and low educational attainment (Hammen, 1998) and this may be 
partly because people in these situations are missing some of the positive 
benefits others experience as a result of fulfilling work they might enjoy.  
 
Another trigger for emotional suffering is the life crisis. This study aims to 
generate more subjective information about experiences of emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression, experiences that are often referred to as 
life discontent or a life crisis. It will therefore investigate whether the onset of the 
participants’ emotional distress was associated with any significant life changes. 
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I will be interested to see if participants in this study experienced any adverse life 
events throughout the course of their emotional suffering or around the time it 
began. Lauber, Nordt, Falcato & Rossler (2003) discovered that distress 
diagnosed as depression is hardly recognized as a psychological disorder among 
the general population in Switzerland; instead, it is often interpreted as a life 
crisis. Whilst it is true that a diagnosis of depression can be missed as it may be 
masked by unhappiness linked to life events or various physical conditions, 
emotional distress can also be over diagnosed as depression when other 
interpretations are possible such as manifestations of grief. 
 
Leaving home, leaving school, getting married and getting divorced are life 
events or life choices. Persons who have self-harmed are described as having 
experienced four times as many stressful life events compared to the general 
population (Aldridge, 1998). Within life event literature, a general hypothesis is 
that life events play a role in the aetiology of somatic and psychiatric disorders 
and provide necessary conditions for such disorders (Dohrenwend & 
Dohrenwend, 1974). However, what must be considered is the way in which 
major life events and lifecycle changes are dealt with which may differ amongst 
individuals.  
 
1.14. Loss  
 
Brown & Harris (1978) noted that the immediate response to loss of an 
important source of positive value is likely to be a sense of hopelessness, 
accompanied by a range of feelings such as distress, depression, shame and 
anger. Loss events can be viewed as the deprivation of sources of value and 
reward. It has been suggested that what is important about such loss in the 
creation of emotional distress is that it triggers an inability to hold positive 
thoughts about ourselves, our lives and those close to us (Brown & Harris, 1978).  
It may also trigger the loss of faith in one’s ability to attain a goal of value and 
importance (Melges & Bowlby,1969).  
 
The implications of loss stretch beyond the fact of the loss itself. Brown & 
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Harris (1968) believe that feelings of hopelessness are key factors in emotional 
suffering and suggest that loss is the most likely cause of hopelessness. Feelings 
of hopelessness are a likely reaction to profound experiences of loss that may 
lead to thoughts about the hopelessness of one’s life in general. Beck (1979) also 
cited thoughts and feelings of hopelessness as central to emotional distress and 
negative thinking. A revised hopelessness model of distress that is categorized as 
depression has been articulated by Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy (1989) and 
hopelessness is the cognition that immediately causes reactions of emotional 
distress.  
 
Though clear links between hopelessness and emotional distress have been 
established, there seem to be people who endure loss in their lives and do not go 
on to receive a diagnosis of depression. Brown & Harris (1978) suggest that a 
personal response to loss is mediated by self-esteem. Therefore by experiencing 
low self-esteem and low feelings of mastery before a major loss, individuals may 
be more likely to struggle with the idea of emerging from their distress. Low 
self-esteem may therefore make someone more likely to experience emotional 
distress in reaction to a loss. Loss of self-esteem was given prominence as a 
critical intervening variable in the aetiology of distress categorized as depression 
by the psychoanalyst Bibring (1953). Employment, intimate and supportive 
relationships, plus not having three or more children under the age of 14 at home, 
have been cited by Brown & Harris (1978) as protective factors which provide 
interpersonal identities and create self-esteem.  
 
Loss of identity is linked to emotional suffering and this has been well 
documented in the case of illness and disability when loss of identity is often 
experienced as a result of people feeling they are no longer the person they used 
to be (Silver, Surawy & Sanders, 2004). Traditionally, depression has been 
regarded as the response to, or expression of, loss, either of one’s identity or of 
the meaning in one’s life (Chesler, 1972). Emotional distress often occurs as a 
result of events that disrupt roles by which people define their self worth, 
particularly when these people lack alternative sources of self-definition. 
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It is generally accepted that women can suffer from emotional distress soon 
after becoming a mother and whilst there is some evidence that there may be a 
biological component to this, such as changing hormone levels soon after birth or 
even the chronic sleep deprivation which many new mothers experience, there is 
also a strong argument that the changes new mothers encounter personally, 
socially and physically can lead to a type of identity crisis (Nicolson, 1998).  
 
Many new mothers are surprised to experience feelings of loss in relation to 
altered relationships with partners, becoming unemployed, becoming financially 
dependent on someone else for the first time, changes in physical appearance and 
changed relationship with one’s own mother who assumes the role of 
grandmother to the newborn child (Nicolson, 1998). There has been some 
interesting qualitative work done in this area that explored individual experiences 
of post-natal distress. A study conducted by Graham, Sharp, Chamberlain, 
Folkes & Turner (2009) highlighted the feelings and experiences of mothers with 
a diagnosis of post-natal depression. The exploration of these experiences 
generated themes such as loss of control or loss of identity in the mothers’ lives. 
Psychological aetiologies such as the stress of parenthood and changed 
relationships were sometimes cited as symptoms.  
 
Some further in-depth qualitative work on post-natal depression was 
conducted by Paula Nicolson (2001) in her book Postnatal Depression: Facing 
The Paradox Of Loss, Happiness And Motherhood which focused on the stories 
of 24 women trying to negotiate their lives as mothers. She challenges the 
expectation that it is normal to be a happy mother, claiming that many new 
mothers experience some form of emotional distress that traditional medical 
accounts tend to pathologize. She argues that in fact many of the issues linked to 
post-natal distress are social rather than biological. She sets mothers’ own 
accounts alongside expert evidence, providing a thorough critique of the 
traditional medical and social science explanations. The book provides a 
systematic feminist psychological analysis of women's experiences following 
childbirth and argues that, far from being an abnormal, undesirable, pathological 
condition, post-natal distress diagnosed as depression is a normal, healthy 
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response to a series of losses as outlined earlier.   
 
1.15. Self-esteem 
 
Many distressed people feel robbed of self-esteem and spiral into a state of 
hopelessness, which may in turn affect self-identity. A study conducted by 
Demir, Kaynak-Demir & Sonmez (2010) found that there was a close association 
between depression symptoms and identity confusion-related distress in 
adolescents who tend to have a heightened sensitivity to psychiatric disorders. 
Moreover, Silver et al., (2004) cited that meanings attached to being ill or 
disabled could affect mood or self worth commonly concerning loss of identity 
(e.g. “I’m not the person I was”). 
 
Feelings of low self-esteem conjure up phrases such as self-image, self-worth 
and self-perception, all referring to the overall picture one has of oneself. 
Negative thoughts about the self reveal themselves in many ways including 
thoughts about the self, behaviour, emotions and relationships. People who are 
emotionally distressed almost always see themselves in a negative light (Fennel, 
1999) and may be vulnerable to seeing any aspect of themselves negatively, 
whether this is their life choices, personality or appearance.  
 
A study conducted by Tao et al (2011) found differences between emotionally 
ditressed subjects and controls in the brain circuits associated with feelings of 
hate, namely the superior frontal gyrus, the insula and the putamen. The links 
among these components of the hate circuit had become largely disconnected in 
the emotionally distressed group. It was found that people diagnosed with 
depression might experience deep self-loathing because such distress seems to 
uncouple the brain’s “hate circuit”. Sufferers may find it hard to cope with such 
disconnected hate feelings and project them onto themselves instead.  
 
Low self-worth and increased self-loathing can manifest in many ways 
depending on the individual; if connected to the way they look, they may begin 
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to feel intensely unhappy or dissatisfied with their appearance and become overly 
concerned with their body image. In his literature on body dysmorphic disorder 
(BDD), a disorder where one has a distressing and impairing preoccupation with 
an imagined or slight defect in appearance, Veale (2004) states that there is often 
a large difference between the perceived ideal and perceived real self and this in 
turn causes emotional distress. The negative appraisals that BDD sufferers have 
produce negative feedback, fuelling feelings of self-dislike. Constant 
comparisons between the self and others continue to reinforce these feelings of 
shame, disgust and hopelessness (Veale, 2004). Links between BDD experiences 
and experiences categorized as depressive symptoms have been established and, 
whist they are unlikely to be symptoms of distress diagnosed as depression, they 
often coexist with a depression diagnosis and may be related to it (Philips, 2005). 
 
Guilt and shame are emotions linked to self-esteem. Feelings of guilt are 
prominent in emotionally distressed people and this may be because distressed 
people are often strongly self-critical and self-punishing. Individuals are prone to 
guilt when they feel they have violated their own values and not lived up to their 
own standards. We feel guilty when we believe we have done something wrong 
or think we should have behaved differently. Shame is usually inextricably 
linked with a negative view of the self and often incorporates secrecy. 
Unsurprisingly, the source of shame is often hidden and destructive (Padesky & 
Greenberger, 1995).  
 
1.16. Gender 
 
In one study women were shown to be twice as likely as men to be diagnosed 
with depression (Gelder, Gath, Mayou & Cowen, 1996). Stressful life events 
have a substantial causal relationship with the onset of depressive episodes 
(Kendler et al., 1999) and the quality of experience associated with life events 
may be a contributing factor to gender differences in such distress. However, the 
evidence that females might be at higher risk of depression owing to higher rates 
of adverse life events has been inconsistent (Bebbington, 1996), with some 
studies demonstrating gender differences in the anticipated direction and others 
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detecting similar levels of life events in males and females. Nonetheless, the 
excess of life events in females has not been found to account entirely for their 
higher frequency of affective disorders (Bebbington, 1996).  
 
Craig (1996) reported that experiences of defeat, humiliation and entrapment 
were at the heart of depressive diagnoses in males and females, although females 
were far more likely to report such experiences.  
 
A study of couples reported that the excess of a depression diagnosis onset 
among females following adverse life events was entirely restricted to crises 
involving children, housing or reproductive problems. This occurred among 
those couples with a clear gender difference in the associated roles, resulting in 
increased responsibility of females in these areas (Nazroo, Edwards & Brown, 
1997). These findings suggest that biological sex represents a useful starting 
point in research on gender differences in distress diagnosed as depression, 
provided that the observed differences are then related to sociocultural roles and 
norms by considering an individual's multiple social identities within his or her 
current and biographical contexts. 
 
Research conducted by Nolen-Hoeksema (1999) found that women reported 
more chronic strain, a tendency to ruminate and a lower sense of self-mastery 
than men. Reported chronic strains were bound up with irritants and burdens 
linked to women’s lower social power. Women were found to carry out a greater 
load of the housework and childcare and to bear more of the strain of parenting 
than men. It was found that the level of strain was correlated to higher levels of 
emotional distress categorized as depressive symptoms, suggesting that such 
factors do contribute to women’s greater vulnerability to suffer emotional 
distress.  
 
Chesler (1972) argues that women do become depressed long before 
menopausal chemistry becomes a possible explanation and suggests that women 
may get depressed as they grow older when their already limited opportunities 
for sexual, emotional and intellectual growth decrease further.  
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Emslie, Ridge & Ziebland (2007) found that both men and women found it 
difficult to recognize and articulate mental health problems and this had 
consequences for their ability to communicate with health professionals. Help-
seeking individuals who present their feelings using psychological language and 
explanations for their symptoms (often women) are more likely to receive 
psychological diagnosis. Those, mostly men, who adopt normalizing styles of 
attribution, attributing their symptoms to environment or physical causes are 
more likely to receive physical diagnosis (Kessler & Mc Leod, 1999) This 
suggests the possibility of emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as 
depression being linked to social role and gender.   
 
1.17. Social role theories 
 
When women freely choose a traditional career as a full-time homemaker they 
often find that this is undervalued, lacks stimulus and is isolating. Such 
conditions can trigger loss of self-esteem, motivation and subsequent distress. 
Repetti & Crosby (1984) referred to this as the noxious nature of the housewife 
role theory of depression. Women who are unemployed outside of the home 
often have limited gratification in their lives. So long as all is well at home, these 
women are happy; conversely, if there is discord at home, they may have no one 
or nowhere else to run to. The theory holds that women often experience distress 
amounting to a diagnosis of depression as they lack multiple roles, which can 
compensate for each other in difficult times (Hoeksema, 1990). 
 
One might infer from this theory that women could avoid emotional suffering 
by having both a family life and career outside of the home. However, according 
to role overload theory (Gove & Tudor, 1973), these women encounter a 
different set of pressures. Most women who work outside of the home still do 
most of the cooking, cleaning and caring for children in the home; hence they 
carry two full-time jobs. They are expected to be unselfish, patient and 
supportive at home, and at the same time selfish, aggressive and self-sufficient at 
work. Such pressures alone can lead to role overload and to the despair of 
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emotional distress (Hoeksema, 1990). 
 
1.18. Victimization and discrimination 
 
Sexual and physical abuse has been identified as a risk factor for emotional 
distress in women. A large community study found the risk of clinical depression 
diagnosis among sexually abused women to be 21.9 per cent, as compared to 
only a 5.5 per cent risk for those without a child sexual abuse history (Stein, 
Golding, Siegal, Burnam & Sorenson, 1988). Other studies report depression 
rates from 53 to 56 per cent for sexually abused women (Mullen, Martin & 
Anderson, 1994).  
 
Another explanation for women’s higher rates of emotional distress is 
domestic violence. Though men are sometimes the victims, men to women most 
commonly mete out such violence. In a World Health Organization multi-
country study of women’s health and domestic violence in ten countries, Garcia-
Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise & Watts (2005) found that rates of severe 
physical violence against women ranged from 4 per cent in Japan to 49 per cent 
in Peru. In all the countries surveyed, women who had experienced physical or 
sexual violence were significantly more likely to report higher levels of crying, 
inability to enjoy life and tiredness, as well as being significantly more likely to 
have attempted suicide.  
 
Chronic, blatant and serious victimization such as that experienced by battered 
wives is the type of experience that creates a sense of helplessness in women. 
Some women are beaten and threatened with murder on a daily basis and feel 
they have no means of escaping the situation because their husband threatens to 
kill her or her children. These situations are more frequent than one imagines 
(Hoeksema, 1990).  
 
There are also many other ways women are made to feel powerless. For 
instance, if they raise objection to actions or statements that they experience as 
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sexist, they may be told they are over sensitive or lacking a sense of humour. 
Repetition of such experiences and ridicule of attempts to change negative 
aspects of one’s environment can lead to feelings of helplessness for some 
women (Hoeksema, 1990). Radloff (1975) argued that the constant frustration 
women face in society could lead to feelings of learned helplessness, a precursor 
of distress diagnosed as depression (Seligman, 1975). Sexual harassment can 
also be a problem for women (Hoeksema, 1990) and it is possible that sexual 
harassment at work may increase the rates of a diagnosis of depression in women 
too. 
 
The gender gap at work is still alive and well according to Kelan (2009) who 
found that women working 41 to 44 hours per week earn 84.6 per cent of what 
men working similar hours do. It was also noted that whilst many female 
workers acknowledge gender discrimination in the workplace they also claim 
their workplaces to be gender neutral. This was linked to the concept of gender 
fatigue where individuals tire of acting upon gender discrimination despite the 
fact that incidents of gender bias either may have occurred at one time within 
their organization or could occur again.  
  
A commonly advanced explanation for gender differences is that women are 
relatively powerless compared with men, and are consequently more likely to 
suffer from the kind of social deprivation and stress which may lead to a 
diagnosis of depression (Brown & Harris, 1978, 1989). It was discovered by 
Jenkins (2008) that divorce makes men richer, particularly fathers, whilst in 
contrast an average woman’s income falls by a fifth and remains low for many 
years.  
 
It seems the idea that many men are fleeced as a result of their divorces while 
women get richer and live off the proceeds may be a myth. In reality many 
women suffer economic hardship when they divorce and this may be exacerbated 
by the fact that many women do not get paid the same as men for comparable 
work and some women do not receive child support from their divorced 
husbands. 
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The above highlights some of the blatant and subtle forms of discrimination 
and victimization that women face and which seem to contribute to feelings of 
helplessness, which feelings are in turn linked to emotional suffering.  
 
1.19. Culture, race and religion  
 
Studies in the US, the UK and elsewhere consistently indicate lower levels of 
depression among people of African descent (Williams, 2008 & Kessler et al., 
1994). Before elaborating on this point it is of significant interest to note that, 
contrary to this, a number of studies in the UK have shown higher rates of 
schizophrenia diagnosis in Afro-Caribbean groups (Bhugra, 2000). Several 
critics have linked this to racism in psychiatry (Fernando, 2003), whilst others 
have linked this to the effects of migration by first and second generation Afro-
Caribbeans migrants (Bental, 2004).  
 
Given the above and the supposed interrelationship between socio-economic 
deprivations, the relative social positioning of black people in the US and UK 
and the rates of depression diagnosis, lower rates of it among African individuals 
presents something of a paradox. Many African Americans living in poverty 
reside in areas beset by alcohol outlets, open air drug markets, high incarceration 
rates, significant levels of homelessness and large numbers of children in foster 
care without permanent homes, all of which have an impact on mental health 
(Martin, 2002). 
 
This may be because misdiagnosis and under-treatment is common within the 
African American community. Many African American women do not seek 
treatment because it is viewed as a personal weakness rather than a health 
problem. Just 12 per cent of African American women seek help or treatment, 
while at the same time they are more likely to consider emotions related to a 
diagnosis of depression as being evil or acting out (Williams, 2008).  
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In addition, high levels of poverty and marginal incomes just above the 
poverty line affect many African Americans, making them more likely to delay 
seeking treatment for mental health needs until they reach a crisis point and 
emergency intervention is necessary. They often do not have adequate insurance 
cover or ready access to primary care where mental health problems can be 
identified and treated in the early stages. Often, family values and traditions are a 
barrier to seeking help as well. There is a long practice of being stoic and 
toughing out troubles that implies that seeking mental health services is a sign of 
weakness (Taylor, 2004). 
 
The prominence of religion in the African American community may also be a 
factor. Taylor (2004) found some evidence for involvement in religion being a 
protective factor in African Americans. Other literature suggests that the strength 
of faith along with support from the church can supplement treatment of 
emotional suffering and reduce isolation for African Americans. For example, 
Loewenthal (2007) cites that there is now an enormous scientific literature 
showing a reliable association between measures of religiosity and well- being, 
including lower distress diagnosed as depression.  
 
Women have been found to rate higher on religiosity than men (Brown, 1987; 
Francis, 1993; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997). This is widely confirmed, though 
most reports pertain to Christian cultures. Research conducted by Maltby (2005) 
indicates that religion makes people feel guiltier and that women are more 
religious; therefore, women feel guiltier and more depressed. He goes on to say 
that some forms of religiosity may be linked to a healthy guilt, while other forms 
may be linked to different types of maladaptive guilt. 
 
 Andrews, Qian & Valentine (2002) suggest that it is shame rather than guilt 
that is linked to depression. It could be that religious factors somehow make 
people feel not only more anxious and guilty but also ashamed.  
 
  However, Pargament (2002) found that particular styles of religious coping are 
associated with better and worse psychiatric outcomes and concluded that higher 
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well-being is associated with internalized religion, intrinsically motivated 
religion and a secure relationship with God. Lower well-being is associated with 
imposed religion, religious beliefs and behaviour that has not been examined, as 
well as a tenuous relationship with God and the world.  
 
Religious factors may have both positive and negative effects on mood, and 
possibly on mood disorders. There are two possible important factors. Firstly, the 
social structure of religious groups which can offer a cohesive social framework, 
incorporating rules that may reduce the occurrence of some of the stresses that 
increase the risk of depression (Loewenthal, 2007). For example, Loewenthal et 
al.,  (1997) found that severe stressors such as divorce were less likely to occur 
within religious groups and that acts of kindness and compassion are considered 
meritorious. Moreover, cognitive factors that allow people to use religious 
coping beliefs in times of stress underpinned by automatic thoughts often form a 
constant backdrop to the lives of religious people. Pargament et al., (1990) 
identified some of the following religious beliefs that were helpful to individuals: 
the belief that God is a supportive partner; the belief that one can only control 
what one can and must leave the rest to God; the belief in a just and benevolent 
God. Nonetheless, the perception of one’s troubles as God’s punishment was 
associated with poorer mental health outcomes, a finding that has been reported 
repeatedly (Pargament, 2002).  
 
Many people who could benefit from professional mental health care do not, 
as they are urged to rely on faith and prayer rather than therapy. In many 
instances, seeking counselling is considered a sign of a lack of faith in God and 
the healing power of divine intervention (Pargament, 2002). One prospective 
study by Tix & Frazier (1998) using general religious coping measures did find a 
positive association between religious coping and positive psychological 
adjustment; however, subsequent studies have failed to replicate these findings.  
 
In a recent prospective study of female cancer patients, Hebert, Zdaniuk, 
Schulz & Scheier (2009) found no association between positive religious coping, 
such as benevolent religious appraisals or religious forgiveness, and measures of 
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psychological well-being. They did find that negative religious coping, in which 
individuals feel abandoned or punished by God, was positively associated with 
experiences of emotional distress, worse mental health and lower life 
satisfaction. Another recent prospective study of medical transplant patients 
(Sherman, Plante, Simonton, Latif & Anaisse, 2009) yielded similar results. This 
study found that negative religious coping was associated with increased 
experiences of emotional distress, post-transplant worry, lower measures of well-
being and transplant concerns, while positive religious coping was unrelated to 
these variables. These findings are further consistent with those found by 
Fitchett, Rybarczyk, De Marco & Nicholas (1999), who prospectively studied 
positive and negative religious coping in medical rehabilitation patients and 
found support only for the harmful effects of negative religious coping.  
 
A study on tolerance for distress diagnosed as depression conducted by 
Loewenthal, Mac Leod, Lee, Cook & Goldbatt (2002) discovered that men and 
women, in a sample of Jews and Protestants, did not differ in their tolerance 
levels to it. However, it revealed that Jews were more tolerant in their attitude to 
emotional suffering than Protestants. This research indicates people may have 
different levels of acceptance and tolerance to their emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression and suggests that there will be a difference 
in the way people respond to and construe low mood or personal distress. Not 
only might religious attitudes influence an individual’s propensity to or the 
severity of emotional suffering, they may also have some effect on the way 
people manage or experience it.  
 
Overall, it is not clear if religious factors play a role in accounting for gender 
differences in emotional distress but it was concluded that religion probably 
plays a beneficial role more often than a malign one.  
 
1.20. Media 
 
New research conducted by Kersting (2005) revealed that gender stereotypes 
interfere with media portrayals of distress categorized as depression. It was 
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found that the printed news media were more likely to depict women's mental 
health in relation to gender-stereotyped roles, such as marriage, motherhood and 
the menopausal female. During this period men's emotional distress was 
increasingly described in terms of aggression or forms of escapism in relation to 
over-engagement in work or sport. Although the media is helping to raise the 
profile of emotional suffering diagnosed as depression, the information 
disseminated about sufferers’ experiences may be biased by preconceived 
stereotypes.  
 
Numerous online magazines and websites carry stories about celebrities who 
admit to experiencing emotional distress. A headline on www.dailymail.com in 
April 2008 read, “‘I had post-natal depression’ admits Gwyneth Paltrow”. 
According to the English dictionary, the word admits is synonymous with 
confess. Indeed other celebrities have been described as confessing to suffering 
from emotional suffering. A headline from Female First magazine in 2007 
referred to  “Anne Hathway’s depression confession”. 
 
Words such as admit and confess transmit feelings of shame in relation to 
depression, and such feelings have been identified as a barrier to treatment 
(Brown et al., 2010). Whilst it is indeed helpful and beneficial for the public to 
have access to people’s experiences of emotional suffering diagnosed as 
depression, the stories often seem to be clouded by the vocabulary used by the 
media. Furthermore, the focus on celebrity experiences may prevent lay people 
with emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression from identifying 
with these stories.  
 
1.21. Treatment-seeking behaviours  
 
There has also been debate as to whether gender-related differences in rates of 
diagnosed depression are accurate reflections of actual psychological morbidity 
rather than being a reflection of gender differences in attribution styles and 
health-seeking behaviours (Wagber, 1998).  
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  Research suggests that the stigma of mental illness can hinder treatment-
seeking and utilization. On account of this perceived public stigma, individuals 
with mental illness might choose to avoid the public label and stigmatization by 
not seeking treatment or discontinuing it prematurely. Alternatively, through 
internalized stigma, individuals with mental illness may avoid the negative 
feelings of shame and guilt about themselves by not seeking treatment at all. 
Public and internalized stigma can manifest differently within individuals, as 
well as influencing each other in their impact on the stigmatized individual. If an 
individual with mental illness perceives public stigma to be high they may be 
more likely to internalize these negative stereotypes than if they perceive public 
stigma about mental illness to be low (Corrigan, 2002). Disparities exist in the 
utilization of mental health services (Snowden, 2001), with African Americans 
typically having lower rates of treatment seeking than whites, higher dropout 
rates from treatment and greater use of emergency care.  
 
1.22. Research aims 
 
 This introduction has focused on experiences that are subsequently diagnosed as 
depression. Although the researcher at times refers to such experiences as pre- 
diagnosed depression this does not imply that the researcher wishes to 
understand these experiences in accordance with any existing model of 
depression. The above introduction considers and reflects on the various theories 
of emotional distress categorized as depression and their relevant perspectives.  It 
is hoped that these theories may offer valuable insights into those experiences of 
emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. Nonetheless it is the 
experience of emotional suffering prior to the depression diagnosis that is being 
explored.  
 
  The researcher intends is to explore the nature of the participants’ distress only 
in those cases where it is considered worthy of a depression diagnosis by a GP or 
psychiatrist. She is primarily concerned with understanding how people might 
experience emotional distress, some of which may not be documented in 
classification manuals. She is interested in the possibility of discovering new 
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experiences that may not be documented in the existing literature.  
 
There are a variety of theories explaining emotional distress subsequently 
diagnosed as depression but the researcher has chosen to focus on life events and 
how the sufferer interprets these. She will also explore how the experience of 
emotional distress varies between individuals and the severity of suffering 
reached prior to the realization that they were in need of professional help.  
 
The researcher has worked with distressed clients who described an 
insufferable amount of emotional and psychological noise, distraction and 
intrusion. Some of these clients told her they were troubled by persistent 
unwanted thoughts and feelings morning, noon and night. Some have described 
feeling emotionally flat and being so detached from their feelings that they claim 
to feel nothing at all, experiencing a world of flat greyness in which they prefer 
to sleep. The common factor in these reported experiences is misery. How did 
participants interpret and understand this misery that would eventually lead them 
to seek professional help?  
 
This introduction was written before the researcher began the analysis. Since 
completing the analysis, the aim of the study has changed a bit and the scope has 
been reduced.  
  
 Originally, the intention was to explore people’s experiences of emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as a first episode of depression. However, it 
was decided to explore only people’s experiences of pre-diagnosed depression 
and forgo the emphasis on a first episode. This was because much interesting and 
relevant data was gleaned from some of the participants’ accounts of pre 
depression diagnosis experience that were not limited to first episodes. Further 
reasons for this change will be elaborated on in the upcoming methodology.  
 
The researcher is interested in this pre-diagnostic period because, working as a 
counselling psychologist, she has observed how different the experiences of 
emotional distress can be and how bad it can become before individuals opt for 
 61 
professional help. Standard symptoms described by DSM-IV-TR (2000) suggest 
that indicators are recognizable across a population of people. Rigid use of such 
manuals with their medical approach runs the risk of not understanding why 
people behave as they do. Psychopathology classifications can never capture the 
complexity and uniqueness of human experience (Ivey & Ivey, 1998). It seems 
that DSM-IV-TR (2000) was never intended to concern itself with the 
individual’s phenomenological experience. This is presumably because it is 
primarily a psychiatric diagnostic tool normally used by clinicians to recognize 
signs and symptoms of disorders. However, as each person is different and their 
distress differs in nature and degree, there can be a danger of individual 
experience getting lost in a pool of theories, symptoms and syndromes 
(Parpottas, 2012). 
 
Unlike DSM-IV-TR (2000), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, 
1996) is a self-scoring checklist composed of items relating to symptoms of 
distress categorised as depression, such as hopelessness and irritability, 
cognitions such as guilt or feelings and thoughts of being punished and physical 
symptoms such as fatigue, weight loss and loss of libido. People are asked to rate 
how much they agree with certain statements, with chosen varying in intensity. 
Those that score highly on the questionnaire statements also score highly on 
levels of distress diagnosed as depression. Statements include “I am so worried 
about my physical problems I cannot think of anything else”, “I believe that I 
look ugly”, “I feel irritated all the time”, “I have lost all my interest in other 
people”, “I feel tired all the time”, “I hate myself” and “I am so sad and unhappy 
I can’t stand it”. This study will investigate in depth what people undergo when 
they experience some of the psychological and emotional background to these 
statements, how these thoughts and feelings play themselves out in people’s lives 
and the extent to which they believe these feelings are related to events in their 
life.  
 
It is worth noting how much more descriptive some of the experiences 
documented as signs and symptoms on the BDI-II (1996) are in comparison to 
those listed in DSM-IV-TR (2000). DSM-IV-TR (2000) does not tell us how any 
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of the symptoms it cites such as feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt 
might show up in an episode of diagnosed depression. BDI-11 (1996) on the 
other hand provides typical cognitions that feelings such as worthlessness listed 
in DSM-IV-TR (2000) might translate into, “I feel I am a complete failure as a 
person’.  
 
This is because experiences of emotional distress documented as symptoms of 
depression in DSM-IV-TR (2000) do not represent the concrete thoughts in 
particular subjects. The current National Institute for Clinical Health and 
Excellence (NICE) guidance uses the DSM-IV-TR (2000) classification to 
diagnose major depression and requests the presence of at least one of the core 
symptoms such as persistent sadness or low mood nearly every day or loss of 
interest or pleasure in most activities.  
 
If an individual had been struggling with the cognition “I feel there are 
permanent changes to my appearance that make me look unattractive” BDI-11 
(1996) or “I have greater difficulty making decisions than I used to” BDI-11 
(1996) or “I am disgusted with myself” BDI-II (1996), I am curious as to how 
they might come to the conclusion they warrant a depression diagnosis according 
to the criteria of BDI-II (1996) and are in need of professional help. If they 
suspected they were experiencing emotional suffering worthy of a diagnosis of 
depression and consulted DSM-IV-TR (2000) as recommended by the the NICE 
guidelines online, they may not be able to link their distorted thoughts such as 
those cited above to some of the described symptoms, for example as loss of 
interest in pleasurable activities or feeling empty.   
 
If they were able to recognise that their distress was indicative of a possible 
depression diagnosis, they might then approach the health care services. If 
however they were not able to do this, they may continue suffering emotionally 
trying to make sense of their personal distress and possibly even feeling guilty 
about it. The researcher intends to interview people who have battled with 
unwanted thoughts such as those itemized in the BDI-II (1996) and to understand 
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how they interpreted them and what the experience may have meant to them 
before they were diagnosed with depression. 
 
This is of particular interest as the researcher’s professional work as a 
counselling psychologist has revealed that each person is different and their 
distress differs in nature and degree. In addition to exploring individual 
experiences of pre-diagnosed depression, she will explore the context of its 
onset, whether or not it was triggered by a particular life event and the totality of 
their life at the time.  
 
This research aims to move away from diagnostic medical language in an 
attempt to understand the participants’ experiences of emotional suffering using 
their own descriptions. An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is an 
approach to qualitative analysis with a strong psychological interest into how 
people make sense of experiences (Harper & Thompson, 2012). As this research 
will explore how people acknowledge, manage and make sense of pre-diagnosed 
depression, it seems a suitable method to adopt.  
 
IPA has been specifically developed by Smith, Harré & Van Langenhove 
(1995) to allow thorough and precise exploration of idiographic subjective 
experiences and social cognitions. It is now widely used within British 
psychology (Thompson, Kent, & Smith, 2002; Clare, 2003; Biggerstaff, 2003; 
French, Maissi, Marteau, 2005). Its philosophical and theoretical roots stem from 
the phenomenology which originated with Husserl's (1931) attempts to construct 
a philosophical science of consciousness, from hermeneutics (the theory of 
interpretation) and from symbolic-interactionism, the theory that the meanings 
individuals attribute to events are of central interest but are only accessible 
through an interpretative process. IPA acknowledges that the researcher's 
engagement with the participant's text has an interpretative element, yet unlike 
other methods such as discourse analysis (DA) (Potter, 1996), it assumes an 
epistemological stance whereby, through cautious and explicit interpretative 
methodology, it becomes possible to access an individual's cognitive inner world.  
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 Moreover, it enables one to examine what people endure when they 
experience emotional suffering by collecting detailed, retrospective and 
reflective first person accounts from research participants. The researcher hopes 
to give voice to those who have suffered from emotional distress. She shall be 
using a one-to-one, semi-structured interview to generate the data.  
 
A step-by-step methodological approach will be outlined later in the 
methodology section. By not looking for quantitative data the researcher will 
focus on the participants’ subjective experiences of pre-diagnosed depression by 
means of a qualitative approach and will have an opportunity to discover whether 
participants experienced anything other than those symptoms cited in DSM-IV-
TR (2000) or the Beck Depression Inventory (1996). 
 
1.23. Study benefits to counselling psychology 
 
It has been stated that although efforts have been made to improve public 
knowledge of physical disease such as heart disease and cancer, efforts to 
increase knowledge of psychological disorders have by comparison been 
somewhat neglected (Jorn, 2000). Research has focused on triggers, causes and 
treatment-seeking behaviours in distress categorized as depression (Adamson et 
al., 2010; Lauber et al., 2003) and less so on subjective experiences.  
 
This research project aims to introduce the complexities of emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression to a wider audience. Learning from our 
clients is something highly valued in counselling psychology where the emphasis 
is on understanding and working with a client’s subjective experience. 
Counselling psychology as a profession prioritizes the therapeutic treatment of 
psychological distress and the client’s unique system of making sense of what 
they are experiencing. It is commonly used with people who are intensely 
worried and extremely sad, otherwise classified in psychiatric terminology as 
depressed or anxious.  
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Emotional distress has been notoriously difficult to detect in general practice. 
Even when the distress diagnosed as depression is severe, half the cases go 
unrecognized (Montgomery, 1990). The reasons for this are unclear, although 
lack of insight on the part of the sufferer is undoubtedly a contributory factor as 
is the failure of sufferers to recognize their own distress subsequently diagnosed 
as depression.  (Montgomery,1990). In primary care practices, up to 80 per cent 
of depressed patients present exclusively with physical symptoms that can 
include headache, abdominal pain and musculoskeletal pains in the lower back, 
joints, neck and body (Stahl, 2004). This inevitably makes it harder to determine 
whether people are presenting with emotional distress or not.  
 
Early intervention and treatment for emotional distress are important to 
prevent people’s suffering from deteriorating.  Effective detection strategies 
require recognition of this distress at an early stage. It requires recognition from 
professionals as well as from the sufferer that something is not quite right. If an 
individual does not think they are in need of help they may be more inclined to 
suffer in isolation as they try to make sense of their plight. A study conducted by 
Barney (2009) found that the low visibility of distress diagnosed as depression 
means it is often not apparent to others. This also suggests that sufferers may 
have to endure emotional isolation, as people around them may not see their 
distress. 
 
This research could help counselling psychologists develop their 
understanding of and familiarity with the breadth of experience people suffer 
when they experience emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. 
It could help them understand the variety of experiences people undergo when 
they are suffering emotionally.  
 
As this study is concerned with what people experience when they are 
suffering emotionally before being diagnosed with depression, the emphasis is 
not on whether they were depressed according to classification systems or not. 
Rather it is on how they experienced the emotional distress that subsequently led 
to a depression diagnosis. It can provide counselling psychologists with a deeper 
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understanding of how distress might manifest when people are emotionally 
distressed and diagnosed with depression. By bringing this to their attention it is 
hoped that counselling psychologists will be able to identify the experiences 
under a broader theme and thereby understand them more.  
 
It may also help counselling psychologists to recognize that some experiences 
that seem bizarre or unusual may in fact be triggered by emotional suffering that 
is subsequently diagnosed as depression. It may also point to early signs that 
someone is suffering emotional distress that may be diagnosed as depression and 
require certain treatment interventions. 
 
The development of Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) in 
2010 was an initiative aimed at making psychological therapies more accessible 
to people facing mental health challenges. A large number of people are seeking, 
and will continue to seek, psychological help for general feelings of unhappiness 
or feeling ill at ease.  
 
Since counselling psychologists are amongst the professionals that provide 
psychological counselling for emotional suffering, any research that can provide 
more information about people’s experiences of personal distress is useful. 
Counselling psychologists are concerned with engaging with subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, values and beliefs. They emphasize empathy and respect for 
first person valid accounts and do not assume superiority of any one way of 
experiencing, feeling, valuing or knowing (British Psychological Society, 2005). 
Gaining information of people’s experiences of emotional distress subsequently 
diagnosed as depression would be of interest because of this. 
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2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. The research question 
 
The research question this qualitative study explored is “How do people 
experience emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression?” The research 
takes the form of an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). The 
researcher’s aim was to engage and empathize with the participants’ personal 
accounts of experience of emotional suffering and to understand how these are 
experienced. As a qualitative study it did not test a hypothesis with quantitative 
underpinnings. Neither was it concerned with predictions of outcomes.  
 
2.2. Epistemological position 
 
When applying IPA it is important to consider its epistemological position. 
Phenomenology pays attention to the individual’s particular account of reality rather 
than the objective reality itself (Smith, 1995). Phenomenology, whilst recognizing 
the material reality of objects in the world, stresses that our perception of those 
objects will always remain subjective. Whilst acknowledging the fact that 
phenomena are always experienced through a personal lens and that any individuals 
participating in research will always be influenced by their own and the researcher’s 
interpretations of the world, this does not mean that the accounts of these individuals 
are not relevant to the realities they describe.  
 
As this study will explore people’s experiences of emotional distress, the 
phenomenological approach will enable the researcher to gather and elucidate 
information about the participants’ experiences whilst suspending presuppositions, 
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assumptions and judgments relating to their stories. It allows for diverse experiences 
of the same environment or situation. Because phenomenology is always concerned 
with how the world is experienced by human beings within particular contexts at 
particular times, it is therefore sensitive to diversity, deviation and difference in 
human experience (Spinelli, 1989) and is consequently well suited to a study that 
aims to explore people’s potentially diverse experiences and interpretations of 
emotional distress.   
 
It seems that exploring and categorizing subjective accounts of such experiences is 
appropriate for a study exploring pre-diagnosed depression experiences. It is because 
the approach is concerned with meaning and interpretation of human experience that 
I chose to conduct a phenomenological research approach. Phenomenologists believe 
that our knowledge and understanding are acquired in our everyday world and that 
truth and the understanding of life emerge from life experiences. As such it cannot 
be quantified. A semi-structured interview process seemed an appropriate way to 
collect data for the study. The results could subsequently be subjected to an IPA 
where the researcher could generate codes from existing data rather than using a pre-
existing theory to identify codes that might subsequently be applied. 
 
The researcher acknowledges that her interpretation of other people’s experiences 
is partly influenced by her own thought processes, assumptions and ideas, and that 
this could have influenced the results. Equally, without some bedrock of thoughts, 
assumption and ideas, one would not be able to interpret other people’s experiences 
at all. 
 
2.3. Reflexivity - The researcher’s standpoints 
 
Reflexivity requires awareness by the researcher of her contribution to the 
construction of meanings throughout the research process and an acknowledgement 
of how difficult it can be to remain objective while conducting research. It 
encourages the researcher to explore the ways in which her involvement in a 
particular study influences and informs the research process (Nightingale & Cromby, 
1999). As reflexivity is considered an important aspect of a study’s transparency, the 
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following section illustrates as far as possible the researcher’s values, interests and 
assumptions and considers how these might have influenced the research process 
(Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999).  
 
2.4. Background to study - Researcher’s interests and 
potential biases  
 
The researchers own interests and professional background also need to be made 
explicit. She is a British white female born in 1974 and grew up in a middle class 
area of London. She worked as a counselling psychologist in the NHS for six years 
before setting up her own private practice in London. In total she has amassed a 
wealth of ten years of experience providing psychological counselling to people 
presenting with a variety problems including emotional distress.   
 
The researcher has worked in a variety of socio-economic areas in London, from 
those with high levels of ethnic minority and poverty to other more affluent areas. 
She feels this has broadened her understanding of different life experiences and the 
ways in which they can impact on an individual’s well being. Overall, the researcher 
has worked with a diverse clinical population.  
 
When the researcher began training as a counselling psychologist, she assumed 
that people’s experiences of emotional suffering, often subsequently diagnosed by 
clinicians as depression, would be more or less the same. She was familiar with 
experiences of distress recorded as symptoms in classification manuals and assumed 
that they would manifest similarly in different individuals. As her clinical work 
progressed, she came to realize that this assumption was at odds with what she 
discovered first hand, namely that individuals’ experiences of emotional distress are 
often very different.  
 
Note only were clients’ experiences of distress made up of many elements these 
elements varied greatly from one client to another. The researcher was interested in 
exploring these varied experiences in more detail. The idea therefore came to 
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develop this into a doctoral thesis on how individual’s experience episodes of 
emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression.  
 
 General Practitioners who have already diagnosed them as suffering from 
depression refer quite a few of the researchers’ clients to her. Similarly, she 
encounters much emotional distress already classified as depression by the time 
clients present for psychological counselling. At the same time she is aware that 
people experience distress differently.  
 
The researcher’s intention was to explore in more detail what actually went on for 
people when they were suffering this kind of emotional distress. She wanted to hear 
their stories of what the experience was like, how they made sense of it and how they 
responded to the situations and circumstances in their lives that may have triggered it 
or been linked to it. 
 
2.5. Rationale for selection of qualitative design 
 
Qualitative research is concerned with meaning. Rather than focusing on an 
outsider’s views of what people do (Fiese & Bickman, 1998), it aims to shed light on 
how people make sense of experiences and what their behaviour means to 
themselves and others (Willig, 2012). Its goal is to understand a relatively small 
number of the participants’ own experiences in depth and it does not attempt to test a 
preconceived hypothesis on a large sample (Smith, 2008). By not looking for 
quantitative data, the researcher is in a position to emphasize the participants’ 
subjective experiences of emotional distress diagnosed as depression.  
 
The approach appealed to the researcher because it is more holistic. In contrast to 
quantitative research methods, which place an emphasis on numbers and statistics 
often at the expense of individuals, a qualitative method allowed a process-orientated 
approach where she was able to examine how people experienced distress and how 
they thought, felt and attributed meaning to it. It is also interesting and exciting to be 
able to conduct research with the freedom a qualitative approach allows one to 
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explore the researcher/participant relationship whilst taking into account the 
phenomenon of reflexivity. A qualitative approach was thus considered suitable for 
this study. 
 
2.6. Rationale for selection of IPA  
 
An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is an approach to qualitative 
analysis with a strong psychological interest in to how people make sense of 
experiences (Larkin & Thompson, 2012). IPA helps to provide new and differing 
perspectives on a phenomenon by learning from those who are experiencing it, rather 
than learning from or being biased by old theories or predetermined notions in 
existing research.  
 
The idiographic nature of IPA therefore fits with the objective of this research. It 
allows the researcher to focus on a small group of individual experiences, rather than 
formulating general notions for larger populations (Smith & Osborn, 2008). Indeed, 
Smith (2004) suggests that this type of analysis can enable us to understand and 
learn about important generic themes in addition to each participant’s individual 
story. IPA is particularly useful for investigating complexity, process and novelty 
(Smith & Osborn, 2008). The opportunity to investigate phenomena from a new 
perspective by learning from those who are experiencing it, rather than from pre-
existing theories or knowledge (Shaw, 2001), fits well within the current NHS 
agenda of taking a patient-centred perspective and listening to the views of service 
users (Reid, Flowers & Larking, 2005). 
 
Its philosophy is embedded in what has been termed symbolic interactionism, a 
concern for how meanings are constructed by individuals within both the social and 
personal world (Smith & Osborn, 2008). IPA views individuals as experts on their 
own experiences that can offer researchers an understanding of their thoughts, 
commitments and feelings by telling their own stories, in their own words and in as 
much detail as possible (Reid et al, 2005).  
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It is an approach concerned with exploring individuals’ experiences and 
perceptions of an object or event, rather than producing an objective truth about that 
object or event. It emphasizes that experiences are influenced by perceptions, which 
are themselves constrained by social constructions. 
 
IPA has proven to be effective in the exploration of sensitive and unexplored 
topics (Flowers, Mc Gregor, Larkin, Church & Marriot, 2011). Any human 
experience can be subject to an IPA in so far as it engages with the individual’s 
subjective experience and concerns itself with its diversity and variability. As this 
research will explore how people manage and make sense of experiences of 
emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression it therefore seems a suitable 
method to employ. It enables the researcher to examine the suffering people endure 
when they experience emotional suffering by collecting detailed and reflective first 
person accounts from research participants. IPA has an established procedure for the 
analysis of experiential qualitative data (Smith & Osbourne, 2003), allowing space 
for a wider contextual interpretation (Willig, 2008). 
 
IPA highlights the value of considering a researcher’s role in influencing the 
process (Smith & Osborn, 2008). As her views, assumptions and beliefs will 
influence an interpretation of a participant’s account, it stresses the importance of 
reflexivity to aid transparency. It recognizes that the production of an interpretative 
account is a function of the relationship between a researcher and a participant, and 
is in turn constructed and shaped by this encounter (Larkin, Watts & Clifton, 2006) 
 
It is also an appropriate methodological approach for the researcher who, as a 
counselling psychologist, has extensive training in gaining empathetic, in-depth and 
authentic accounts of individual experience and in managing personal accounts of 
individual distress.  
 
The researcher took a curious and facilitative stance, using a series of one-to-one, 
semi-structured interviews to generate the data. An interview agenda was devised 
and explained in the method overview to help prevent her from losing sight of the 
original research question; nevertheless, she tried not to be controlled too rigidly by 
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this as potentially rich data could have been lost if she did not follow her 
participants’ accounts. An interpretative engagement within the text is therefore 
apparent and it is likely that this took the analytic process into a particular direction. 
 
2.7. Limitations of IPA 
 
Although IPA recognizes the importance of the researcher’s perspective, it has 
been criticized for not providing guidelines on how to incorporate reflexivity into the 
research process and for not specifying how the researcher’s preconceptions 
influence analysis. Willig (2001) suggests therefore that findings invoke a sense of 
discovery rather than construction, although Smith & Osborn (2008) argue that IPA 
is an approach rather than a rigid methodology, allowing flexibility to meet the 
researcher's need and context. 
 
The role of language can be problematic in IPA. Social constructionists argue that 
language constructs rather than describes reality. It could be said, therefore, that an 
interview transcript tells us more about the way in which an individual talks about a 
particular experience, within a particular context, than about the experience itself 
(Willig, 2001). The ability of participants to communicate the rich texture of their 
experience successfully is a question that has been often asked of IPA. It is possible 
then that this study could potentially yield information about how participants talk 
about their experiences of distress rather than about the experience itself. This may 
be exacerbated if participants struggle to communicate their thoughts and feelings 
with words.  
 
The phenomenological approach may not always be suitable for people who are 
less able to articulate their experiences through words. In answer to this, IPA 
acknowledges the role of social constructionism and the fact that pure experience is 
never accessible. It recognizes the action-orientated nature of language yet 
challenges the narrow view of people only as discursive agents (Eatough & Smith, 
2006). Individuals can struggle to use language in a way that accurately conveys the 
subtleties and nuances of their experience (Willig, 2001). However, Smith & Osborn 
(2008) accept that whilst people often struggle to express what they are thinking and 
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feeling, their emotional state can be interpreted by a researcher as a result of 
analyzing what they say and, importantly, by asking critical questions about what is 
not said. It has therefore been assumed that language is a representative and valid 
tool for communicating experience (Willig, 2012). 
 
A potential disadvantage of using a semi-structured interview is that participants 
may be inclined to adopt the stance of an interviewee. In this case, the result may be 
that they say more about their experience and reaction to being interviewed than the 
experience the research is attempting to explore. This is always the possibility of 
interference within interview-driven qualitative research.  
 
This approach was suitable for this research, however, because it enabled the 
researcher to describe and record the lived experiences of the participants. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that it does not, in itself, explain them. Any 
insight gained from analysis of text is only the product of interpretation. 
Furthermore, it is recognized that the researcher will be implicated in the analysis 
one way or another and that her conceptions will influence the analysis. The 
researcher has therefore disclosed her values and assumptions to help the reader 
interpret the analysis. In addition the researcher’s demographics have been declared 
to facilitate the detection of any possible influences on the data collection and 
analysis.  
 
As mentioned earlier, IPA depends on both the participants’ ability to 
communicate their experiences in a relatively articulate and comprehensive manner 
and the researcher’s capacity to understand and process the participants’ accounts of 
their experiences. There is further potential for ethical dilemmas arising from the 
close supportive relationships that can arise as a result of exploring people’s personal 
experiences and handling personal and sensitive participant data (McLeod, 2003). 
However, it has been recognized by McLeod (2003) that ethical research problems 
often arise in everyday clinical work and this is part of the research process. He 
recommends that the researcher strike a balance between good and harm when 
conducting research. Possible examples include whether or not a researcher should 
give or withhold treatment, or whether to conduct research in natural or artificial 
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settings.  
 
2.8. IPA as opposed to other qualitative methodologies 
 
In deciding on this study’s methodology, Grounded Theory was ruled out 
notwithstanding its similarities to IPA. It has been suggested that Grounded Theory 
is best suited to address sociological research questions, as it focuses on theory 
construction and social processes that account for phenomena, whereas IPA adopts a 
more psychological approach focused on gaining a detailed understanding of the 
quality and texture of individual experiences (Willig, 2001). 
 
Discourse analysis (DA) was also felt inappropriate due to its focus on the role of 
language in the construction of social reality (Willig, 2008). Its goal of 
understanding how people use language to create and enact identities and activities 
contrasts with IPA’s focus on the detailed understanding of a particular lived 
experience (Starks & Brown Trinidad, 2007). 
 
2.9. Reliability 
 
The issue of reliability is less important in qualitative research as it does not 
investigate large numbers of people. However, Silverman (2000) emphasized that 
qualitative research ought to generate reliable results. Hammersey (1992) stated that 
reliability in qualitative research refers to the consistency with which experiences are 
assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observers on 
different occasions. Having an independent co-rater can aid the control for bias in 
qualitative research whereby the observer unconsciously seeks out particular 
categories to support a desired outcome (Coolican, 1999).  
 
Alternative procedural suggestions to improve reliability in qualitative research 
include: the documentation of methodology and research procedure (Kirk & Miller, 
1986; Silverman, 2000); the availability of interview recordings and transcripts to 
examiners (Bryman, 1988); and, the use of the participants’ own language in the 
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coding process (Glassner & Loughlin, 1987). In the present study these were 
addressed through an emphasis on transparency in the methodology and the 
availability of a section of the transcript for review. 
  
2.10. Validity  
 
Problems with validity can arise within qualitative and quantitative research. 
Potential concerns are managed in various ways. For example, much qualitative 
research is conducted in real-life places as opposed to artificial settings such as 
laboratories where one has to extrapolate findings to the real world. This means 
qualitative studies have higher ecological validity. Moreover, the process of 
reflexivity means the researcher is continuously reviewing his or her own role in the 
research, thus increasing validity and discouraging the imposition of meaning on the 
part of the researcher (Willig, 2008).  
 
2.11. Ethical considerations  
 
Throughout this study, the researcher aimed to remain ethically sensitive as such 
issues and dilemmas can arise at any point throughout the research. Participants were 
informed that the research would not be of direct benefit to them and that the 
researcher would not provide a professional opinion or intervention.  
 
In addition, the researcher adopted interventions to maintain personal safety and 
self-care. Participants were asked to attend her private practice for interviews where 
there were other practitioners and a reception service. This addressed personal care 
and safety by eliminating any potential problems that could arise if the researcher 
was alone and interviewing a stranger in an unfamiliar environment. As this was not 
always convenient for participants, some were interviewed at  
) in a hired, private and quiet room and two were interviewed in 
their own home. These two people were acquaintances, so concerns of the researcher 
visiting a stranger in an unfamiliar and unprotected environment were significantly 
reduced. 
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This study endeavors to be transparent and reflexive, placing value on interaction 
and sharing. Explicit permission was gained for the recording of interviews. The aim 
of the research was explained and made clear. Conducting interviews about 
experiences of emotional suffering is likely to stimulate participant’s self-reflection, 
thoughts and feelings, which they may not have experienced otherwise.  
 
Though it has been stated by Thompson & Chambers (2012) that there is 
substantial evidence that emotional disclosure across a wide range of settings has the 
potential to be beneficial, there is always a chance this may affect a participant in a 
non-desirable way. For example it may highlight beliefs and values the participant 
had been unaware of previously. It may promote focus on or the recall of unwanted 
memories, raise divisions between attitudes and behaviours and trigger feelings of 
remorse, resentment or regret.  
 
Though the researcher adopted responsibility for the research effects on the 
participants, she could not guarantee being able to deal with them. She therefore 
ensured that participants had space at the end of the interview during which 
reflection on the process could occur (Fossey, Epstein, Findlay, Plant & Harvey, 
2002) and any interview-engendered emotional distress could be dealt with. She was 
also able to raise the participants’ awareness of other support sources such as 
counselling services or support groups. 
 
The following standard ethical considerations were applied (Elmes, Kantowitz & 
Roediger, 1995) and the research adhered to the ethical principles of the British 
Psychological Society (2005): 
 
1. Informed consent: participants were told exactly what the researcher 
was exploring and were asked for consent to participate in the study. 
2. No deception: participants were not deceived at any point in the 
study. 
3. Right to withdraw: participants were able to withdraw from the 
research at any time. 
 78 
4. Debriefing: participants were informed about the full aims of the 
research and were informed that they would have access to any publications 
arising from it.  
5. Confidentiality: complete confidentiality regarding any information 
about participants was maintained. No names or participant descriptions were 
attached to the study; moreover, all recordings of interviews will be 
destroyed a year after the study is completed.   
 
Furthermore, all comments in the study are presented anonymously and all 
participants were made aware of all these conditions before signing the 
consent form. 
 
The study proposal was supported by the Ethical Committee of City University 
London (see Appendix A). 
 
2.12. Purposive sampling and participants  
 
Ten participants were interviewed: 
• Eight participants were born and brought up in England, one was born 
in Denmark and moved to England as a child and another was born in Africa 
and also moved to England when she was a child.  
• Ethnicity: White 7, White and Black Caribbean 1, British Asian 1 and 
Black African 1 
• The age range was 21 to 42 years. 
• Two participants were male and eight were female.  
          The occupation status of the participants varied greatly. One was 
unemployed and on benefits, one a housewife, two lived on family 
generated private income, three were students, one was self-employed and 
two were in full time employment.  
• Seven described themselves as of middle class and three as working 
class status. 
• Four participants were educated to degree level, three were studying 
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for a degree and three were educated up to GCSE level. 
 
All of the participants gave the researcher consent prior to being interviewed. 
Participants were selected using purposive sampling based on a number of criteria 
and were recruited to represent the research question and illustrate the phenomena 
under investigation. In this case, this included adults between the ages of 18 and 65 
who had been diagnosed with depression by a GP or psychiatrist within the previous 
three years as well as being treated for said condition within the previous three 
months.  
 
2.13. Changes made to the study  
 
Originally the researcher set out to out to explore experiences of emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as a first episode of depression. The aim was to 
interview people who had been i) diagnosed with depression for the first time in the 
previous three years and ii) treated within the previous three months.  This three-year 
cut-off point aimed to reduce the risk of interviewing participants who may have had 
subsequent episodes of emotional distress diagnosed as depression and who might 
consequently have found it hard to distinguish these later episodes from the initial 
one that the research intended to focus on. Interviewing participants who had been 
treated at least three months prior to taking part in the study was intended to 
significantly reduce the risk of participants still suffering emotionally when they 
took part in the research.  
 
However, whist conducting the interviews it became clear that some participants 
had not been diagnosed for the first time in the last three years despite having said 
that this was the case prior to the interview. Whilst being interviewed, some 
participants started talking about previous experiences of distress subsequently 
diagnosed as depression as opposed to a more recent first experience that my 
research intended to focus on. The researcher thinks this was because whilst being 
interviewed, participants began to reflect on past experiences they may have 
forgotten, repressed or even denied. They said things like “Actually, now I think 
about it I was depressed back in 1999 when I saw that counsellor”. As participants 
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are humans it is difficult to be sure that their disclosed histories will tally with what 
they tell the researcher before the interview takes place.  
 
Having reflected on this with her supervisor and the course director of the 
counselling psychology top-up doctorate, it was agreed that the study would be 
improved if the researcher did not restrict herself to exploring a first time diagnosis 
only. This was because some very interesting data was generated by a couple of 
participants who had been diagnosed with depression more than three years before 
and had been diagnosed with it more than once. The researcher decided she did not 
want to reject this data just because it did not reflect their first time experiences of 
diagnosed depression. As the essence of the study explores experiences of emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression, it seemed it would have been a 
shame to eliminate interesting data on experiences of a diagnosis of depression 
gleaned from such participants.  
 
It also seems an ethical concern would only have arisen if a decision had been 
made to abandon the second condition of interviewing people who had been treated 
for emotional distress diagnosed as depression within the previous three months as 
there would have been the problem of them still being distressed when they 
participated in the research. All the participants had received treatment in the 
previous three months so the procedure was still in line with the researcher’s primary 
ethical safeguard, that of not interviewing people who had not received treatment for 
their diagnosis of depression. 
 
It was ensured that all participants had recovered from their diagnosis of 
depression by taking the extra precaution of administering the CORE-10 (Clinical 
Outcomes in Routine Evaluation), a client self-report questionnaire where the client 
is asked to respond to ten questions about how they have been feeling over the past 
week (see Appendix B). It is used as a screening tool and outcome measure of worry 
categorised as anxiety, distress categorised as depression, trauma, physical problems, 
day-to-day close and social relationships and risk to self. A score of above 25 would 
indicate that an individual was experiencing clinical levels of any of the items 
measured and would not be deemed suitable for interview. All the participants 
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scored well below this number except for one who scored 25. We discussed that his 
score was borderline and he explained that he was happy to continue with the 
interview bearing in mind the possibility that there would be potentially rich data for 
me. As he did not score above 25 on the core form the researcher deemed it safe and 
ethical to continue. She did however inform him of possible services where he could 
get further support and treatment were he to need it. However, he explained he did 
not believe this would be the case. 
 
2.14. Recruitment strategy 
 
An email with a letter was sent out to undergraduate psychology students at one 
university asking them if they would be interested in participating in the research (a 
copy of this letter is attached in Appendix C).  
 
 Other participants were recruited through word of mouth where the aim was to 
recruit people adhering to the sample characteristics described above (see Purposive 
sampling and participants 2.12.)  Friends and colleagues were opportunely 
approached with the aim of them passing on a request for participation in the study. 
The interviews with my ten participants generated data relevant to this research 
project and made possible the exploration and examination of the conversations that 
ensued.  
 
2.15. Recruitment response  
 
In total ten people agreed to participate in the study. Three of the participants had 
responded to the email sent out to psychology students at  
 and seven participants responded by way of word of mouth. 
 
All participants were keen to tell their stories and told me they had found it a 
cathartic experience describing in detail their pre-diagnosed depression experience.  
 
2.16. The interviews 
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Smith & Osborn (2008) recommend the use of semi-structured interviews for an 
IPA study. This facilitates a more informal, flexible conversation, enabling the 
interviewer to probe particular areas of interest that arise or follow novel areas 
pertinent to the research question. IPA often incorporates a verbatim transcript of a 
first person account generated by the research participant in response to questions 
from a researcher (Larkin & Thompson, 2012). This usually manifests in the form of 
a one-to-one, semi-structured interview (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009).  
 
The interviews in this research followed a semi-structured interview format (see 
Appendix D), although it was decided that if conversations became restricted or 
compromised because of this, the researcher would not be too rigid about adhering to 
the format in order to avoid the loss of potentially rich data.  
 
The researcher began by introducing herself and telling the participants a bit about 
the work and the study. They were informed that they were welcome to ask 
questions at any point during the process. Explicit consent was gained for the 
recording of the interviews (see Appendix E). 
 
The style of interviewing was designed to allow the participants maximum 
freedom to describe their personal experiences of emotional distress.  Open-ended 
questions were formulated beginning with words like “what”, “how”, “when” and “is 
there” to encourage and evoke thought, memory and contemplation in the 
participants. Questions were also devised that would prompt them to elaborate at 
certain points.  
 
The researcher began with more public questions and moved on to more personal 
matters once a rapport had been established. She then asked questions that she had 
devised for the interview. Throughout the interview participants’ comments were 
noted and often incorporated into further questions. The researcher referred to 
Spradley’s guide (1979) in order to formulate different types of questions that were 
meaningful to the participants. 
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The interviews were conducted and transcribed using principles of interpretive 
phenomenological analysis. A conversational style was adopted to diffuse power 
imbalances and a counsellor-client dynamic. Transcripts were subject to individual 
analysis and emerging themes were identified which would then be reduced to 
further subcategories. The ultimate aim was to identify shared themes that captured 
the essence of the participants’ experience of emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression.  
 
Interviews were conducted and recorded (with a Sony Minidiscs recorder) at a 
booked room at LSBU, at the participants’ homes and at the researcher’s private 
practice where she conducts psychological counselling and where a receptionist and 
other therapists were present. For those interviewed at the private practice and 
LSBU, the locations gave a sense of credibility to the research. There was great 
assurance of personal safety for both researcher and participant. As those that were 
interviewed in their homes were acquaintances, this eliminated the concern of the 
researcher visiting a stranger in an unfamiliar environment. However, there was also 
an increased sense that the balance of power was shifting towards   the participant as 
the researcher was entering their territory. It was also harder to end the interviews on 
time as there were not other participants or clients arriving and consequently there 
was no need to vacate a hired room. However, this had its advantages, as the 
researcher felt more relaxed about letting the participants take their time, as it was 
not essential to finish on the exact hour.  
 
All participants were given ten pounds for their time and travel. Informed consent 
was sought on the day of the scheduled interview. Upon meeting participants were 
asked if they had any questions. Participants were not asked to sign the consent form 
until they had been given adequate information about the study, had read the 
participant information form and had had time to consider their decision. The 
researcher talked through all aspects of the study and responded to the participants’ 
queries to check their understanding of what was involved in the study prior to 
gaining consent. 
 
Participants told their own stories and the transcripts were analyzed in accordance 
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with the principles of IPA. Emerging themes from the text were identified and 
examined in detail. Relationships between themes were detected and 
interrelationships established. Since this study was interested in the participants’ 
experience of emotional suffering, the content of their reported experiences provided 
the analytical focus of this study. 
 
2.17. Confidentiality and consent 
 
Participants were given the choice to sign the consent form just with their first 
names. Before signing the consent form they were made aware of the following 
points: 
 
1. The interviews were to be recorded for transcription purposes only 
and would be seen only by the researcher and their research supervisor. The 
recorded interviews were to be destroyed a year after completion of the 
research. 
2. All data would be treated in the strictest confidence and kept in a 
locked cabinet to which only the researcher had access. 
3. The names or any descriptions of the participants would not be 
attached to the study. Any personal details about the participants were to be 
changed so that they would be unidentifiable.  
4. Comments used in the study were to be presented anonymously. 
5. All participants would have the right to withdraw from the study at 
any time without having to give a reason for doing so. 
 
The consent forms were signed by all participants and the researcher prior to the 
start of each interview and this intended to deal with some of the possible ethical 
dilemmas that can arise with psychological research on humans. Participants were 
debriefed on the nature, purpose and consequence of the research as recommended 
by Thompson & Chambers (2012) and given the opportunity to discuss it. They were 
also able to request a copy of the transcript afterwards as well as a final copy of the 
report.  
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2.18. Information given to participants 
 
Information sheets were sent to participants by email before the interview took 
place (see Appendix F). This provided them with time to read a bit about the 
research and what would be expected. It also gave them an opportunity to further 
consider if they wished to partake after reading the information sheet. In some cases 
the interview questions were sent out to participants before the interview so they 
could prepare accordingly. This was requested by four of the participants.  
 
On arrival, it was explained to participants that they should raise their arm at any 
point if they decided they no longer wished to continue with the interview due to the 
sensitive nature of the subject. The researcher also confirmed that the interview 
would last one hour if they were happy to complete it. It was important to establish a 
time boundary due to the sensitive nature of the subject. She did not want to find 
herself in a situation where the participant felt cut off and asked to end abruptly in 
the middle of discussing something that was emotionally distressing. 
 
2.19. Transcription 
 
The researcher transcribed four of the transcripts from the recorded interviews and 
this proved to be of enormous value as it allowed her to engage with the data in a 
way she had not previously done. The researcher found that she paid more attention 
to some things when hearing them for a second time and began detecting themes in 
the participants’ interviews as they were typed up. This was before beginning the 
analysis.  
 
As it took on average three hours to transcribe each interview it was becoming 
time consuming and preventing progress with the analysis.  An arrangement was 
therefore agreed with a professional typist who signed an agreement of 
confidentiality and typed up the six remaining interviews anonymously. All 
transcripts were transcribed using intelligent verbatim. The transcripts were then 
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analyzed using IPA (Smith, 1997). See Appendix G. 
 
2.20. The procedure used for analyzing transcripts 
 
Data was analyzed using IPA, as detailed by Smith & Osborn (2008) and 
discussed above. The analysis was also guided by documentation on quality in 
qualitative research (Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 1999; Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis & 
Dillon, 2003; Yardley, 2008) and through research supervision.  A procedure for 
analyzing the transcripts outlined by Willig (2008) was followed.  The researcher 
began by reading and re-reading the transcripts, scrutinizing them line by line, as this 
enabled her to remain open to the data and to continue to notice new nuances and 
subtleties (Charmaz, 2006). Ideas were able to arise in ways they may not have done 
had she merely been listening to the texts or transcribing them in larger chunks. 
 
Broad and somewhat unfocused notes were made in the left margin, reflecting the 
researchers observations and thoughts about the texts (see Appendix H). These notes 
included summaries of what was said, as well as comments on connections, 
similarities, differences, contradictions, associations, questions, interpretations, 
absences, descriptive labels and preliminary interpretations. 
 
The emerging data was then clustered into themes and analyzed using IPA. The 
aim was to remain as close as possible to the original data and its meaning whilst 
simultaneously attempting to unearth the key experiential themes in each 
participant’s accounts.  
 
2.21. The process of identifying and labelling themes 
 
The emergent themes were then listed in order of appearance and attempts were 
made to look for and make sense of connections between them, creating theme 
clusters. Smith & Osborn (2008: pp70) suggest imagining a magnet, “with some 
themes pulling others in, helping to make sense of them” (see Appendix I).  
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These clusters were then titled, creating superordinate themes. It was essential to 
keep returning to the transcripts throughout this process, in order to verify that the 
superordinate themes still reflected what the participant had actually said. A 
spreadsheet of superordinate themes, together with associated subordinate themes 
and supporting verbatim text extracts was then produced. 
 
This process was repeated for all ten interviews, each time putting the previous 
interview to one side and working on the next one from scratch. Although 
commonalities in themes began to be identified, care was taken to acknowledge new 
issues emerging from each transcript, thus paying attention to ways in which 
accounts from participants were similar but also different (Smith & Osborn, 2008). 
 
When all ten interviews had been analyzed, the superordinate and subordinate 
theme clusters for all interviews were examined and clustered together to create a 
master list of superordinate themes and component subordinate themes for all 
participants. The superordinate theme titles provided a coherent framework to 
understand the participants’ experiences of emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression.  
 
2.23. The production of a summary table  
 
 Identified themes were reflected upon and then considered in relation to one 
another. The researcher oscillated between the list of themes she wanted to structure 
and the text that initially generated them as suggested by Willig (2008). Many of the 
themes shared meanings and references with one another and others were 
distinguished by hierarchical relationships with one another.  
 
A spreadsheet summary table (see Appendix J) was then produced for the first 
participant with the structured themes together with quotations that illustrated them. 
The original participant summary of identified themes was then used to code the 
other transcripts in the same manner, elaborating and adding themes in the process. 
A cyclical process was adopted so that later emerging themes could be verified 
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against earlier transcripts to acknowledge whether new themes were genuine new 
concepts. As a result of this process an integrated list of themes developed and this 
reached completion on the analysis of the final transcript.  
 
2.24. Integration 
 
The researcher then continued to generate a list of superordinate themes that 
encapsulated the quality and nature of the participants’ shared themes. The analysis 
continued until full integration of themes was achieved. The list of superordinate 
themes reflected the data from the subordinate themes from which they were derived 
and reflected the experiences of the group as a whole.  
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3 
RESULTS 
 
 
3.1. Results 
 
All participants generated rich and interesting material and the total 
accumulation of themes was higher than that presented for this study. As this 
study set out to explore experiences of emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression only, themes that were not directly linked to this were 
omitted. 
 
There was considerable overlap and interrelatedness between themes and this 
is apparent throughout the analysis. The researcher chose to focus on themes that 
conveyed the rich and penetrating experiences participants described throughout 
their emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression. Many of the 
themes were either not documented in the classification manuals or not 
systematically discussed in the literature of counselling psychology. A decision 
was made to focus on these themes as the researcher felt this brought something 
new to the literature.  
 
3.2. Introduction to superordinate themes  
 
Eight superordinate themes were presented in the analysis and identified as 
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being most relevant. This was because they arose most frequently amongst 
participants and together conveyed the depth and complexity of their 
experiences.  
 
In answer to the research question enquiring how the participants experienced 
emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression, accounts clustered 
around these eight themes. The following table itemizes these and their related 
subordinate themes. 
(Table 1) 
Superordinate theme Subordinate themes 
A) Totality of life at the 
time 
i. Change and loss 
ii. Lack of space and the need to escape  
iii. Feeling trapped by responsibility/obligations  
iv. Feeling directionless 
B) Embodied distress i. Somatization 
ii. Physical manifestations of self loathing 
iii. Discomfort in one’s own skin 
iv. Feeling catatonic 
C) Trapped in the head i. Overthinking and overanalysing/noise in the head 
ii. Worry 
D) Severed social and 
emotional connections 
i. Mistrust and persecution 
ii. Troubled relationships 
iii. Feeling misunderstood and rejected  
iv. A need to belong 
E) Transformation of 
identity 
i. Social comparisons 
ii. Changed identity 
iii. Multiple identities and masking 
iv. Lost identity 
v. Fixed identity 
F) Dissociation i. Disengagement and alienation 
ii. Chosen detachment 
G) Belief in a higher 
force 
i. Destiny 
ii. Deserving of punishment 
iii. Superstition 
iv. Spirituality 
H) Disciplining the self i. Finding control  
ii. Application of acceptance and patience 
  
The themes identified are discussed using relevant passages from the 
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participants’ accounts of their experiences. Individual identities have been 
changed in all the accounts to maintain anonymity.  
 
The identified themes are discussed in three different sections. In the first 
section (3.3.1.) attention is focused on possible triggers and maintaining factors 
(A). In 3.3.2. the focus shifts onto how emotional distress was itself experienced 
(B & C). Finally in 3.3.3., I consider those aspects of this experience, which, 
through the participants’ interpretations, sometimes led to the development of 
coping strategies (D, E, F, G and H).  
 
3.3. Discussion of themes 
 
3.3.1. Life situations as a possible trigger and maintaining factor at the time of 
the participants’ emotional suffering 
 
Whilst this research set out to explore experiences of emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression, it also considered some of the life events 
and situations participants experienced both before and during the time of their 
initial distress. In order to understand the participants’ accounts it was considered 
necessary to situate them in the context of their lives.   
 
The researcher was motivated by the belief that experiences of distress 
generally do not arise out of nowhere and are often responses to situations in life. 
Cromby, Harper & Reavey (2013) use the term distress to characterise 
experiences that are sometimes referred to as mental illness or symptoms of 
psychopathology. They argue that distress can be part of everyday life and is 
bound up in social and material conditions, personal biographies, life events and 
relationships. They believe that in psychiatric settings these experiences are often 
matched all too easily with pre-defined diagnostic categories and that, as a result, 
difficulties in their lives that are linked to their distress can be missed.  
 
Most of the participants in this study were able to speculate about causal and 
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maintenance factors related to their emotional distress in ways that were of 
significant interest to the researcher. Some suggested that their difficulties were 
with their life at the time. This is in contrast to those who felt that they had fallen 
victim to the sudden onset and sudden development of a psychological or 
emotional disorder often classified in clinical manuals and psychological 
literature as depression. Hence, the following theme emerged: 
 
A) Totality of life at the time 
 
This superordinate theme was linked to circumstances and situations generated 
by the subordinate themes change and loss, lack of space/the need to escape, 
feeling trapped by responsibility/obligations and feeling directionless.  
 
i. Change and loss 
 
The diathesis-stress model unites biology, in the form of an organic 
vulnerability or diathesis, with the psychological and social influences that cause 
stress. If the combination of a person’s predisposition and stress exceeds a 
certain threshold, the person may go on to develop a disorder (Ingram & Luxton, 
2005). Vulnerable people can thus develop a diagnosis of depression in response 
to life events that disrupt the equilibrium of their lives.  
 
Below Adrian describes how facing change in his life was unsettling for him 
because of new experiences: 
 
“I’d had my first son, I had a lot of stress at work and there were new 
experiences, perhaps in similar ways to when I first went to college. I just didn’t 
know who I was. I was in a new environment, with new stresses, and didn’t really 
know who I was, I felt out of control.” (Adrian, p6, 19-22) 
 
Adrian discloses how he felt thrown by new situations in his life and that 
consequently he felt out of control. He did not feel equipped to tackle or deal 
with the new demands placed upon him at that time and this appeared to trigger 
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his feelings of distress. He later acknowledged that change was not something he 
dealt with well. 
 
“Periods of change. I am not very good at those.” (Adrian, p17, 17)  
 
These changes in life situations were often described by participants as triggers 
to their emotional distress and as being negative experiences often linked to loss. 
 
Tania refers to the time her parents divorced as a difficult period for her that 
precipitated her emotional distress: 
 
“My parents divorced which is something I completely blocked out. All my 
security, everything I had known, had suddenly gone, like the rug had been 
pulled quickly from under my feet, but I detached myself from it and just thought 
it is for the best and did not allow myself to get emotionally involved in it.” 
(Tania, p3, 17-20) 
 
Later, she adds:  
 
“My old family home was no more. I remember when my sister was my age 
and she would come home at weekends and have both parents there and have 
this security but for me I had my grandma’s house but it was not quite the same. 
It was not as I knew it. My parents were different people. It was very unsettling.” 
(Tania, p4, 17-21) 
 
Tania describes feelings of change and loss at the root and core of her family 
life and how related feelings of unfamiliarity led her to feel insecure. She was 
able to establish clear links between this and the commencement of her 
emotional distress.  
 
Another participant mentions her experience of loss. She was able to link the 
onset of her emotional distress to the painful experience of being left by her 
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partner of many years and communicates how she struggled with feeling 
rejected.  
 
“I was in a very long term relationship with someone I loved dearly and we 
grew apart. He ended up leaving and I was totally floored by it.’ (Kate, p3, 1-2) 
 
Jane also points to an experience of loss as triggering her misery, although in 
her case it was loss experienced through death:  
 
“Well, I think it was a combination of factors. There was the death of a very 
close friend and I think that had a big impact on me emotionally.” (Jane, p1, 30)  
 
Jane’s emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression is interpreted 
partly as a response to her friend’s death, and can be interpreted as a normal 
reaction to a traumatic even that triggered great sadness and distress.  
 
  DSM-IV-TR (2000) states that feelings of grief and sadness that do not exceed 
two months may not be signs of distress diagnosed as depression if they can be 
better accounted for by bereavement. Jane’s emotional suffering went on for a lot 
longer than two months. Two months seems a surprisingly short time for 
someone to recover from the loss of a loved one or a best friend and perhaps 
DSM-IV-TR (2000) is wrong to state that grieving beyond two months is a sign 
of a depressive illness. Could it not rather be the ongoing emotional suffering 
linked to bereavement?  
 
It is of course possible that Jane’s emotional suffering was triggered by 
bereavement and that this continuing despair manifested as a further distress that 
was later diagnosed as depression. It has been noted (Frances, 2013) that 
someone who is typically grieving focuses their thoughts on the person who has 
passed away and experiences waves of pain rather than the constant pain of 
someone suffering from distress categorised as depression, similar to the constant 
distress that Jane described throughout her interview. It is possible then that in 
the later stages of her emotional suffering Jane may not have been suffering from 
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bereavement alone.  The experiences of distress that mimic ‘depression 
symptoms’ associated with grief tend to lessen over time with the help of family 
and friends (Frances, 2013). The opposite seemed to happen with Jane whose 
distress seemed to intensify over time, suggesting her grief may have spiralled 
into a deeper form of emotional distress subsequently considered worthy of a 
depression diagnosis by a healthcare professional. However it is possible she was 
experiencing grief in addition to other emotional distress that may not have been 
linked.  
 
 
Ella also reflected on a difficult time of both loss and change when she had a 
young child and a new baby. She explained that her husband became addicted to 
gambling triggering a temporary break-up of their marriage and a related loss of 
income. This resulted in her having to move out of her home. She established a 
link between her living conditions and emotional distress. The theme lack of 
space emerges     
 
ii. Lack of space and the need to escape 
 
 “I kind of felt like it was circumstance. I was living in a room that was 
smaller than this with my two sons. My step mum did not want me to be there. All 
my boxes were around. We were living in a damp room and because of the 
severity of my circumstances I had gone right into the worst part of my psyche.” 
(Ella, p7, 24-30) 
 
Another participant also describes returning to her childhood home at the peak 
of her emotional suffering and explains that, while her parents were helpful and 
supportive, the situation eventually became counterproductive. She too described 
feeling the need for space and the need to escape: 
 
“I realized at that point I really needed to leave my parents’ house. They were 
very loving and supportive but their anxiety and fear about my state was 
becoming counterproductive.” (Jane, p12, 16-18)  
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Like Ella, Kate explained that at the time of her pre-diagnosed depression she 
had to move back home due to her circumstances; whilst it was clear in the 
interviews that this served a purpose and was helpful to some extent, related 
difficulties linked to lack of space appeared to exacerbate her distress. 
 
“For a period of time the only thing that got me out of bed was the idea of 
getting out of my mother’s house. I think there was a lot of pressure with that 
because I had come from being this big shot from New York and then I had to 
move back home to London to my mother’s house, which I’d left when I was 17.” 
(Kate, p11, 5-9) 
 
Kate’s account suggests she felt she had taken one step forward and two steps 
back with her life. She felt she had regressed by moving back to her childhood 
home and it seems that this may have had a negative impact on her confidence 
and self-esteem.  
 
iii. Feeling trapped by responsibility/obligations 
 
“My mum - who I was closest to - in a way I felt imprisoned by her because 
she’d asked me to move in and take care of her while she was disabled. I was 
stuck with her and she was not letting me be depressed. She was not letting me 
feel low and she just thought it was all nonsense.” (Kate, p11, 31 & p12, 2) 
 
As we have seen, Ella also moved in with her mother. Although the change 
was helpful in many ways, like Kate she found it hard as it exacerbated her sense 
of duty and responsibility, as she too felt obliged to look after her mother.  
 
“I felt like my mother wanted me there to look after her so I suddenly felt very 
stressed that I had another person to look after.” (Ella, p19, 3-5)  
 
“I felt like I was looking after her and my children.” (Ella, p19, 7-8) 
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iv. Feeling directionless 
 
Jane disclosed how she struggled to have a normal life and romantic 
relationships. She described her needs and choices as incompatible with what she 
felt she could achieve. She confessed to feeling directionless in life at the time of 
her emotional distress and this too might have been a causative factor in her 
emotional suffering.  
 
“I felt desperate, isolated. I also could not imagine how I was going to have a 
normal life in the world. I just could not see how I was going to have a 
relationship. I felt like I couldn’t have a relationship. Up until that point I’d 
wanted to be an actress but then when I considered the realities of life as an 
actress, I suddenly thought ‘I am not sure that I would be able to handle that’, so 
I didn’t really have a direction.” (Jane, p7, 1-6)  
 
These participants seem to have understandable reasons for suffering 
emotionally. It is easy for the reader to empathise and sympathise with these 
participants’ descriptions of their lives and agree that they are distressing. These 
participants felt powerless to alter the negative events in their lives that triggered 
their emotional distress.  
 
3.3.2. How emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression was 
experienced  
 
This second chapter explores the content of the participants’ experiences of 
emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. Their accounts reflect 
how they felt at the time of their distress and what went on within them. Two 
super-ordinate themes were generated by six sub-ordinate themes that emerged 
from the data and these are discussed in the next two sections (B & C). 
 
B) Embodied distress  
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The superordinate theme embodied distress was generated by the subordinate 
themes somatization, physical manifestations of self-loathing, discomfort in 
one’s own skin and feeling catatonic. Whilst acknowledging that DSM-IV-TR 
(2000) points to physical symptoms of emotional distress diagnosed as 
depression such as weight changes, insomnia, lack of appetite and psychomotor 
agitation or retardation, and the BDI-II (1996) to somatic preoccupation, the 
participants in this study also revealed some different bodily experiences at the 
time of their emotional distress.  
 
i. Somatization 
 
The most prevalent subordinate theme of embodied distress was somatization 
where participants described feeling their emotional distress in their bodies. 
There are three theories of somatization, the oldest of which, holds that 
symptoms represent the body’s own defence against psychological stress. This 
theory suggests that the mind’s capacity to tolerate stress and strain is limited 
and, consequently, social or emotional stresses beyond a certain point become 
experienced as physical symptoms (Pribor, Yutzy, Dean & Wetzel, 1993). This 
theory can help explain links between distress and somatization, indicating that 
when emotional suffering reaches certain intensity the person can no longer 
endure the distress will manifest itself physically.  
 
The second theory postulates that it is triggered and maintained by heightened 
sensitivity to internal physical sensations. Some individuals feel the slightest 
amount of discomfort or pain in their bodies. Hypersensitive people can 
experience bodily events such as minor changes in heartbeat that the brain 
normally would not register in the average person. Studies have shown that 
people with panic disorder are particularly sensitive to internal sensations such as 
breathing and heart rates, which may lead them to react with intense fear to 
minor internal changes. The physiological or psychological origins of this 
hypersensitivity to internal sensations and their relevance to somatization 
disorder are still not well understood (Allen, Woolfolk, Escobar, Gara & Hamer, 
2006). 
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The third theory claims that somatization is caused by one’s own negative 
thoughts and overemphasized fears. For example, interpreting slight ailments 
such as headaches to be brain tumours, or equating shortness of breath to asthma 
could lead those who have somatization problems to actually worsen their 
symptoms (Stein & Muller, 2008). A somatic preoccupation indicative of worry 
diagnosed as health anxiety has been cited as a symptom of a diagnosis of 
depression in the BDI-II (1996).  However, the following somatic experiences 
described by participants did not seem to convey only this.  
 
Below, some participants describe how they felt physically at the time of their 
emotional distress. In particular they reported head, heart and stomach 
experiences.  
 
“The only way I can describe it is like there’s a feeling like there’s a death in 
your head and your heart. If I shut my eyes and think about what it looks like 
inside it’s just dark.” (Joe, p7, 11-13)  
 
“I think when I was 17 I did not really know anything about the concept of 
depression. I didn’t know that you could interpret things in this way or that way. 
I had a blank mind. Everything was just like a feeling. No thoughts.” (Joe, p4, 
24-27) 
 
Jumania also describes times during which she experienced no thoughts at all, 
only bodily experiences: 
 
“I used to have no thoughts. There was no particular thought that was causing 
it.” (Jumania, p2, 8-10) 
 
Joe and Jumania’s accounts of emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as 
depression sit uncomfortably with the CBT theory of depression as a thinking 
disorder (Beck, 1979). Interestingly, both make reference to the heart in 
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describing their experience: Joe feels his heart has died whilst Jumania states that 
her heart feels heavy.  
 
“I just started to feel ever so down. My heart used to feel really heavy and I 
used to feel just something pulling me down.” (Jumania, p8, 11-12) 
 
Participants also alluded to a feeing of dread in their stomach that 
accompanied them most of the time. 
 
“How did you make sense of everything and what did you think was going on? 
What kind of things went through your mind?” (Researcher, p4, 10-11) 
 
“Just a negative, crippling and dead feeling in my stomach. It’s a sick feeling 
as if something has died.” (Tallulah, p4, 14-15) 
 
Jane echoes this: 
 
“Well, it was just really hard to describe. I just felt one thing all the time and 
there was this sort of pain. If I can talk about it in a physical way, it was a pain 
in my solar plexus… and a feeling of complete emptiness - that’s all I ever felt.” 
(Jane, p8, 19-24) 
 
This stomach discomfort that some participants describe resembles the familiar 
butterflies in the stomach that children sometimes allude to when they are feeling 
nervous or stressed. What is striking about these accounts is that participants 
described the stomach pain as constant, suggesting they may have been 
experiencing a perpetual degree of fear in their emotional distress subsequently 
diagnosed as depression. This would be supported by previous links between 
worry and low mood already alluded to in the introduction.  
 
Below Joe and Adrian explain their experience of embodied failure: 
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“How does it manifest for you when you feel like a failure?” (Researcher asks 
Joe, p18, 7-9) 
 
“It’s a very palpable feeling. It’s strong. It’s inside, in my chest and then up to 
my head… It’s a bodily feeling, then you feel exhausted.” (Joe, p18, 10)  
 
“It won’t go away, just the feeling of unhappiness, the feeling of dread, the 
feeling of self loathing, the desire to try to kill yourself.” (Adrian, p7, 8-10) 
 
He also refers to this state of dread that Tallulah and Jane described but does 
not give it a precise location in the same way the others did. It would have been 
interesting if the researcher had enquired as to where in his body this feeling of 
dread had manifested. Was it in the stomach? 
 
ii. Physical manifestations of self-loathing 
 
Adrian mentions self-loathing and this leads us into the next theme, namely 
physical manifestations of self-loathing. This description of embodied distress 
can be linked to those depression symptoms as documented in the BDI-II (1996) 
such as “feeling ugly and unattractive”. Cheryl elaborates on the theme of self 
loathing and feeling ugly and unattractive: 
 
“I used to have a real problem with the way I looked and thought I was really 
ugly and really fat.” (Cheryl, p3, 8-9) 
 
She adds later:  
 
“Every time I look in the mirror I just think ‘Oh really, is that what I look 
like?’ I can’t do anything to change it. I do what I can.” (Cheryl, p4, 3-4) 
 
Researcher continues to ask:  
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“So you are not happy with what you see and there is a sense of powerlessness 
as you can’t change what you see?” (Researcher, p4, 5-6) 
 
Cheryl replies:  
 
“It makes me feel miserable, it makes me hate myself. I don’t like looking in 
the mirror. And then it makes me question why my fiancé is with me even though 
he says I look beautiful” (Cheryl, p4, 7-9)  
 
And:  
 
“I just hate myself completely and utterly and that is why.” (Cheryl, p4, 18-19)  
 
It seems that Cheryl does not like herself and is looking for reasons to validate 
how she feels. She possibly hated the person she felt she had become when she 
was emotionally distressed and consistently felt she looked ugly; perhaps she 
believed this is how others saw her too, hence her disbelief that her boyfriend 
could be attracted to her. Anna’s account conveys a strong dissatisfaction with 
her appearance at the time of her emotional suffering too as well as an 
uncertainty and incomprehension as to why her husband wanted to be with her. 
 
“I don’t feel like a woman. I just wondered why he would want to be with me. I 
had some issues with trust when he went out. I was not able to trust him. I could 
not be the woman I was when I first me him. I was slim, beautiful and motivated. 
Things just spiralled from there.” (Anna, p5, 20-24) 
 
iii. Discomfort in one’s own skin 
 
Below, Cheryl describes feelings of intense body discomfort including feeling 
a lack of familiarity in her own body. It seems as if she feels she might be able to 
expel some of her emotional pain by transferring it into physical pain and 
scratching it away. 
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“I say to Adam sometimes that I feel like scratching my skin off as I don’t feel 
it is mine. In the same way, I have those moments when I don’t want him 
touching me. It’s the same thing, like my skin is crawling. Like it’s not mine and I 
need to remove it and he is looking at me saying ‘Are you alright, what are you 
doing?’ But I just feel so uncomfortable, my body feels all weird, like it’s not 
mine.” (Cheryl p10, 1-5)  
 
And: 
 
“I just do not want to be in it [my skin] any more as it is so uncomfortable.” 
(Cheryl, p10, 8) 
 
She describes feeling as if her skin is crawling which conveys intense 
discomfort and perhaps a feeling of tension combined with disgust. She later 
elaborates on this, saying she feels she is squirming: 
 
“I sit there and squirm. Usually I get in the shower, that helps and cools me 
down and when the shower hits my head it drowns out all the noise - I can’t hear 
anything else.” (Cheryl, p10, 13-15)  
 
Jumania also points to feeling uncomfortable in the extreme: 
 
“I was crying about how uncomfortable I felt and I just wanted it to go. Like, I 
was crying because I was in an uncomfortable sate.” (Jumania, p3, 22-23)  
 
Some of the following physical descriptions of embodied distress can be 
linked to those depression symptoms as documented in DSM-IV-TR (2000) such 
as loss of appetite. However, in this study the theme feeling catatonic emerged. 
 
iv. Feeling catatonic 
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“Everything becomes negative and then it got to the point that I stopped eating 
and then, by that stopping, not going to the loo and finally I felt that I couldn’t 
even move.” (Kate, p6, 6-7) 
 
Whilst Kate’s description fits the DSM-IV-TR (2000) symptoms of loss of 
appetite, she goes on to say she did not even go to the toilet any more, something 
not documented in DSM-IV-TR (2000) or the BDI-II (1996). 
 
“The loss of appetite and not eating or drinking anything. I stopped going to 
the loo and I just sat on the floor in my bedroom in a heap and just did not 
move.” (Kate, p6, 30-31) 
 
This section covers the variety of embodied experiences participants felt at the 
time of their emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. It reveals 
individual aspects of their experiences in detail and also highlights physical 
experiences people feel when they are distressed some of which are not 
documented in classification manuals on depression.  
 
C) Trapped in the head  
 
The following responses from participants convey a sense of being mentally 
trapped by their distress. Cheryl describes her emotional distress as an internal 
experience that exists within her. She does not link her distress to her experience 
of life circumstances. Rather she suggests her experiences of distress are 
internally generated. 
 
“It’s me; it’s in my head.” (Cheryl, p5, 17)  
 
Whilst Tania, Tallulah and Ella were able to link their emotional distress to 
circumstances in their lives, at other times in their interview they also described 
emotional distress as this intrusive, cognitive turmoil. In response to the question 
“How would you describe your emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as 
depression?” they replied:  
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“A manifestation of thoughts and feelings.” (Tania, p13, 24) 
 
“A mental feeling.” (Tallulah, p, 10, 21) 
 
“Being swamped with thoughts that make you feel like you are shit or a failure, 
that life is hopeless and that you’re worthless and not being able to get out of it, 
like buckling legs.” (Ella p 20, 30-33) 
 
Ella describes, “not being able to get out of it”, indicating she has no control 
over the thoughts of worthlessness and failure she describes. Jumania also 
describes it as a mental experience in the way that Tallulah does.  
 
“I think all your problems are in your mind. It’s basically like a disabling of 
your mind in your brain rather than your physical being.” (Jumania, p16, 30-32)  
 
Jane describes how throughout her pre-diagnosed depression she existed in her 
mind only: 
 
“I withdrew entirely into a mental world where I was absolutely in a sort of 
fantasy world. I was in my mind constantly. I was entirely in a world of thoughts. 
I don’t know how to explain it really, always in the future, in the past: I was 
always in my mind.” (Jane, p8, 35-38) 
 
The subordinate themes overthinking and overanalyzing, noise in the head and 
worry contributed to the superordinate theme trapped in the head. 
 
i. Overthinking and overanalysing – noise in the head 
 
Many participants explained feeling that they couldn’t think properly, feeling 
lost in rumination and being stuck in an endless loop of worry and negativity. 
Descriptions of relentless overthinking and overanalysing featured strongly in 
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some of the participants’ accounts. This is in contrast to those who emphasized 
embodied distress or interpersonal distress as the central ingredient to their 
emotional distress. 
 
Anna alludes to this relentless thinking and there is a sense that she is 
struggling to live in the present as she is constantly distracted by the contents of 
her mind. 
 
“In my mind it was too much. I had too much going on. Constant thinking….” 
(Anna p3, 4) 
 
“It feels like noise, just the same old conversations and trying to analyse 
people…” (Anna, p3, 7)  
 
“Obsessing about people’s intentions and other things.” (Anna, p3, 9) 
 
Anna’s reference to noise is suggestive. It is an image echoed by Cheryl: 
 
“I have that noise going through my head all the time. I do not know what it is 
like to be relaxed any more.” (Cheryl, p1, 1-2)  
 
“It is constant. I think that is why I have trouble sleeping because I close my 
eyes but my brain still works. I have to go to bed at least two hours before I 
sleep.” (Cheryl, p11, 13) 
 
Cheryl describes being kept awake at night by intrusive thoughts as well. 
There is a sense her brain is working overtime and she cannot switch off. She 
describes the contents of her mind as a consistent noise and distraction that she 
cannot ignore. 
 
ii. Worry 
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Tallulah disclosed how she dwelt on the possibility of accidents. There is a 
sense she was powerless to stop these thoughts that engulfed and preoccupied 
her: 
 
“It’s difficult. I got the anxiety, the thoughts were crippling and since my child 
was born I had a fear of something happening, worrying about safety. I would 
remain awake at night touching wood.” (Tallulah, p2, 2-3)  
 
The striking thing about this theme is the participants’ descriptions of feeling 
unable to dismiss the constant thoughts they describe. They are unable to ignore 
the troublesome contents of their minds. 
 
The theme C), trapped in the head complements theme A), totality of life, 
which links the participants’ experiences of emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression to unwanted difficult and challenging life 
circumstances. As some participants describe experiences of both unwanted, 
difficult life events and unwanted, cognitive intrusion, one can conclude that pre-
diagnosed depression may be a response to both the totality of life and a response 
to the contents of one’s mind, with retained insight. 
 
It seems that for many participants these two factors may be causally linked, as 
many participants who experienced difficult life events went on to develop what 
they would probably describe as intrusive mental distress that amounted to 
intense emotional suffering, usually incorporating many other unwanted 
experiences. 
 
3.3.3. Aspects of distress experiences, which, through the participants’ 
interpretations, may lead to various coping strategies 
 
D. Severed social and emotional connections  
 
The superordinate theme severed social and emotional connections was 
generated from the subordinate themes mistrust and persecution, troubled 
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relationships, feeling misunderstood and rejected and a need to belong. 
 
i. Mistrust and persecution 
 
Below, Anna talks about feeling she can no longer trust people. She describes 
questioning everyone’s intentions and her attempts to cope with this: 
 
“I used to try and stop thinking and tried to convince myself that actually I 
should not be questioning things as much as I did because it is not real. It’s 
mainly about other people’s mistrust so I try and think of positive things or I try 
and think of my mistakes, or think about how I felt at some point and wonder if 
the other person may have felt that way too.” (Anna, p4, 3-7) 
 
This issue of mistrusting others developed further into a general mistrust of 
everyone, including a mistrust of friends. Allied to this mistrust were feelings of 
persecution: 
 
“I think I became very wary of people. I trusted no one.” (Jumania, p10, 3) 
 
“I didn’t even trust my own friends. I felt so alone and had a complete lack of 
trust. I just felt so let down that I could not depend on anyone.” (Kate, p3, 13-14) 
 
“I started to get paranoid about people. I have always been quite sceptical of 
people but I actually started thinking everyone was against me and it just got too 
much for me.” (Anna, p2, 4-6) 
 
“I just didn’t like people.” (Anna, p2, 14) 
 
When emotionally distressed one may feel vulnerable and different to other 
people and this may be a key factor in the generation of suspicious or paranoid 
thoughts. Freeman & Garety (2006) point out that when people are feeling low, 
they may feel guilty or ashamed and believe that other people not only see this 
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but also may treat them accordingly. This belief only fuels the suspicion and 
paranoia about others.  
 
ii. Troubled relationships  
 
The comments below reveal some of the struggles participants experienced in 
their relationships at the time of their emotional suffering. Anna described how 
she withdrew from her husband and reflected on the negative impact this had on 
their relationship and how consequently they grew apart. 
 
“I just did not like people. That was my reaction. I did not say that but inside 
that is what I was thinking. Even my partner: it affected our relationship a lot; 
we were not intimate at all. I just withdrew from him.” (Anna, p2, 14-16) 
 
Joe explained how he struggled to feel fulfilled in his relationships when he 
was suffering emotionally and this may well have been a maintaining factor in 
his distress: 
 
“I tried huge friendship groups, long-term relationships, short-term 
relationships, casual relationships, one-night stands - everything. Nothing really 
fulfilled me.” (Joe, p6, 14-17)  
 
He discloses that he felt unable to get close to anyone and that, despite having 
intimate relationships with others, he could not escape the painful feeling of 
emptiness he alludes to so often throughout his interview. 
 
Adrian talks about finding relationships chaotic and how, as a coping strategy, 
he found solace in avoiding them all together: 
 
“Well, if I completely become a hermit I wouldn’t have to have these chaotic 
relationships.” (Adrian, p19, 1-2) 
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iii. Feeling misunderstood and rejected 
 
Many participants felt that others did not understand their experience of 
emotional suffering in pre-diagnosed depression. Kate said of her mother: 
 
“She was not letting me feel low and she just thought it was all nonsense.” 
(Kate, p11, 31)  
 
Kate describes further how she felt misunderstood by her family: 
 
“I didn’t feel they understood or knew me at all and they didn’t really care as 
long as I was the sweet Kate who was always there to help. Compared to my 
sister, they were bowled over if she actually even answered the phone or spoke 
with them and everything she did was so wonderful. In fact, she did jack shit for 
them and only ever took care of herself and I felt dreadfully hard done by 
[laughs] because it is really unfair.” (Kate, p12, 14-19) 
 
She laughs when talking about feeling hard done by, perhaps trying to make 
light of how she feels, as she may feel uncomfortable about her disclosure. She 
talks earlier about the importance of being seen as someone who can cope and 
perhaps it was hard to for her to acknowledge that other people’s demands and 
expectations, at that time, were too much for her. 
 
Other participants described feeling misunderstood by others. This was linked 
to reactive feelings of disengagement and isolation from people.  
 
“I would make excuses not to see people. I felt very uncomfortable around 
people. I could not talk, I was just there and felt raw the whole time and felt 
alone like no one understood me.” (Anna, p2, 8-10) 
  
“One time someone said ‘Are you all right? I am saying hello to you’ and I 
had not even noticed they were there.” (Anna, p3, 12-13) 
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When talking about her friends, Jumania says: 
 
“They never used to understand. Like, when I used to say I m feeling really 
down or feeing quite depressed they used to just say ‘You don’t know the 
meaning of it. You don’t know what you’re talking about’. It was like, come on, 
pick yourself up and get on with it. Yeah, I used to hear that quite a lot.” 
(Jumania, p1, 29-32) 
  
“I used to feel that nobody really got me.” (Jumania, p1, 34) 
 
Jane echoes Jumania’s comment: 
 
“There were some people initially that were understanding because they’d 
experienced a few things like that but there were other people who really weren’t 
understanding at all. I think what happened was as a result of me not knowing 
how to manage what was happening to me, as well as not understanding what 
was happening to me.” (Jane, p4, 2-5) 
 
Jane not only felt misunderstood by others, she said that she herself did not 
understand what was happening to her and acknowledges that this exacerbated 
her distress all the more. She elaborates as to why she struggled to be around 
those who did not understand her. It is clear from her quotes that feeling 
understood by others would have helped her re-connect to people, making her 
feel less isolated and perhaps less worried. 
 
“When I am suffering I want to find someone who can understand. I don’t 
want to be around normal friends who really have never suffered because they 
don’t understand and that just increases the sense of isolation.” (Jane, p17, 8-
12) 
 
 “I actually tried a couple of different therapies at the time. There were a few 
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different people around. I went to a few more traditional therapists but when I 
started to talk about my experiences in the spiritual dimension I felt they did not 
understand.” (Jane, p5, 22-25) 
 
iv. A need to belong 
 
A need to belong seemed to arise often in those interviews where participants 
described feeling detached, dissociated or disconnected from others. It also 
appeared to be linked to feeling lost and directionless in life. Anna describes an 
overwhelming sense of needing to belong: 
 
“I always have this overwhelming sense of wanting to be part of something 
and belonging because I do not feel like I am. That is why I have things inside 
me.” (Anna p4, 9-11) 
 
Here she refers to her feelings of distress as “things inside me” and links them 
to not being part of something and not belonging, therefore implying that she 
would have felt better had she been. 
 
In a more positive manifestation of the need to belong, Jane makes reference 
to feeling connected to others in a way she had never experienced before. At this 
point, her experience was a positive one that she described as spiritual. It seemed 
that a sense of belonging was key in her experience at this time. 
 
“I went on holiday to Ireland with some friends who were interested in 
spirituality and that was the first time I’d ever really heard about spiritual things 
and I think I became interested then. Also, they were very creative people, one of 
them was a poet and I felt I was suddenly amongst kindred spirits.” (Jane, p2, 9-
13)  
 
The need to belong bore fruit in a coping strategy with a positive outcome, 
reaffirming the significance of her social and emotional connections at this time.  
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In the following passage, Tania talks about feeling completely lost in her 
distress around the time her parents got divorced and not knowing where she 
belonged any more. She describes how she lost a sense of herself and how this 
could only be regained by identifying with a new crowd of people with who she 
felt she belonged. Her wanting to belong is prominent here and her coping 
behaviour is a response to it. 
 
“I think I completely lost myself. My identity was immature. It took me a long 
time to grow up. I loved being with the family and in the family home and all that 
was so important to me so I think when all this happened I did not know who I 
was so I tried to carve out a new identity by doing all this stuff, self destructive 
behaviour, hanging around with people from different worlds to me… I even 
adopted a new accent, not my middle class accent; it was all unconscious but I 
was longing to be accepted. The new people I was hanging around with were 
working class Afro-Caribbean and some had grown up in awful circumstances. I 
wanted to belong and felt I had a connection with them. I changed everything 
about me to suit my new life.” (Tania, p8, 16-22 & 27-31)  
 
There is a sense here that Tania had to develop a new identity to survive her 
emotional suffering in an interpersonal world where fitting in with others seemed 
her only option.  
 
E) Transformation of Identity 
 
A prominent superordinate theme that emerged was transformation of identity. 
It was evident from the data collected by interview that emotional suffering had 
the ability to transform a participant’s sense of identity either as a result of their 
emotional distress or as a way of managing it. Subordinate themes were social 
comparisons, changed identity, multiple identities and masking, lost identity and 
fixed identity. 
 
i. Social comparisons 
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Some participants descended into tremendous depths of self-doubt and self- 
dissatisfaction as a result of comparing themselves with others and validating 
their identity in relation to them. They tended to engage in upward comparisons, 
measuring themselves against people who appeared or were more skilled or 
fortunate than they were (Festinger, 1954). 
 
The following quotes illustrate some of the ways in which the participants’ 
sense of self was interpreted in terms of, and influenced by, their relations with 
others. The comparisons generally led participants to view themselves in 
unfavourable and self-deprecating ways.  
 
“When I would socially interact I’d spend ages scrutinizing it and just loathed 
it. I guess I kind of looked at myself in the third person and thought: I am not like 
one of these people; everything seems a real breeze for them. They can go down 
the pub and have a laugh and make friendships. Everything’s very kind of 
straightforward, which of course is an enormous assumption but that’s the way I 
felt about other people.” (Adrian, p2, 32-36) 
 
Adrian articulated thoughts and feelings to the effect that these other people 
were managing better and enjoying life more than he was; there is a sense of me 
versus them. When comparing himself to these others, he concludes that he must 
be different in some way. This sense of difference is felt in relation to how he 
views himself in comparison to the people he is around.  
 
Like Adrian, Jumania arrived at the conclusion she is different when 
comparing herself to her friends. At the time of her emotional suffering she felt 
different to her friends, indicating that her sense of identity as a different person 
was triggered and maintained by the comparisons between herself and the 
company she kept. 
 
“I felt alone as a person, feelings, everything, like me as a whole I felt alone 
and that was not necessarily a bad thing but I just thought you’re different. I’m 
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different from all the people I see.” (Jumania, p4, 6-8) 
 
Other participants described a similar and somewhat exaggerated tendency to 
identify themselves in relation to the people around them. Ella’s identity is 
framed in relation to how she feels when she compares herself to her friends 
whose more affluent lives make her feel socially inferior. 
 
“I think I’m living in a flat whereas they’ve got a house. Friends of mine 
would have their houses done up or they’d buy houses and I’d think I haven’t got 
that. I haven’t got a garden I am not a proper family.” (Ella, p4, 25-28)  
 
Later, she says she feels:  
 
“Like I have failed, like I’m not where they are. I’m not clever. I remember 
standing outside someone’s house that I knew…. they had limitless money that 
they could spend on doing it up and I just remember looking through the window 
and being crushed.” (Ella, p4, 37-40) 
 
She confesses to feelings of jealousy brought on by the belief that other 
people’s lives were better than hers. She describes this as a change in her 
personality, reflecting a transformation of her identity: 
 
“I felt jealous of people… It took away the softness and my acceptance of 
everybody, which I was like when I grew up. I was a pleaser really and loved 
people. Instead, having all these thoughts created jealousy and bitchiness as 
every time I heard someone have a success story I would get crushed and feel 
jealous, which I am not doing so much now, so I am very grateful and that was a 
really good indicator for me that things were not right”. (Ella, p6, 17-25) 
 
Kate on the other hand discloses that she feels shame and a negative sense of 
self when she compares herself to her peers: 
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“I wasn’t being productive. I wasn’t here. There was nothing positive coming 
out of me so I felt very much ashamed. Comparing myself to anyone else and 
trying to analyse things and really I should have been fine. I had a roof over my 
head. I had the ability to eat every day. I didn’t have dependants so really I was 
quite lucky yet I wasn’t able to function properly.” (Kate, p8, 15-19) 
 
   Shame is usually connected to a highly negative view of oneself (Padesky, 
1995). It involves the feeling that we have done something wrong. When people 
feel shame they may assume they are flawed or no good.  
 
The participants’ indulgence in social comparisons reveals how their identities, 
at the time of their emotional suffering, were created, maintained and 
transformed in relation to the people around them. Their social surroundings 
provided a framework through which they created an identity for themselves. 
Further exploration of the theme transformation of identity shows the ways in 
which participants presented differently with different groups of people and how 
the ways in which they compared themselves to others affected the way they 
projected themselves on to others.  
 
ii. Changed identity 
 
Social comparisons were seen to bring about a change due to negative self-
appraisal. However, some participants said that their identity had actually 
changed, though not as a result of such comparisons. 
 
Adrian explains how he feels his major episode of distress diagnosed as 
depression changed him into a different person as a result of having to modify 
his behaviour to accommodate his emotional distress: 
 
“I’m a different person now than I was ten years ago, before this major 
episode. There are things I deliberately know I am doing now and deliberately 
avoid, so I will avoid situations because they depress me” (Adrian, p8, 34-36) 
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Others had made a specific decision to change their identity as a result of their 
emotional suffering, thereby creating a coping strategy. Tania describes feeling 
as if she had to become someone else to save herself from her emotional distress. 
The sense of agency in relation to this project is clear. 
 
“It must have felt like I had to get away from my old world as it was the only 
way I could detach myself from my old self and my old world. I had to become 
someone else.” (Tania, p8, 21) 
 
It seems that with her emotional distress she entered uncharted territory in her 
life and felt she had to become a new person to manage it. For these participants 
a change of identity had enabled them to cope with their distress.  
 
iii. Multiple identities and masking 
 
Some participants employed masking and the adoption of multiple identities as 
a way of coping with other people in the course of their emotional distress. 
 
“It’s only in the last three years that I have thought enough is enough. I want a 
life where I am free of having to hide.” (Joe, p4, 4) 
  
“I felt I did not know myself any more. I had to drop that front that I put 
across that everything is fine, that I am happy and can be dependable and I can 
pick the mood up. All of a sudden I had to drop that.” (Joe, p14, 27-29)  
 
“I went to college and all of a sudden within two months I became the centre 
of a group of about 20 friends who organized everything and people would say 
the party didn’t start until I’d turned up.” (Joe, p4, 9-13) 
 
The experience and pressure of putting on a jolly façade is also familiar for 
Adrian who describes reaching a point where he was no longer able to keep 
wearing the mask:  
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“You big yourself up and go out of the door and you are fine and everything’s 
a laugh and everything’s going to be okay and then you just kind of crumble 
when you come back through the door.” (Adrian, p8, 1-4) 
 
It is noticeable that only the male participants describe a mask of laughter in 
which they are having fun and everything is fine. There seems to be some 
counter-attack or overcompensation strategy at play, masking the fact they are 
actually suffering emotionally and in reality not enjoying the company of others 
at all. Perhaps they were attempting to make light of their situation in addition to 
trying to convince others they were well and happy. 
 
Talking about his emotional distress, Adrian also says that though he went to 
lengths to hide or mask his inner self it may have been visible to others anyway.  
 
“I spent years sweeping it under the carpet, hiding it. I think the people around 
me knew because a lot of things went along with the depression, like being 
antisocial or introverted.” (Adrian, p1, 14-16) 
 
Again he reaffirms his need to veil his distress. He was concerned about others 
knowing how he felt: 
 
“I do remember cutting myself on the chest and having absolutely no idea 
why, and this had been going on for a year on and off. I didn’t even notice it 
going on because I didn’t want anybody to know that I was going through so I 
kind of blocked it out, that kind of stuff.” (Adrian, p5, 8-11) 
 
Kate also makes reference to her desire to withdraw from others and this 
seems to originate in her fear that her emotional suffering may have been visible 
and may have resulted in her becoming a burden to others.  
 
“I did not want to be around anyone and maybe that’s because I didn’t want 
anyone to see me like that because I always identified myself as being quite 
bubbly and energetic and a helper, so I didn’t want to burden anyone.” (Kate, 
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p10, 26-30)  
 
“It’s also really interesting because I think that a lot of the time - and I noticed 
this myself - I have tried to cover up my feelings or tried to pretend that things 
are okay because you get to a point where you feel ‘I can’t keep telling my 
friends that I am feeling this way because I am going to become boring for 
people’.” (Jane, p16, 26-30) 
 
Jane’s hiding of her pain is linked to a fear of rejection from others unlike Kate 
who fears being a burden to others and Adrian who fears disapproval from 
others. Though the theme masking was consistent across these participants, it 
appeared that the motivations behind each one differed. Nonetheless, common to 
them all was fear of being perceived and evaluated negatively by others.  
 
This fear echoes some of the symptoms cited in a diagnosis of social phobia 
where people experience dread in relation to how they will be perceived or 
judged by others, usually involving a fear of embarrassment or humiliation. 
Extensive co-morbidity between a diagnosis of social anxiety and major 
depression has been established, though social worry has also been known to 
have an earlier age of onset than distress categorised as depression. Less is 
known however about the relationship between them (Chavira, Stein & Bailey, 
2004). Whilst it is clear that in the above instances participants were talking 
about wanting to hide their emotional suffering, their concerns about how others 
would perceive them also seemed to reflect those experiences commonly 
associated with a diagnosis of social anxiety 
 
“I was a failure because I was depressed. There was no way I wanted people 
to know” (Adrian, p7, 25-17) 
 
iv. Lost identity 
 
The following comments indicate a sense of lost self that some participants 
alluded to when disclosing their experiences of pre-diagnosed depression. Here, 
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Kate describes feeling that she no longer knows herself and almost sees herself 
as a stranger: 
 
“So, it was complete loss of self in a way. Of thinking, just who is this person 
that’s emerged?” (Kate, p9, 23-24) 
 
Jane also articulates feelings of disconnection linked to a lost self:  
 
“I mean, I was in such a state there was no sense of identity or self, really. I 
didn’t communicate at all. Really, I withdrew entirely in to a mental world where 
I was absolutely in a sort of fantasy world.” (Jane, p8, 34-36) 
 
Ella elaborates on her feelings of lost self in response to the researcher’s 
question: 
 
“Did you experience any changes to your self identity at the time and your 
perception of yourself?” (Researcher, p5, 24) 
 
“Yeah, [I felt like] a non-entity” (Ella, p5, 25) 
 
This quote indicates that the participant’s sense of self has dissolved, possibly 
in response to the ongoing distraction and immersion of her emotional distress.  
 
v. Fixed identity  
 
Some participants described feeling that their emotional suffering was a 
manifestation of who they were and what they had become, thereby linking it 
more directly to their identity or sense of self. Tania describes feeling that her 
emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression was just a part of who 
she was: 
 
“I thought, this is not a real problem. This is something I am faking. I was 
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making a big deal of it because I just thought it was part of my character.” 
(Tania, p11, 18-20) 
 
She communicates a belief that her emotional suffering is not related to 
anything in the material world or to any particular living difficulty or 
circumstance. Instead, she sees it as being merely the product of experiences 
created and maintained by her personality alone. A sense of powerlessness 
comes through here; if her distress diagnosed as depression is part of who she is 
then it may be something she has no control over and will never escape. This 
may be a manifestation of the feeling of helplessness recognized in the 
psychological literature on depression (Seligman, 1975). 
 
Jumania also explained that she felt her unwanted thoughts were just part of 
who she was: 
 
“When you were depressed did you still have those thoughts about cleanliness 
and germs?” (Researcher, p8, 19-20) 
 
“Yeah, it’s kind of like become installed in me. That is part of me.” (Jumania, 
p8, 22) 
 
Jumania sees herself as the totality of her obsessive thoughts linked to her 
emotional distress, again attributing them to her personality. She believed the 
thoughts were part of her rather than cognitive intrusions triggered and 
maintained by her emotional distress. Her belief that her obsessions were 
ingrained in her identity and life experience run counter to mindfulness theories 
which suggest intrusive and obsessive thoughts are uncomfortable experiences 
that are transitory and inevitable aspects of human life (Gilbert, 2009).  
 
Anna, too, explains that she had not considered her experience of emotional 
distress to be the depression it was diagnosed as. She perceived her distress to be 
part of her personality and identity, attributing her emotional suffering to who 
she was: 
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“I did not think mine was depression, I just thought ‘Help, I cannot cope’. I 
thought it was just what I was…” (Anna, p8, 6-7) 
 
Finally, the identification of the self with a diagnosis of depression sometimes 
leads to reluctance to let go: 
 
“This is another thing about the way I’ve experienced depression, that it’s 
something I’ve kind of enjoyed as well. It’s the sort of thing that is a real part of 
me and I haven’t wanted to give it up.” (Adrian, p10, 31-33)  
 
Adrian indicates that his emotional suffering had almost become like his 
friend. He does not want to reject it and it is possible this is linked to feelings of 
fear about the unknown, of living his life without it.  
 
F) Dissociation 
 
Related subordinate themes of dissociation were disengagement and alienation 
and chosen detachment, the latter being a coping strategy.  
 
The researcher will begin by looking at the participants’ navigation through 
already existing feelings of dissociation, which exacerbated feelings of personal 
distress in pre-diagnosed depression. She will elaborate and examine in more 
detail the participants’ descriptions of a peculiar inability to feel connected to the 
world.  
 
Whilst this research set out to explore experiences of distress diagnosed as 
depression, it was interesting to discover that, for some, emotional suffering 
involved an absence of experiencing any emotions at all. Participants portrayed 
this as flatness, indifference and even a living death.  
 
i. Disengagement and alienation 
 123 
 
This profound feeling of being cut off from others was both distressing and 
isolating. It goes beyond the BDI-II (1996) reference of social withdrawal. 
Participants often described this feeling of being disconnected and cut off from 
other people as feeling alienated.  
 
Jumania describes being with her friends and at the same time feeling as 
though she is not really there with them. She seems to experience these situations 
more in the role of observer rather than as a social participant. The term 
depersonalization refers to feeling cut off from both the world and even one’s 
own self. People with depersonalization complain of feeling like a robot or an 
automatic pilot and feeling like an observer of oneself (Barker, Hunter, Lawrence 
& David, 2007).  
 
“I felt like I was an onlooker on myself. It’s as if I’d been recorded on CCTV 
or whatever and I was just watching myself.” (Jumania, p5, 4-6) 
 
She goes on to describe a sense of disconnection between herself and others, a 
sense of feeling different to everyone else. She describes this experience as 
alienating: 
 
“I would see people laughing and joking and just getting on with their normal 
lives around me and I would feel like they were in a different world to me.” 
(Jumania, p3, 30-31)  
 
“It’s like I felt detached and they weren’t aware of this. They would include 
me in their jokes and everything but I felt like we were in different places in our 
lives.” (Jumania, p9, 33-35)  
 
“I felt like I was in my own world. I was experiencing different things.” 
(Jumania, p4, 10-11)  
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“I was going to say ‘alienated’.” (Jumania, p4, 15) 
 
Similarly Jane,  
 
“There was just a sense of being somehow outside of the normal world. Also 
what I found was that I was unable to communicate with a lot of my friends and I 
felt very alienated from them.” (Jane, p3, 38-40)  
 
Adrian refers to feeling alien around others: 
 
“I didn’t want to be with them, I did not want to be there. I wanted to hide 
away, I felt that I was sort of slightly alien to these people.” (Adrian, p2, 28-29)  
 
Joe also alludes to a feeling of separateness from his friends when he describes 
this surreal experience of feeling as if he is watching them and himself from a 
distance, removed and detached from them: 
 
“People would say ‘The party does not start till you turn up’ - the classic - but 
it was like I was watching. I would feel like I was in a theatre, in the stalls, 
watching the play on the stage and having no connection to it other than just 
observing.” (Joe, p4, 11-14) 
 
Cheryl affirms her inability to feel connected to her friends: 
 
“It’s like total emptiness, like most of the time even when I am with friends, I 
just feel numb and detached and everything feels cold and distant even though I 
am in the moment.” (Cheryl, p9, 18-19) 
 
Given that a lack of support is a recognized trigger and compounder of 
emotional distress (Hammen, 1998), it seems a cruel twist of fate that these 
participants were unable to connect with people in a meaningful way that might 
have supported them in their time of personal distress. Unsurprisingly this 
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incongruity intensified their emotional suffering all the more. 
 
“There was a feeling of intense loneliness in me. The more it went on, the less 
able I felt to actually find a way in to the world.” (Jane, p4, 32) 
 
This feeling of utter disconnection is not something that is overly 
acknowledged in popular cognitive theories of emotional distress categorised as 
depression. Yet it seems the ways people connect or disconnect from the material 
world and why is of great significance to the experiences of emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as depression. 
 
Jane discloses an absence of feeling, which contributed to her interpersonal 
difficulties at the time: 
 
“I lost my ability to feel people. I had uncomfortable interactions with people 
because I couldn’t sense what was going on for them at all, so I would sometimes 
ask questions that they were obviously uncomfortable with and I wouldn’t even 
realize. I would just suddenly read it from their faces, I had to learn to read 
faces.” (Jane, p9, 27-30) 
  
“It was very strange, feeling that cut off from people and talking to them or 
interacting with them but not having any sense of them emotionally at all. I 
started to understand how people could sort of view each other as objects of 
curiosity. I really did not have any empathy at all and it suddenly all made sense 
that people could do awful things to each other and have no feelings about doing 
so.” (Jane, p10, 3-10)  
 
Tania reaffirms her experience of having no feelings at all and the resulting 
sense of detachment when she describes how she feels like she is talking about 
someone else: 
 
“Because I internalize everything I did not get angry. There were no related 
emotions. Even now it is like I am talking about someone else but I think what 
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happened was I repressed it all and went about my day.” (Tania, p6, 1-3) 
 
Adrian talks about loss of feeling giving rise to feelings of indifference: 
 
“You could come up to me and say ‘Well done, you’ve won the lottery’ and I’d 
go ‘That’s fine’.” (Adrian, p14, 6-7) 
 
Perhaps the most prominent aspect of this subordinate theme was an 
experience of dissociation and detachment triggered and maintained by a 
profound loss of feeling and a consequent emptiness. 
 
Kate describes this feeling of total emptiness below: 
 
“I just surpassed it all. You surpass being scared or you surpass almost 
feeling nauseous with depression because you feel so sad or so low or so 
panicked. You surpass all of that and you’re an empty shell and I would have not 
been able to get myself up off the floor. Someone else did.” (Kate, p7, 18-21) 
 
When reflecting on her experience of feeling cut off from the rest of the world, 
Cheryl concludes that ultimately she feels empty and different as mentioned 
previously in the theme severed connections. 
 
“You don’t feel like you are really there somehow, so it’s like separateness 
between you and other people. Not even other people, just the world, buildings 
and tables seem lifeless and empty.” (Cheryl, p9, 22) 
 
“Sounds like a jigsaw puzzle and you are the bit that won’t go in.” 
(Researcher, p9, 23) 
 
“Yeah, good, ha!” (Cheryl, p9, 24) 
 
Kate also refers to this sense of a mere existence or living death. The following 
 127 
extract illustrates the experience of feeling there was nothing left of life at all: 
 
“I was not eating or drinking anything, stopped going to the loo and I just sat 
on the floor in my bedroom in a heap and just didn’t move.” (Kate, p6, 30-31) 
 
“Why? What was stopping you from moving?” (Researcher, p6, 32) 
 
“There was just nothing left.” (Kate, p6, 33) 
 
  The depersonalization already mentioned also encompasses feeling emotionally 
numb and detached from the world around you, lacking empathy towards other 
people and the world around you appearing artificial and less colourful than it 
really is (Barker et al., 2007). These are all experiences described by the 
participants, although, interestingly the literature says that people with distress 
diagnosed as depression only report depersonalization from time to time and that 
it is generally confined to emotional blunting or deadness of feeling (Barker et 
al., 2007).  
 
ii. Chosen detachment 
 
This section will look at how some participants appeared to use dissociation as 
a coping mechanism to aid them through and detach them from their emotional 
suffering.  
 
Some participants described escaping by retreating into imaginary situations, 
on occasion even fantasizing about death as the ultimate escape: 
 
“I would fantasize about being in a car crash.” (Ella, p8, 30) 
 
Although Ella entertained thoughts of death, the concept of taking her own life 
was unthinkable to her at the time. She was separated from her husband because 
of his gambling problems and had young children who were dependent solely on 
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her. 
 
Jane elaborated on her complete avoidance of others by retreating to a fantasy 
world devoid of any interaction with the outside world.  
 
“I mean, I was in such a state, there was no sense of identity or self, really. I 
didn’t communicate at all. I withdrew entirely into a mental world where I was 
absolutely in a sort of fantasy world.” (Jane, p8, 34-36)  
 
Her comment suggests she feels that in the absence of any social interaction 
she experienced a complete loss of self where she no longer felt she existed in 
the material world. However she continues to describe her experience as 
somewhat detached and possibly destructive. She revealed that her emotional 
suffering intensified around this time and it sounded as if losing touch with 
reality was pivotal in exacerbating her distress. 
 
“This is my understanding of it: I felt opened up on some level to something 
I’d not experienced before and I think I also somehow started to lose touch with 
normal life.” (Jane, p3, 29) 
 
It is important to note that she says she didn’t communicate at all and 
withdrew to a mental world. It seems an element of choice influenced this 
process. This is in contrast to cases in which she and other participants describe 
strong feelings of disconnection and detachment that did not arise through choice 
and caused them dreadful suffering and related anxiety. In the case of Jane, this 
decision to withdraw from others into a mental world was the beginning of 
something more sinister that was soon to overpower her and deny her of any 
connection with the external world. 
 
Tania also describes retreating to a chosen place of fantasy to avoid and escape 
from her life as it is. 
 
“I fantasized about the past a lot.” (Tania, p10, 4) 
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“I would also have fantasies about climbing through the TV into my old family 
life.” (Tania, p10, 6-7) 
 
This preference for fantasy suggests that these participants were not happy 
with their real worlds at the time and were escaping into fantasies that could 
make them feel better and perhaps more in control. It seemed that reality was a 
zone they chose not to be in.  
 
Cheryl also discloses a sense of chosen detachment and dissociation and 
indicates that it served a purpose in the form allowing her to escape difficult 
feelings and situations. 
 
“Well, I like my bubble. I do not like people in my personal space and even 
when I’m not in a depressed mood, I still feel like that a lot.” (Cheryl, p7, 10-11) 
 
The borders between reality and fantasy appear to have blurred in some of the 
participants’ descriptions of their pre-diagnosed depression experiences. It seems 
that in the above cases participants have chosen to dissociate as this provides a 
better alternative to a world that had for them become meaningless, grey and 
miserable.  
 
The fantasies of fantasy prone people often include dissociation and a high 
correlation between dissociation and fantasy proneness has been identified 
(Dalenberg, 2012). Both Jane and Tania describe fantasizing and they both 
reported high levels of chosen and unwanted detachment and dissociation 
throughout their emotional suffering. 
 
A link has been established between the fantasy-prone personality and 
paranormal and intense religious experiences (Wilson & Barber, 1983). Jane 
describes both spiritual and religious experiences, as recorded in the theme belief 
in a higher force to be discussed next, and retreating into a fantasy world 
throughout the course of her emotional suffering.  
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G) Belief in a higher force 
 
Belief in a higher force refers to the participants’ understanding and 
interpretation of their emotional suffering within a supernatural or spiritual 
framework, characterized by the belief that a higher force or stronger power is 
controlling their experience of emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as 
depression.  
 
Subordinate themes that generated this superordinate theme were destiny, 
deserving of punishment, superstition and spirituality. This theme is also 
reflected in some of the participants’ various coping strategies. 
 
i. Destiny 
 
The subordinate theme destiny was a term some participants used to describe a 
sense of fate and determinism, which they believed to be in control of their 
emotional suffering. The following passage illustrates how these concepts and 
beliefs manifested: 
 
“It’s too much effort in the end. It’s too hard. It’s like you’re changing the 
flipping curtains when the whole house is falling down around you, trying to 
keep things under control and then in the end you just think, right, I’ll just leave 
it to fate.” (Joe, p8, 8-11)  
 
Here Joe expresses his inability to maintain the battle against his emotional 
suffering and describes feeling despondent. He communicates his desire to 
“throw the towel in” (Joe, p28, 15) and just give up altogether; with a mixture of 
despondency and relief, he places his future in the hands of a stronger power he 
calls fate.  
 
Other participants pointed to a more punitive sense of feeling damned. 
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“I felt like I was doomed, like I was not going to get better.” (Jumania, p3, 28-
29)  
 
ii. Deserving of punishment  
 
“I just wanted to be dead. I just thought ‘What’s the point of being alive when 
you have been afflicted with so much crap?’ It’s cruel. I used to think, ‘What did 
I do to deserve this life?’” (Anna, p2, 21)  
 
Anna’s account reflects a sense of being punished by a higher force that’s 
beyond her control. She describes feeling that she deserves her emotional distress 
and talks about being afflicted, suggesting that bad things in life just happen to 
her combined with the belief that they may have happened for a reason, such as 
to punish her. She goes on to say: 
 
“I did not think mine was depression, I just thought ‘Help, I cannot cope’. I 
thought it was just what I was and just what I deserved.” (Anna, p8, 6-7) 
 
She suggests that she is somehow blameworthy of emotional and 
psychological punishment and one might suspect that this would further 
compound her suffering and reinforce her feelings of low self esteem and self 
doubt.  
 
Cheryl describes an uncertainty about her spiritual beliefs, claiming she is 
divided on whether she believes in God or not. Though she says she is an atheist, 
she feels God is punishing her, as this is the only way she can make sense of her 
suffering and discomfort of her existence. 
 
“My head was wrong, my life was wrong. I should not be here. I am an atheist, 
I don’t believe in God but if there is one, it would be like he has put me on this 
Earth and I should not be here. He has made a mistake and now he is trying to 
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punish me for it for being here.” (Cheryl, p12, 8-11) 
 
Later she elaborates, indicating that she is being controlled and possessed by a 
higher force. She does not describe this as God but as “something coming over 
me”, perhaps leaning towards something more sinister. 
 
“I was crying once, as usual in the evening, and something came over me and 
I felt possessed. It sounds really weird but I had this overwhelming feeling of 
dread and fear and I was writing stuff and did not know what; it felt like it wasn’t 
me doing it but I have never been so scared in my life. It was terrifying. I don’t 
think anyone really believes me.” (Cheryl, p12, 13-18) 
 
iii. Superstition 
 
Some participant’s were more superstitious than others and in some cases this 
subordinate theme was linked to anxiety and obsessive behaviours, as may be 
seen in the following passage: 
 
“I had a fear of becoming something I didn’t want to become. I had obsessive 
thoughts for three or four years about becoming a devil worshipper. I have never 
wanted to be a devil worshipper but I had non-stop thoughts about becoming 
one, to the point where I used to pray constantly.” (Jumania, p15, 2-5) 
 
Here, the participant feels she is losing control to supernatural forces and is 
afraid of this. She adopts safety behaviour, praying in an attempt to ward this off 
and regain some control over her life and future. The cited links between worry 
and despair have been mentioned in the introduction and it is evident that this 
participant’s emotional suffering incorporated feelings of fear and worry.  
 
This supernatural - or superstitious - perspective is also apparent in Joe’s 
attempt to overcome his suffering: 
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“It was like I was exorcising some sort of demon.” (Joe, p9, 8)  
 
It is as if, feeling that something or someone has taken control over him, he is 
commanding it to depart in the name of a higher power.  
 
iv. Spirituality 
 
Some participants referred to the discovery of spirituality at the time of their 
emotional distress and saw their distress as a transformative experience from one 
stage of their life to another. Spiritual interpretations sometimes seemed to make 
possible a positive reconstruction of the participant’s experience and to help 
some participants to regain control of their lives.  
 
Jane makes reference to her emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as 
depression as a spiritually transformative period in her life. She explains having 
met a psychic healer who she believes understood her plight by saying:  
 
“I can see that you have gone through some sort of spiritual awakening.” 
(Jane, p3, 8-10) 
 
This same participant also refers to a newly developed belief in God: 
 
“Suddenly, for the first time, I believed in what people would call God, 
probably because I suddenly felt aware of something else, of another dimension 
of existence that I had not been aware of or at all interested in up until that 
point.” (Jane, p2 38-41) 
 
As she describes her experience as profoundly empowering, this resort to 
spirituality may be viewed as a coping strategy. 
 
H) Disciplining the self 
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Another superordinate theme that arose was disciplining the self. This need for 
discipline found particular expression in the subordinate themes finding control 
and application of acceptance and patience. 
 
i. Finding control  
 
Throughout the interviews many participants described a need to feel in 
control and this was often a response to feeling out of control. Adrian explains 
how he felt he had lost control and describes his attempts to regain a sense of 
control in his life: 
 
“I just wasn’t coping with large groups of people really. I was fine one-to-one 
but felt incredibly out of control as soon as I was in a group.” (Adrian, p2, 21-
23) 
 
“I was in a new environment, new stresses, didn’t really know who I was, felt 
out of control. There you go, felt completely out of control. The whole food thing 
was about, I think, in it’s varying guises about control. I had a need to punish 
myself around food so I could be binge eating, putting on tons of weight and then 
starving and then the whole bulimic thing.” (Adrian, p6, 22-30) 
  
Reflecting on his need to have things in order Adrian says,  
 
“It became obsessive.” (Adrian, p18, 33) 
 
“The washing up has got to be done and the clothes have got to be put away 
and all the toys have got to be in their baskets. Yes, and that goes along with so 
many different things and as soon as it’s not, you are out of control and even 
when you are out of control emotionally, if you go into a room and everything is 
tidy, that’s alright. It looks in control. It’s part of that façade. It’s like I’m saying 
that I am not depressed, I haven’t got any problems - look at it, everything is 
tidy.” (Adrian, p18, 9-12) 
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Jumania also discloses that she felt out of control at the time of her pre-
diagnosed depression and it is evident in her description that she felt able to 
overcome this experience by controlling and disciplining her thought processes: 
 
“I remember going to my job and not being able to control myself and just 
crying.” (Jumania, p3, 19)  
 
“I feel that if I think I am down, I am down, and if I think in my head that I can 
enjoy myself today, despite how bad I was feeling an hour ago, I am able to 
enjoy myself today.” (Jumania, p9, 18-20) 
 
ii. Application of acceptance and patience 
 
Ella describes how the discipline of a steady mechanism within her enabled 
her to control herself and not spiral into a breakdown. She was able to retain 
some stability throughout her emotional distress with the application of 
acceptance and patience, and there is a sense she is in charge of her emotions. 
 
“I knew something was not right but then I knew I would not have a 
breakdown.” (Ella, p3, 28-29) 
 
“I felt very strong as well so even though I was crumbling there was 
something in me that I felt I could cope with it and it wasn’t a fake cope, it was 
just a steady mechanism that I had in my head which I feel like has always been 
there, of just sailing and just biding.” (Ella, p3, 30-34) 
 
Whether Ella and Jumania are aware of it or not, they both appear to be 
cultivating aspects of mindfulness with the application of patience, acceptance 
and the focusing and discipline of their attention and awareness. Mindfulness 
involves understanding attention and learning how not to be caught in the 
automatic-ness of our thoughts and taking control over what we attend to rather 
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than allowing our attention to be directed by whatever emotions happen to be 
activated at the time (Gilbert, 2009). 
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4 
DISCUSSION 
 
  
 
4.1. Discussion 
 
 The terms ‘symptoms’ and ‘depression’ arise throughout this study. This is not 
because the researcher believes that classification manuals and their terminology have 
an authority in relation to experiences diagnosed as depression. Rather it is because it is 
important to understand how emotional distress diagnosed as depression is understood 
and discussed in the existing literature. Once the researcher had completed this research 
and analysed the generated themes, it became apparent that the word ‘depression’ 
functions as an umbrella term for an array of experiences that people struggle to make 
sense of when they are emotionally distressed. 
  
This thesis attempts to flesh out the clinical term depression by revealing how some 
of these distressing experiences are much more complex and heterogeneous than is 
suggested in the classification manuals. Indeed the results of this study show that the 
diagnostic term ‘depression’ failed to apply to some of my participants’ experiences of 
emotional distress and that it might be preferable if this term were used in a less rigidly 
diagnostic manner. Emotional distress has been found to manifest in difficult 
relationships, bodily experiences, spiritual experiences, mental distress and challenged 
and fractured sense of the self. 
  
This research hopes to make a contribution to the understanding of people’s 
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experience of emotional suffering by giving voice to the participants’ experiences and 
illustrating both how emotional distress manifests for individuals and how it impacts on 
their day-to-day living experiences. It charts the journey people undergo from the 
moment they feel something is not quite right up until the time they are diagnosed with 
depression by a GP or a psychiatrist. 
  
4.2. Summary of findings 
  
The results section reveals the prominent experiences that arose for participants and 
documents them in the form of superordinate and related subordinate themes. This 
discussion will consider how the documented themes revealed in this study relate to the 
relevant literature in the field of counselling psychology and psychology in more general 
terms. 
  
Some of the generated themes, for example, deserving of punishment and physical 
manifestations of self-loathing, have already been documented in established 
classification manuals. However, the researcher doubts whether symptoms listed in this 
way can adequately capture and incorporate the experiences of those who suffer 
emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression. Symptoms and signs are often 
described using words such as psychomotor retardation or indecisiveness. Nothing 
further is conveyed as to what the contents of these experiences are. Consequently, 
describing what they actually felt like expands on themes formed in this study, such as 
feeling deserving of punishment. 
  
Some of the themes have not been noted in classification manuals and it is to be 
hoped that this study provides some interesting and original data. For example, the 
theme belief in a higher force documents the participants’ experiences of spirituality. 
However, it must be acknowledged that those experiences which are not documented as 
symptoms in classification manuals such as DSM-IV-TR (2000) and the Beck 
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Depression Inventory (BDI-II (1996) may be acknowledged and reflected in more 
general psychological literature. Such themes will be discussed in relation to the existing 
literature available on them. 
  
There was considerable overlap between the themes generated in this research and 
the existing literature. This is not fully alluded to in the results section due to both 
restrictions on word limits and the fact that the primary purpose was to discuss themes 
that arose rather than how they overlapped. 
  
4.3. Links between themes and existing literature 
  
4.3.1. Totality of life 
  
One of the themes discussed in the results section was totality of life at the time. This 
captured possible links between life events and the onset and maintenance of 
experiences of emotional distress. Some participants were able to say that their distress 
was caused by life events at the time. For example, one participant explained that her 
distress had been caused by the stress of having to move out of her home into a box 
room with two young children due to her husband’s gambling problems. She said the 
stress of her circumstances had pushed her into the “worst part of her psyche”. 
  
Another participant disclosed how difficult her life was as a single mother on 
benefits. Although she had a boyfriend at the time, the responsibility of raising and 
financially supporting her child was largely down to her. She described feeling 
directionless and hopeless and, due to her commitments as a mother, was unable to 
escape from being financially dependent on the welfare system. 
  
Population studies have shown that poor mental health is strongly associated with 
low income and material deprivation (Fryers, Melzer, Jenkins & Brugha, 2005). People 
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on lower than average income are twice as likely to develop mental health problems 
(Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). Pickett & Wilkinson (2010) have gathered substantial 
evidence, through long-term population studies, that the bigger the gap between the 
richest and poorest members of a society, the worse said society performs on measures 
such as mental and physical health, violence, crime, obesity, education and community 
life. Cromby et al. (2013) state that restricted income, resources and opportunities 
enable distress to arise more often and more severely and that those in disadvantaged 
situations will have fewer resources to buffer their experience of distress. 
  
Some participants linked the onset of their emotional suffering to life events such as 
loss of a relationship, death of a friend or the divorce of their parents. Kendler, Hettema, 
Butera, Gardner & Prescott (2003) found that experiences of loss or humiliation made 
people more likely to suffer from distress diagnosed as major depression whilst 
experiences of loss and danger rendered people more likely to suffer from worry 
categorized as generalized anxiety disorder. In this study it was found in the 
participants’ accounts of their experiences, experiences of loss were pervasive. 
  
 The foregoing is in contrast to explanations that are inclined to attribute emotional 
distress to the person than a response to their surrounding world. For example (Weekes, 
1977) in her book Self Help For Your Nerves writes “above all, remember that 
depression is you, and it is not the world that is so terrible. Depression is an illness, just 
as influenza is an illness”. This book was written some time ago and it is interesting to 
note how emotional suffering is not considered to be linked to the nature of people’s 
lives. 
  
4.3.2. Trapped in the head 
  
The theme trapped in the head, does not relate so much to the specific content of 
thinking as to the experience of being overwhelmed by the presence of thoughts and by 
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an inability to escape them. When describing experiences of worry, overthinking, over 
analysing and noise in the head, participants alluded to an experience of being locked in 
by their thoughts. Whilst there is much literature acknowledging dysfunctional thought 
processes in emotional distress categorized as depression, the researcher was not able to 
find any material that focused on this sense of being locked in by thoughts. 
  
As the results section conveys, some participants describe their experience of 
emotional suffering as a heady manifestation of thoughts. Beck (1979), in describing 
emotional distress as a thinking disorder, emphasizes their negative, dysfunctional and 
intrusive character. However he omits any reference to their claustrophobic and constant 
locked-in-ness. 
  
The closest example in the literature the researcher could find was in Trapnell & 
Campbell’s (1999) differentiation between motivated attention on the self, such as the 
enjoyment of trying to understand oneself through reflection, and a tendency to be 
constantly analysing why one does things. This latter sense of endless inner reflection 
has something though not everything in common with what participants in this study 
communicated as a feeling of being locked in by their thought processes. 
  
Hoeksema’s theory on overthinking also links in to this feeling of being locked in by 
cognitions. Hoeksema (2003) describes overthinking as going over and over negative 
thoughts and feelings, examining them, questioning them and kneading them like dough. 
She outlines three possible types of overthinking: rant and rave overthinking centring 
around some wrong we believe has been done to us; life of its own overthinking where 
one entertains possible causes for their feelings and accepts all the explanations we 
generate, especially the most dramatic ones; and, lastly, chaotic overthinking, where we 
don’t move in a straight line from one problem to another and all kinds of concerns 
flood our minds at the same time. Chaotic overthinking can be especially overwhelming 
as people can’t identify what they feel or think very clearly and become overwhelmed 
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with feelings and thoughts that disorientate them, causing them to shut down or run 
away (Hoeksema, 2003). Chaotic thinking captures what many of the participants in this 
study described as persisting throughout the time of their emotional distress, a constant 
intrusion of thoughts and worries, linked to their life and world experiences at the time 
which they could not expel from their minds. 
  
For example, they might feel overwhelmed with self-deprecating thoughts that are set 
off and maintained by constant social comparisons; these in turn may cause people to 
feel inferior to more affluent and seemingly respectable others. Hoeksema (2003) cites 
the different ways in which happy and unhappy people engage in social comparisons 
suggesting that unhappy people engage in social comparisons a lot as they are more 
attuned to their status compared to others.  Unhappy people worry more about how they 
are doing. Their moods are more affected by thoughts about relative status, with the 
result that how they measure up against others ends up being more important to them 
than how they actually perform. In contrast, happy people generally ignore social 
comparison as their identity is based on more stable internal standards. In this case if 
they meet their own standards, then they are happy (Hoeksema, 2003). 
  
Whilst this rings true for this research, it should be acknowledged that participants 
felt socially inferior to their peers due to deterioration in status and lifestyle. Their 
intrusive and overwhelming thoughts are a manifestation of distress with life at the time. 
The mind becomes fixated with this and struggles to think about anything else. There 
seems then to be an interaction between unhappiness in life and a related obsession with 
the explanation of this unhappiness. This is re-affirmed by Teasedale & Green (2004) 
who describe a mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and passively 
focusing on experiences of distress and on the possible causes and consequences of it. 
  
4.3.3. A need to belong 
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This tendency to compare the self with others shares elements of another theme 
discussed in the results section, namely a need to belong. In social psychology the need 
to belong is an intrinsic motivation to affiliate with others and be socially accepted 
(Zimbardo & Formica, 1963). This need plays a role in a number of social phenomena 
such as self-presentation and social comparison. Our need to belong is what drives us to 
seek out stable, long-lasting relationships with other people. It also motivates us to 
participate in social activities such as clubs, sporting, religious and community 
activities. By belonging to a group, we feel we are a part of something bigger and more 
important than ourselves. 
  
It has also been noted by Shachter (1959) that contact with other people is often an 
antidote to loneliness as it reduces anxiety. Simply put, there is safety in numbers and 
the presence of others can distract people from their concerns. The reactions of others 
can provide information about our situations and other people. They provide the means 
by which we evaluate ourselves. 
  
In The Theory of Human Motivation (1943), Abraham Maslow identifies the human 
need for affiliation. The hierarchy is usually portrayed as a pyramid, with more basic 
needs at the base and more complex ones near the summit. The need for love and 
belonging lies at the centre of the pyramid as part of the social needs. While Maslow 
suggested that these needs were less important than the physiological and safety needs, 
he believed that the need for belonging helped people to experience companionship and 
acceptance through family, friends and other relationships (Maslow, 1943). 
  
It was evident in this research that some participants who felt misunderstood, lost, 
detached or isolated were longing to experience a feeling of connection with others. The 
theme a need to belong was a subordinate theme of severed social and emotional 
connections and it seemed some participants who did not feel connected to others 
expressed a yearning to belong to a group or crowd where they felt accepted and 
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understood. 
  
4.3.4. Dissociation 
  
Dissociation has been described as a partial or complete disruption of the normal 
integration of a person’s consciousness or psychological functioning. It is a common 
response to trauma as it allows people to distance themselves from experiences that are 
too much for them to cope with by spacing out or switching off (Dell & Neil, 2009). 
Dissociation was one of the most prominent themes that emerged in the participants’ 
experiences of emotional distress. The term dissociation captures a sense of being 
detached and cut off from the world. However, the term depersonalization seems to be 
more suggestive of the depth of the experiences participants described when reflecting 
on their varied experiences of dissociation. 
  
The following have been associated with the experience of depersonalization; feeling 
cut off or detached from the word around you, being emotionally numb, lacking 
empathy towards other people, feeling in a dreamlike state, feeling isolated from the 
world around you, feeling like an observer of yourself with the world around you 
appearing artificial and less colourful than it really is (Barker et al., 2007). Such 
experiences appear to mirror what some participants in this study were experiencing in 
their emotional distress. They are not documented in depression classification manuals. 
  
Participants described feeling as if they were observers of themselves. They reported 
feeling as if they were watching themselves on CCTV or watching themselves perform 
in a play when they were socializing at parties. There is a distinction to be drawn here 
between dissociation from the self and dissociation from others and the surrounding 
world. Some participants described feeling dissociated from themselves whilst others 
described feeling dissociated and detached from others. 
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Feelings were disclosed of intense detachment from the surrounding world, feeling 
completely cut off from people and having no empathy or sense of them emotionally. 
Some participants also conveyed an emotional indifference to the things that would 
normally arouse excitement and emotion such as winning the lottery. 
  
When experiencing depersonalization participants also described changes in the way 
they experienced their surrounding world visually at the time of their emotional distress. 
They explained that chairs and tables seemed somehow empty and lifeless. It seems this 
particular experience might be better described by the term derealisation which is 
defined as an alteration in the perception or experience of the external world so that it 
appears strange or unreal (Baker et al., 2007). 
 
4.3.5. Belief in a higher force/spirituality 
  
Links between dissociation and spirituality have been established by Loewenthal 
(2007). She claims that in certain societies, what we might consider to be dissociation 
may in fact be connected to culturally or religiously specific states. Participants 
disclosed having spiritual experiences at the time of their emotional suffering during 
which they felt possessed, as if in some kind of trance. Case studies from Singapore 
(Ng, 2000), Colombia (Pineros, Rosselli & Calderon, 1998), Senegal (Bullard, 2005) 
and other African societies (Helman, 2000) have shown possession and trance states to 
share certain features with dissociative states, such as amnesia, multiplicity and a loss of 
touch with reality. It has also been noted that feeling possessed may result from 
personally stressful and traumatic experiences and is often more connected to religion, 
such as the belief in reincarnation and spirits (Cromby et al., 2013). 
  
Chen (2006) states that striving for meaning is considered to be at the core of an 
individual’s being and the driving force behind intellect and emotion. These 
understandings can be incorporated within religious perspectives of life and in 
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humanistic and existential thinking as discussed in the introduction. Spirituality has been 
conceptualized as a broader search for meaning in life, involving a universal power as a 
guide (Koenig, 2001,Canda & Furman, 1999; Underwood, Powe, Canales, Meade & Im, 
2006). The concept of spirituality is found in all cultures and is often considered to 
encompass a search for ultimate meaning through religion. Both religious and spiritual 
beliefs offer a foundation from which understanding, insight and meaningful life 
experiences may be recognized by providing feelings of comfort, peace, faith and hope. 
These concepts may be linked to the generation of the theme belief in a higher force. 
Although none of the classifications manuals for depression document spiritual 
experiences as a possible component of emotional distress categorized as depression, the 
relationship between spirituality, religion and health is now a focal point of interest in 
mainstream health psychology and psychiatry (Culliford, 2002; Miller & Thoresen, 
2003). There is substantial empirical evidence highlighting the important role of 
spiritual practice for mental health (Koenig, McCullough & Larson, 2001;Weaver & 
Koenig, 2006). Similarly, a robust and vast body of empirical research demonstrates the 
positive effects of mind-body practices, which are often associated within, or practiced 
as part of, a spiritual belief system for well-being and health (Khols, Walach & Gander, 
2009). 
  
   From an existentialist perspective, a longing for truth and orientation in life forces us 
to ask questions about the ultimate meaning of life. It has been argued by Dysen, Cobb 
& Forman (1997) that if an individual is unable to find this meaning, all domains of life 
may be affected and spiritual distress will be experienced. This concept echoes the 
experience of one participant who believed her emotional suffering was some sort of 
wake-up call for a need to create a more spiritual existence and find an alternative 
meaning in her life that would be more fulfilling. Her understanding of her emotional 
distress was that she was undergoing a spiritual transformation that was purposeful 
rather than pathological. 
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A study conducted by Diaz et al. (2011) exploring the relationship between 
spirituality and diagnostic depressive symptoms among in-patient individuals who abuse 
substances lends further support to the idea that spirituality may play a purposeful and 
protective role in relation to mental and emotional distress. It found that individuals who 
abused substances and reported higher levels of spirituality were more likely to report 
lower levels of depressive symptoms. Given that spirituality involves meaning and 
purpose in life linked to a sense of belonging, which may minimize loneliness and 
despair thereby cultivating feelings of optimism, hope and a sense of well-being, this is 
not surprising (Diarmuid, 1994). 
  
Whilst there is evidence that spiritual belief and practice can play a supportive role in 
emotional suffering, there is also some evidence that it may be a contributing factor to 
the development of distress. 
  
In this study both positive and negative aspects of spirituality were associated with 
distress. Whilst some participants believed they were deserving of their emotional 
suffering and were damned, others described intense emotional distress at the time their 
search for and involvement and engagement in spirituality began. It has been suggested 
that breakdowns or mental distress may occur after intense periods of spiritual 
exploration and attempts at self-realization, as people endeavor to acquire meaning in 
their lives (Clay, 1996). It is however possible that emotional distress labeled as anxiety 
and depression may cause spiritual distress. Smucker (1996) argues that physical and 
emotional distresses are defining characteristics of spiritual distress, as they are 
accompanied by feelings of disharmony, disconnectedness and a loss of meaning. 
  
Swinton & Kettles (1997) identify a model whereby spirituality already present is 
affected when subsequent distress is experienced. For example, they suggest that when 
someone experiences distress diagnosed as depression, their spirituality becomes 
contaminated by hopelessness, purposelessness and a loss of meaning in life. 
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4.3.6. Disengagement and alienation 
  
A person with anxiety may experience alienation in relationships, which are central 
to a person’s well-being (Polner, 1989). The theme disengagement and alienation was 
prominent in the participants’ experiences of emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression. Whilst the term was often used to denote feelings of difference 
and apartness from others and was strongly linked to experiences of dissociation and 
detachment, it also seemed to convey a feeling of being an outsider, sometimes in the 
most literal sense of the term. Some participants not only described moments of feeling 
alienated from others but also complained of feeling like an alien, a sense of feeling 
somehow foreign to the rest of the human race. Such an experience seems to go beyond 
the loss of interest in other people mentioned in the BDI-II (1996). It is one thing to feel 
detached and apart from people around you, as people do when they feel dissociated or 
depersonalized as mentioned earlier, and quite another to experience feeling foreign to 
the human race. This is something that could be explored more as it seems it may be a 
more prominent experience in emotional distress than is currently acknowledged. 
  
4.3.7. Severed social and emotional connections/troubled relationships 
  
Another theme that arose in relation to feeling alienated from others was troubled 
relationships. It has been recognized that people diagnosed with depression often have 
limited social support and this may be due in part to emotionally distressed individuals 
alienating those close to them on account of their excessive demands for support, a 
process that elicits rejection and in turn serves to intensify or maintain distress 
diagnosed as depression (Coyne et al., 1987). However, according to participants in this 
study, problems arose within the existing relationships rather than on account of the lack 
of them. Interestingly, Hammen (1991b) observed that women with recurrent depression 
diagnosis experienced significantly more interpersonal negative events during a one-
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year period than groups of women with bipolar or medical disorders or non-psychotic 
controls. Those distressed women diagnosed with unipolar depression were particularly 
likely to have experienced conflict events and interpersonal difficulties with friends, 
spouses, family, employers and teachers. 
  
This tendency for emotionally distressed women to contribute to the occurrence of 
more interpersonal and conflict stressors was also found in another sample of young 
women (Daley et al., 1997). It was not always clear in this research whether troubled 
relationships were identified by the participants as being a causative factor in their 
experiences of pre-diagnosed depression or a consequence of it. Nevertheless, 
interpersonal difficulties featured in the participants’ accounts of their emotional 
distress. 
  
It is indeed widely recognized that distress can result from and create difficulties in 
interpersonal relationships. IPT therefore attempts to alleviate experiences of emotional 
distress improving interpersonal functioning by clarifying, refocusing and renegotiating 
the interpersonal context associated with the onset of depression (Weiss & Kleinman, 
1998). This lends support to the findings in this research that troubled relationships as 
well as lack of social support are something individuals experience at times of emotional 
distress. 
  
4.3.8. Mistrust and persecution 
  
One of the things that seemed to interfere with some of the participants’ relationships 
was the issue of mistrust and persecution. Bentall et al. (2009) described paranoia as the 
excessive estimation of personal threat and stated that paranoid beliefs are more likely to 
emerge in those individuals who have experienced victimization and powerlessness 
(Janssen et al., 2003; Mirowsky & Ross, 1983). 
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Interestingly some participants in this study described traumatic childhood 
experiences of neglect from both family and those who fostered them in the care system. 
Whilst this study did not set out to focus on or establish links between a persons past 
and present emotional suffering, it is noteworthy that the participants’ experience of pre-
diagnosed depression does match what the above literature suggests. This gives the 
researcher a clue as to where these experiences of mistrust and paranoia may have 
originated. Traditionally, psychiatric theorizing assumes that experiences of paranoia are 
simply irrational and false, a sign of pathology whose context and content are 
meaningless (Harper, 1996, 2004). Whilst this may sometimes be the case it is perhaps 
no surprise that if one has been excluded, marginalized, discriminated against or have 
faced victimization, you may start to experience the world as a fearful place (Cromby & 
Harper, 2005). 
  
4.3.9. Transformation of identity 
  
Another key theme that arose was transformation of identity, reflecting changes the 
participants’ self-identity underwent at the time of their emotional suffering. The 
concept of personal identity refers to an inner sense of wholeness and security, which is 
achieved when there is congruence between the individual’s perception of self and 
others’ perceptions of him/her (Erikson, 1968). 
  
Many participants described feelings of uncertainty and discomfort in relation to their 
assumptions as to how other people might perceive them at the time of their pre-
diagnosed depression. It seemed their sense of self was unstable. It was as if they were 
mere reflections of what they assumed other people thought they were and that their 
own negative thoughts about themselves at the time influenced what they saw 
themselves to be. Erikson (1968) described identity as a subjective sense and an 
observable quality of personal sameness and continuity, and it seems this core sense of 
self was disrupted and sabotaged in the participants’ experiences of pre-diagnosed 
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depression. 
  
One could argue that at the time of their pre-diagnosed depression some of these 
participants experienced an identity crisis. Erikson (1968) stated that when an adolescent 
has an identity crisis, they might have no idea as to who or what they are, where they 
belong or where they want to go. He further described patterns of withdrawal from 
normal life and the turning to negative activities, such as crime or drugs, as a way of 
dealing with identity crisis, stating that to someone having an identity crisis, it is more 
acceptable to have a negative identity than none at all. This theory would fit with the 
participant’s accounts of masking, whereby they created a new identity to fit in with and 
please the people around them. Whilst Erikson applied this theory to adolescents, he 
also stated that an identity crisis might occur at any time in adult years when one is 
faced with a challenge to their sense of self. This is what the participants’ accounts 
reflected. 
  
4.3.10. Embodied distress 
  
Feeling unhappy with appearance was another form of distress participants described. 
Some participants described feeling ugly and unattractive as part of their experience of 
emotional suffering. This form of embodied distress is something that is documented in 
the BDI-II (1996) as mentioned in the introduction and it was something the researcher 
was able to explore further with those participant’s who felt it. Participants described 
feeling that they hated themselves when they were emotionally distressed and, when 
they talked about their suffering; they related their despair to their appearance. Some 
disclosed that self-hatred manifested in feeling ugly and not being able to understand 
why their boyfriends or husbands were with them. This can be seen as an example of 
negative attitude towards one’s own body, experiences commonly associated with a 
diagnosis of Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD). This is defined in DSM-IV-TR (2000) 
as a condition marked by excessive preoccupation with an imaginary or minor defect in 
 152 
a facial feature or a localized part of the body.  A common feature of a BDD diagnosis is 
the fundamental belief that the self is defective due to flawed appearance (Corrove & 
Gleaves, 2001; Phillips, 2005; Veale, 2004b). Negative perception of self in individuals 
diagnosed with BDD has been specifically linked to the particular association of 
appearance with self worth (Silver & Reavey, 2010). The importance of examining 
selfhood in relation to embodiment is now well established across the social sciences 
and feeling good about oneself is thus intimately tied to the widely available discourses 
on what constitutes the ideal body/self and is not necessarily confined to specific 
diagnostic categories (Silver & Reavey, 2010). 
  
As this research has demonstrated, emotional distress is not only a matter of the mind 
but also of the body, affecting both the patient’s bodily functions and his or her attitude 
towards their own body. It is a common experience from physiotherapeutic practice in 
psychiatry that emotionally distressed patients tend to have somatic complaints and 
difficulties, such as pain and ache from muscles and joints, disturbed body awareness, 
general bodily tension and anxiety, restlessness, slowness and lack of coordination of 
movements, disturbances in posture, restricted breathing and negative feelings and 
attitudes towards their own body (Stahl, 2004). 
  
As the term ‘depression’ has been primarily used as a name for an illness and the 
experiences of those who suffer from it have been described in terms of ‘symptoms’, 
such as anxiety and vegetative symptoms such as sleep disturbance, it is therefore not 
surprising that a great deal of emphasis is placed on the recognition and treatment of 
such experiences. On the other hand, according to Stahl (2004) distress categorized as 
depression is an illness that frequently presents with a large number of unexplained 
physical symptoms and such symptoms are frequently excluded from diagnostic criteria 
for major depressive disorder. Some of the physical symptoms that arose in this study 
are not mentioned in DSM-IV-TR (2000) or BDI-II (1996). For example, some 
participants in this research described a constant feeling of dread in their stomachs, 
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sometimes referred to as pain in the solar plexus, a description that may be more easily 
identified within new age literature. 
  
Participants also described feeling an intense discomfort in their body that made them 
want to scratch their skin off. This description calls to mind the colloquial expression 
“feeling so comfortable in one’s own skin”, meaning that one is relaxed and happy with 
oneself. However, one participant’s comment describes the opposite, an extreme 
discomfort both with herself and inside her body. 
  
The experience conveys this similar sense of being locked in that some participants 
described when disclosing experiences that reflected the theme trapped in the head. 
There is a sense that intense physical discomfort is overwhelming and cannot be 
escaped. This is not something that is documented under cited physical symptoms of 
depression. 
  
4.3.11. Disciplining the self 
  
Some participants described disciplining themselves with rigid eating habits and even 
starvation, whilst others did so through obsessive rituals. It has been argued that what 
individuals share in weight loss is not so much a desire to be thin as a desire to exert 
control over lives that are often beset by family conflict, abuse and oppression (Lee, 
2001). It seems that the participants’ experiences of rigid eating and starvation in this 
study may be linked to emotional distress linked to life difficulties that are in turn 
managed by trying to control the self and manage mood. 
  
Malson & Ussher (1996) noted that in a sample of women diagnosed with anorexia, 
starving oneself was related to refusal to be associated with some of the negative aspects 
of femininity, such as “highly emotional, sexual, vulnerable and out of control”. This 
reinforces the view that starvation can be used as a means to develop and maintain a 
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sense of control in an individual who is feeling out of control. Participants who 
described interpersonal difficulties and troubled relationships at the time of emotional 
suffering also described starving themselves and bingeing. Cooper, Todd & Wells 
(2005) found that triggers for bingeing included low mood, anger and interpersonal 
distress. Participants described attempting to avoid unwanted emotions and exerting 
control in their life through habits of chosen starvation and bingeing. Some participants 
described enduring emotional suffering with a self induced steadying mechanism, a 
process of self-discipline that enabled them to bide their time. 
  
Feeling out of control was an experience participants described in relation to their 
emotional suffering. Attempts to regain control included the adoption of obsessive 
order, tidying and routine rituals. Participants described imposing structure on their lives 
as a way of coping with feeling chaotic and out of control and many disclosed that their 
lives were lacking structure at the time of their emotional suffering. This was 
noteworthy and not sufficiently common to be elaborated into a theme.   
  
Overall, participants described an on-going struggle reflecting problems around 
management of the self in relation to others. The subordinate theme, troubled 
relationships that contributed to the generation of the superordinate theme severed social 
and emotional connections focused on the difficulties participants were having in 
managing their relationships with others at the time of their emotional distress. This was 
not the only superordinate theme that had to do with the relational difficulties 
participants were undergoing. Many of the identified themes in this study indicate a 
certain level of interpersonal distress. 
  
For example, the theme severed social and emotional connections incorporates the 
subordinate themes mistrust and persecution, troubled relationships, feeling 
misunderstood and rejected and a need to belong. As acknowledged by the 
superordinate theme severed connections, these themes all reflect experiences 
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participants were having with other people. It encapsulates the relational struggles 
participants were enduring at the time of their pre-diagnosed depression. 
  
Similarly, the superordinate theme transformation of identity incorporates the 
subordinate themes social comparisons, lost identity and multiple identities and 
masking. In times of emotional distress, participants were constantly adjusting their 
identity to fit in with their surroundings adapting their behaviour around different people 
as a way of managing other people’s expectations and experiences of them. This seemed 
to be experienced as a pressure for some of those who otherwise felt unable to manage 
their relationships with others. Participants appeared to be transforming their identity 
depending not only on whom they were with, but also in response to what was going on 
in their relationships at the time. The superordinate theme transformation of identity is 
concerned with the participants’ movements through different forms of identity at 
different times, which movements depend on the relationships they found themselves in. 
  
The superordinate theme dissociation also revealed some of the difficulties people 
were having maintaining their relationships with other people. Ultimately, it was about 
people switching off from those around them, presumably because they found it too 
difficult to maintain relations in the way people do when they are not suffering 
emotionally. This gave rise to feelings of detachment and alienation, the feeling that 
they were no longer the same as others or not existing in the same world. 
  
The totality of life at the time theme revealed how some participants struggled with 
the basic demands of work and family life. Again, this reflects aspects of relational 
dynamics suggesting misery may not just be about the individual, it can encompass the 
relationships they are in too. This study suggests that emotional suffering subsequently 
diagnosed as depression is an experience that is deeply embedded in peoples’ 
relationships, how those relationships are managed alongside their distress and how 
others’ responses to the emotional distress are experienced and managed by sufferers. 
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It appears that many of the themes, amongst them severed social and emotional 
connections, troubled relationships, a need to belong, multiple identities and masking, 
feeling misunderstood and rejected and dissociation, are incorporated into this thing 
called depression and are largely about relationships and how individuals manage 
themselves in relation to others; they are about what it is like to deal with people who do 
not understand what the emotionally distressed person is enduring. They highlight the 
stress individuals can feel when demands are placed upon them they don’t feel they can 
fulfill. This was evident in the examples on the theme totality of life at the time where 
participants, particularly females, described feeling unable to cope with the pressures 
and demands linked to other people’s needs. This may have been linked to gender. It has 
been stated by Hoeksema (1999) that women report higher levels of chronic strain as 
they carry a greater load of the housework and childcare and more of the strain of 
parenting than men do. 
  
The participants’ experiences in this research also highlighted the difficulties people 
feel in not being able to escape when they feel emotionally distressed and have to fit into 
a world that does not necessarily support, understand or accommodate their emotional 
suffering. This difficulty is well documented by Smail (1993) who has long maintained 
that not many of the experiences of psychological and emotional distress may correctly 
be seen as medical matters. Smail maintains that the so-called psychiatric disorders are a 
construct of the social world in which we live. 
  
Overall, emotional suffering in this study seems to incorporate a variety of 
experiences, some of which are documented in well-known classification manuals and 
many that are not. It is interesting that some of the reported experiences correlated with 
experiences described as symptoms in other psychological disorders. 
  
The results of this study reveal that there may be considerable overlap in experiences 
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of emotional distress as described by participants on the one hand, and symptoms that 
diagnostic psychological disorders cite on the other. Some of the participants’ distress 
experiences correlated with symptoms described in the accounts of various 
psychological disorders. Feeling uncomfortable and worried about how one is being 
perceived by others and adopting related coping strategies, prevalent in the generated 
theme transformation of identity, mirrored experiences described as social anxiety in 
classification manuals, in which a person in a social situation is overly concerned about 
being judged or evaluated by others and has an intense fear about what others they may 
be thinking about them (Adelman, 2007). 
  
As mentioned earlier, feelings of detachment and dissociation seemed to mirror 
experiences of depersonalization and derealisation. Worry, overthinking, overanalysing 
and noise in the head seemed to reflect some of the cognitive obsessions as documented 
in the diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Hatred of one’s body and 
appearance also occurred and seems to mimic experiences cited as symptoms in the 
diagnostic manuals of Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD), while the interpersonal 
difficulties that many participants described have been documented as symptoms of a 
borderline personality disorder (Padesky, 1995). 
  
One could argue that if an individual is undergoing such a variety of experiences, it 
could be difficult for them to make sense of what is going on and they may be inclined 
to believe they are suffering from a variety of psychological disorders in an attempt to 
make sense of the multitude of their experiences. The researcher feels that the situation 
of the sufferer may not be unlike that of the astrological enthusiast who finds it all too 
easy to identify with the wide and overlapping characteristics the various star signs 
represent. 
  
Exploration of how individuals suffering from emotional distress come to understand 
their suffering in relation to various classification systems of psychological disorders 
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would be interesting as it might shed some light on how helpful classification systems 
actually are to individuals undergoing such experiences. Whilst we know that those who 
work in the field of mental health are aware that worry diagnosed as anxiety and distress 
diagnosed as depression often occur simultaneously (Beck, 1979) the layperson might 
not equate worry with unhappiness. Because of this, they may become confused as to 
what exactly they are suffering from when they try to make sense of their experiences 
using classification manuals. It can indeed be misleading when symptoms in such 
manuals overlap. For instance, the documented symptoms of depersonalization may 
describe some participants’ experiences well, yet they are not to be found in those 
classification manuals that categorize emotional suffering as depression. 
  
This may be a problem inherent in classification manuals. It is improbable that 
participants in this study were suffering multiple disorders simultaneously. Perhaps their 
emotional suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression incorporated experiences that 
mimicked some symptoms cited in other disorders. It seems the experience of emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression may be vastly more complex than which 
the depression classification systems describe. 
  
4.4. Undocumented experiences and classification problems 
  
Not only did this research reveal distressing experiences that were reflected in the 
symptoms of the disorder commonly diagnosed as depression. As we have seen, it also 
brought to light experiences not documented in depression classification manuals. This 
suggests that classification systems can be problematic and may not work as well as 
some might think. 
  
In this research, emotionally distressing experiences displayed heterogeneous 
trajectories that were different for all participants. This was in stark contrast to the more 
homogeneous type of distress, which standard diagnostic criteria suggest. Whilst the 
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researcher acknowledges that diagnostic categories and classification manuals can be 
helpful in indicating treatment, enabling prognosis, providing a basis for research, 
enabling professionals to communicate with each other, giving patients access to 
services and in some cases even providing relief to patients and carers (Cromby et al., 
2013), it is worth noting that they also provide much benefit to current categorization 
systems. Psychiatric diagnosis is deeply embedded in the criminal justice system, in 
medical insurance, in government treatment guidelines and in pharmaceutical 
companies’ development of new medications (Cromby et al., 2013). It is clear, then, that 
diagnostic categories have many advantages. However, the advantages may be more 
objectively beneficial than subjectively helpful. 
  
It can be argued that the medical language of psychiatry (diagnosis, illness and 
symptoms) hides the fact that the course of psychiatric diagnosis is essentially unlike 
medicine on account of the lack of signs similar to those that confirm the presence of a 
biological disease. We are still not able to understand why people have the emotional 
and psychological experiences they do in the same way that we are able to understand 
why people suffering from diabetes show signs of low blood sugar due to rises in 
insulin. 
  
Further problems arise with diagnostic categories when one considers that medical 
diagnosis should be stable across cultures. If one has HIV in the USA they will still be 
recognizable as having that illness wherever they are, whether that be in Africa, 
Denmark, Japan or anywhere else. However, as Cromby et al. (2013) point out, someone 
who experiences hearing voices in UK may consider themselves cured when they arrive 
in a country where hearing voices in normal, which can be the case in countries where it 
is not unusual to believe you can communicate with spirits or ancestors. If certain 
experiences are recognised as pathological in one culture and healthy and acceptable in 
another, it suggests that not only are people’s experiences of distress very different but 
their interpretations of them are too. 
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This study also highlights some of the reasons why people tend to develop emotional 
suffering subsequently diagnosed as depression. As Cromby et al. (2013) state, the 
reasons why people break down psychologically and emotionally are very complex. 
Classification manuals do tend to suggest that people are suffering from an illness rather 
than responding to difficult life situations.  
  
As this research has revealed, some participants, at the time of their emotional 
distress, were undergoing extreme stress in their lives due to social deprivation, troubled 
relationships and various other life-related circumstances and their thoughts, behaviours 
and feelings at the time seemed to reflect this. The current dominant paradigm is to view 
this type of emotional distress as depression, a psychological disorder, although one 
could argue that misery is a natural and understandable response to the difficulties listed 
above. This raises the question: does diagnosing life-related emotional distress as 
symptoms and illness have the unintended consequence that people’s experiences may 
be misunderstood or framed in a way that is unlikely to lead to them receiving the help 
they need? 
  
 As a counselling psychologist, the researcher works with formulations as opposed to 
diagnosis and conducting this research has reinforced the importance of this. A 
formulation can be described as a hypothesis about a person’s difficulties, which draws 
from psychological theory (Johnstone & Dallas, 2013). It is an individual summary of a 
person’s problems, which reflects on all aspects of his/her life in an endeavor to explain 
how and why their problems arose and what therapeutic interventions might be useful 
(Cromby et al., 2013). Formulations in clinical practice reflect a desire to understand 
individuals from a psychological perspective, to recognise the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the clinical presentations together with the specific problems of 
individuals sometimes collectively diagnosed as depression. 
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When considering this research in relation to counselling psychology, the researcher 
reflected on how much it really helps to label certain kinds of emotional distress as 
depression. When a client is referred for treatment for distress diagnosed as depression, 
it signifies that they may be, and usually are, suffering from a range of symptoms, which 
are recognised and documented in classification manuals. This may be helpful and 
unhelpful. It may help psychologists to consider some appropriate interventions to help 
emotionally distressed people manage and overcome some of the experiences 
documented in this research. However, there is a danger it can encourage the 
psychologist to attribute an individual’s experiences to a disorder and merely attempt to 
treat the symptoms rather than to explore their problems in the context of their lives and 
to help them make sense of them. 
  
Regarding a client as depressed has not influenced the way the researcher works with 
them therapeutically. Within the psychological process, the client and the psychologist 
unearth the client’s experiences collaboratively to seek and identify what it is that needs 
acknowledging and addressing. When this is done sensitively and adequately, it usually 
enables the client to recognize, manage and overcome their difficulties, thus releasing 
them from the prison of their emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression. 
  
4.5. Limitations 
  
The findings of this study provide insight into the salient themes of participants’ 
experiences in this particular study. The participants have been investigated primarily as 
a group of individuals who had been diagnosed with depression. As the participant 
demographics show, the group featured a range of ethnicity, gender, employment status, 
income and educational background. Nevertheless, there were four times as many 
women in the study as there were men and only one unemployed person on benefits. 
  
It would have been be of interest to explore differences in between the distressed 
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experiences of men and women, those on unemployment benefits and the employed. It 
would also be of interest to explore whether there might be differences in experiences of 
pre diagnosed depression from a wider range of socio-economic, cultural and racial 
backgrounds. Differences connected with gender and sexuality might also be worth 
exploring. 
  
A further factor to consider is the potential selection bias amongst those choosing to 
participate. It could be that the experiences of those choosing not to participate may 
have been quite different to those taking part. 
  
A final consideration is the use of member validation. There is debate in the literature 
regarding its usefulness as a method of establishing the credibility of findings (Angen, 
2000). It is suggested that it is a useful method to check the researcher’s understanding 
and to ensure that the participants’ views are not misrepresented (Elliott et al., 1999; 
Yardley, 2008). However, it can be argued that this may lead to confusion, as 
participants may have changed their minds about an issue, may not understand the 
interpretations made and may not feel comfortable commenting on the researcher’s 
interpretations (Angen, 2000; Yardley, 2008). Moreover, it relies on the presumption 
that there is a fixed truth or reality against which accounts can be measured, continuing 
the positivist assumption of an external foundational reality (Angen, 2000). The 
researcher therefore decided that use of member validation would be inappropriate for 
this research, as the interpretative element of analysis may have made it difficult for 
participants to relate to the analysis. In any case, every effort was made to be rigorous 
and transparent in the analytical process and recommendations for ensuring the 
credibility of results were adhered to (Yardley, 2008), as discussed earlier in the 
methodology section. 
  
4.6. Researcher application and reflexivity 
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In increasing the integrity and evaluation of qualitative research, researchers need to 
evaluate how inter-subjective elements influence data collection and analysis (Finlay, 
2002). This is thought to involve a thoughtful, conscious self-awareness that further 
helps to acknowledge that we actively construct the knowledge that we produce as 
researchers and is therefore integral to any conclusions that are made throughout the 
research process. Thus it is important to explore the dynamics of the researcher-
researched relationship as this plays a fundamental role in shaping the research findings 
and data collection (Banister, 1994). Acknowledging the researcher’s impact on the 
research in allowing readers to assess the validity of her presented findings is also to 
acknowledges that a different researcher may have responded differently within the 
research context, with the potential to create a different relationship with participants by 
asking different questions (Finlay, 2002). 
  
Although every attempt was made to be rigorous and transparent throughout the 
analysis and interpretation of the interviews, the researcher recognizes that what is 
presented is the researcher’s interpretation. Other researchers may have highlighted 
different aspects of the participants’ pre-diagnosed depression experiences and 
generated different themes in relation to them. Given the researcher’s background as a 
counselling psychologist who provides psychological counselling to people 
experiencing emotional distress, she may have been more likely to focus and explore 
those experiences she felt she understood or recognised. However a conscious effort was 
made to follow and explore exactly what it was the client was communicating in an 
agenda free way. 
  
It is likely that the researcher’s experience as an integrative counselling psychologist 
enabled her to tune in to a wide range of pre-diagnosed depression experiences without 
focusing more specifically on cognitive ones, which she may have been more inclined to 
do if she were a CBT therapist. Furthermore, as a counselling psychologist the 
researcher is aware of how external stressors of various kinds may affect mood, 
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behaviour and the view of the self. It is likely that she would have been particularly 
mindful of the possible links between the participants’ life situations and their emotional 
distress at the time. 
  
Some participants were interviewed in their own home, some at university and some 
at the researcher’s clinical practice. It seems that those participants who were 
interviewed in their home communicated their stories slightly differently. They were 
more inclined to tell their experience in the form of a story about what had happened to 
them. This may have had something to do with the fact that they had not travelled to 
meet the researcher. They would have had time to reflect and gather their thoughts 
before she arrived, thereby feeling more comfortable, relaxed and open. 
  
The researcher’s interests and potential biases have been documented in the 
methodology section to enable the reader to consider how the researcher’s background 
and interests might have influenced the results of this research. For example, having 
been referred many clients diagnosed with depression there was sometimes a sense that 
such clients might require similar interventions to manage and overcome their emotional 
suffering. However, during the process of conducting this research and analyzing the 
data it became apparent that experiences subsequently diagnosed as depression go 
beyond symptoms described in classification manuals. It seems that the term depression 
does not accurately capture the complexity of experiences of emotional distress 
subsequently diagnosed as depression that the participants described. 
  
4.7. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
  
This study attempts to make a contribution to the knowledge of how people experience 
emotional distress subsequently diagnosed as depression. It also provides examples of 
some of the coping strategies people adopt as a way of managing this emotional distress 
so they can try to continue with their everyday lives. It also shows how this emotional 
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distress may sometimes be seen as an understandable response to life and some of its 
difficulties, thereby calling into question whether these responses and experiences need 
to be understood as psychological disorders. Developing further understanding of those 
experiences not recognised in classification manuals could help counselling psychology 
to consider further useful therapeutic interventions. It could also help counselling 
psychologists to identify possible behaviours clients might be adopting as strategies to 
cope with their emotional distress. 
  
Further studies can use the information gleaned for the development of theory in the 
area of emotional distress. More in-depth understanding of the experiences people 
endure when they are suffering emotionally or diagnosed with depression could help 
counselling psychologists to recognise that if people are distressed, they may need 
therapeutic attention in the hitherto unidentified areas this study has generated. 
Moreover, if the experiences people undergo prior to being diagnosed with depression 
are more widely recognised it is possible that early therapeutic interventions could be 
developed. 
  
One avenue for further research might be exploration of the role of embodiment in 
emotional distress. Another might be the role relationships play in distress. It was clear 
in this study that embodiment and relational dynamics were central to emotional distress 
subsequently diagnosed as depression. Looking further into how people manage their 
relations with others when, for example, they feel dead inside or a changed person 
would be a potentially fruitful avenue for further research. 
  
It would be interesting in a further study to enquire how people experienced their 
depression diagnosis and whether they agreed with it or not. What was striking about 
this research was that all the participants arrived at these experiences of despair in such 
different ways. Some appeared to have agency over their experiences while others did 
not, and this too would be an area for further qualitative exploration.  
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HOW HELPFUL IS MINDFULNESS-BASED THERAPY 
FOR OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER? A 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is marked by obsession and compulsions 
DSM-IV-TR (2000). An obsession is defined as a persistent thought, image or urge 
that forces its way into the mind and causes distress. Such obsessions are frequent, 
unwanted and difficult to expel from the mind.  
 
Examples of the most common obsessions are: excessive concern with exactness, 
order or symmetry; fear of contamination dirt, germs and bodily fluids; doubts about 
harm occurring; urge to hoard useless or worn out possessions; obsessions with the 
body or physical symptoms; religious and sacrilegious thoughts; inappropriate 
sexual thoughts; images and thoughts or images of violence and aggression (Veale & 
Willson, 2005).  
 
Compulsions, otherwise described as irresistible impulses to act, on the other hand 
occur in response to obsessions with the aim of reducing distress and may consist of 
repetitive behaviours such as washing, checking or counting. The National Institute 
of Health and Clinical Excellence in the UK (NICE, 2005) recommended that adults 
with mild to moderate OCD should be offered a choice of Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) or SRRI medication given their comparable effectiveness and 
suggested a combination of the two for more severe symptoms. 
 
Contemporary treatment of OCD has developed over time and now has some 
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overarching elements. The different elements of treatment involve: i) exposure, 
facing your fears in a prolonged period of contact until associated anxiety reduces; 
ii) response prevention, not responding to your urges to ritualize or use a safety-
seeking behaviour; and, iii) graded exposure, facing your fears in a graded manner 
with a planned hierarchy (Veale & Wilson, 2005). These treatment interventions 
derive from the behavioural model of OCD suggesting that OCD is maintained 
through negative reinforcement where behaviours aimed at avoiding feared objects 
or events are successful at reducing anxiety in the short term (Abramowitz, 1996).  
 
In contrast to behavioural theories, cognitive theory focuses on the meaning one 
attaches to events, thoughts and images. Cognitive therapy reduces OCD thinking by 
helping individuals understand some of the thinking styles and philosophies that 
make one vulnerable to the problem (Veale & Wilson, 2005). It aims to identify and 
challenge beliefs linked to OCD, for example the importance of controlling thoughts 
and beliefs about personal responsibility for causing or preventing harm, or beliefs 
involving thought-action fusion (TAF) whereby one believes that having an 
unwanted and unacceptable intrusive thought increases the likelihood that a specific 
event will occur (Coughtrey, 2012).  
 
In contrast to CBT the emphasis of mindfulness therapy is on developing the skill 
of non-judgmental awareness and acceptance of present-moment experience, 
including all of the unwanted thoughts, feelings, sensations, and urges that are at the 
heart of these conditions. What this means is that, from a mindfulness perspective, 
the individual's primary agenda ought not be to change or eliminate their unwanted 
thoughts, feelings, sensations, and urges, but rather to fully acknowledge and accept 
them. 
 
Background to review 
 
So what is the rationale behind mindfulness interventions for OCD for those 
 193 
therapists that endorse its use? Studies have shown that mindfulness based therapies 
halve the risk of relapse for people with a history of recurrent major depression (Ma 
& Teasdale, 2004) and reduced symptoms of depression for people currently 
depressed (Barnhofer et al., 2009).  
 
It has been noted that drop out rates from mindfulness therapy are low. In the Ma 
& Teasdale (2004) study only three of the 72 participants dropped out (4%) and only 
two of the 16 participants (13%) who began a group in the Barnhofer et al., study 
(2009), cited above, withdrew. A drop out rate of 26% was reported by Aderka et al. 
(2011) for exposure response prevention (ERP) and cognitive therapy for OCD. It 
appears mindfulness based therapy may have reduced drop out rates though there are 
other reasons as to why it may be effective for OCD.  
 
From a behavioural perspective mindfulness based therapy encourages individuals 
to observe unwanted and unpleasant thoughts and experiences as opposed to 
engaging with them (Baer, 2003). It facilitates meta cognitive change by 
encouraging clients to accept thoughts such as “thoughts are not facts” which are of 
particular importance in OCD (Fairfax, 2008). It encourages individuals to notice 
urges and compulsions and to choose to react and behave in different ways. The 
purpose of this review is to constructively address the empirical evidence for the 
effectiveness of mindfulness-based therapy for OCD. In doing so the review will 
identify and critically evaluate studies of mindfulness-based therapies for OCD with 
a view to assessing whether it is an effective intervention for OCD. 
 
The subject matter of this review was influenced by my clinical work as a 
counselling psychologist. I have found that my own clients experiencing OCD have 
not always benefited from the CBT approach; generally, this lack of success has 
been restricted to cases where the OCD has been deeply entrenched in the client for 
some time. In such cases clients have expressed the view that whilst the CBT model 
makes sense and helps explain why they are experiencing distressing thoughts, 
beliefs and behaviours it does not necessarily eradicate the their suffering. Although 
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CBT with exposure and response prevention (EPR) is the first line of treatment for 
individuals with OCD, not all of them achieve remission on a long-term basis 
(Hertenstein et al., 2012). 
 
Having reached a point where I was beginning to question the effectiveness of 
CBT for OCD, I decided to try some mindfulness interventions on a recent client of 
mine who was suffering from OCD experiences. Surprisingly, after only two 
sessions of mindfulness intervention this client reported not only a reduction in 
intrusive obsessive thoughts but also increased control over his urges to indulge in 
related reassurance seeking behaviours. Whilst there may have been all sorts of other 
factors that may have contributed to his response, it nevertheless inspired me to 
explore the recent available literature.  
 
Retrieved studies on the effects of mindfulness-based 
therapy for OCD 
 
An electronic literature search was conducted using the following databases, 
PsychINFO, PsychARTICLES, Psychology and Behavioural Sciences Collection, 
Medline and Emabse, with a view to identifying studies on the effects of 
mindfulness-based therapy for OCD. The searches covered the most recent five-year 
period from 2007 to 2013 and included papers generated by the above electronic 
databases as well as relevant papers in the reference lists. The descriptors in the 
search included the terms mindfulness therapy paired with ocd, obsessions and 
intrusive thoughts.  
 
The search results generated a range of papers from various journals including 
Clinical Psychology And Psychotherapy, Journal Of Nervous And Mental Disease, 
Psychotherapy And Psychotherapeutic Counselling and Cogntive And Behavioural 
Practice. Upon closer inspection many of the studies failed to directly address the 
subject matter, general and specific to this review. For example, some of the studies 
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investigated acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) as opposed to mindfulness 
therapy. Once studies focusing more on peripheral aspects of the subject matter were 
discarded nine remained.    
 
 
Summary of retrieved articles  (Table 2)  
Title Written By Publication Date 
The effectiveness and acceptability of 
mindfulness-based therapy for obsessive 
compulsive disorder: A review of the 
literature 
Hale, L., 
Strauss, C., & 
Lever Taylor, B. 
Mindfulness Aug 2012 
The effects of a mindfulness intervention 
on obsessive- compulsive symptoms in a 
non-clinical student population 
Hanstede M., 
Gidron Y., 
Nyklícek I. 
Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease. Vol., 196 
(10): 776-779 
2008 
Adapting mindfulness-based stress 
reduction for the treatment of obsessive-
compulsive disorder. A case report 
Patel, S., 
Carmody, J. & 
Simpson B. 
Science direct, vol 14: pages 
375-380 
2007 
The use of mindfulness in obsessive 
compulsive disorder: Suggestions for its 
application and integration in existing 
treatment 
Fairfax, H Clinical Psychology and 
psychotherapy. Vol, 15: 53-
59 
2008 
Effectiveness of detached mindfulness 
techniques in treating a case of obsessive 
compulsive disorder 
Firouzabadi, A 
& Hossein, S 
Advances in cognitive 
science. Vol, 11 (2): 1-7 
2009 
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. A 
qualitative study on patients experiences 
Hertenstein, E., 
Rose, N., 
Voderholzer, U., 
Heidenreich, T., 
Nissen, C., 
Thiel, N & 
Herbst, N 
BMC Psychiatry. Vol, 
12:185 
2012 
 196 
Is mindfulness-based therapy an effective 
intervention for obsessive-intrusive 
thoughts: a case series 
Wilkinson-
Tough M, Bocci 
L, Thorne K, 
Herlihy J 
Clinical Psychology and 
Psychotherapy. Vol, 17 (3): 
250-68 
2010 
Effectiveness of mindfulness-based 
cognitive behavioural therapy on patients 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
Liu, X, Han, K 
& Xu, W 
Chinese Mental Health 
Journal. Vol 25 (12): 915-
920 
2011 
Managing Obsessive Thoughts During 
Brief Exposure: An Experimental Study 
Comparing Mindfulness-Based Strategies 
and Distraction in Obsessive–Compulsive 
Disorder 
Wahl, K, 
Huelle, J, 
Zurowski, B & 
Kordon, A 
Cognitive therapy and 
research Vol, 37, (4): 752-
761 
2013 
 
  Nine research papers in total were reviewed. One was a review itself on the 
effectiveness and acceptability of mindfulness-based therapy for OCD. This paper 
summarized four studies conducted between the years of 2004 and 2012. The 
remaining eight studies consisted of: an analogue quantitative case control study, the 
only study reviewed that had a case control group; a quantitative randomized control 
condition study; a qualitative and quantitative mixed methods A-B-C replication 
series study; a single-subject A-B type experimental trial study; a non experimental 
case study generating both qualitative and quantitative data; a qualitative and 
quantitative non experimental follow up study; a non experimental qualitative 
exploration of individuals; a single case multiple baseline design generating 
quantitative data. 
 
Research conducted on the effects of mindfulness therapy for OCD seems to 
incorporate varied methodologies. Sample size was generally small with the largest 
sample of participants being 30.  
 
Hale, Strauss & Taylor (2012) carried out a literature review of the effectiveness 
and acceptability of mindfulness-based therapy for OCD. The central purpose of 
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Hale’s review was to establish a rationale for using mindfulness-based approaches 
for OCD, to establish whether it was effective in reducing symptoms, whether is was 
a therapy that was acceptable to people diagnosed with OCD and to identify the 
mechanisms of change in mindfulness based therapy.  
 
After a comprehensive literature search four empirical research papers were 
reviewed and it was concluded that all the studies showed positive effects of 
mindfulness therapy for symptoms of OCD. Three of these four studies were 
conducted between 2007 and 2010 so will also be critically examined. This review 
will however not review anything before 2007, as Hale’s did, and will also review an 
additional five studies including a review of the most up to date study on the effects 
of mindfulness-based therapy for OCD conducted in 2013.  
 
This literature review will start with the oldest of the journals and finish with the 
most up to date one.  
 
A case study conducted by Patel, Carmody, & Simpsom (2007) presented a 25-
year-old white male with severe OCD and no psychiatric comorbidity. He refused 
treatment with medication, due to previous experience of SRIs that he had not found 
particularly helpful for intrusive thoughts. He found exposure and ritual prevention a 
distressing prospect and refused that as well. He was therefore treated with the 
application of an Adapted Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program.   
 
Before beginning the program he had drawn upon various coping strategies such 
as rationalizing or suppressing thoughts, which had proved to be slightly helpful in 
the short term. His treatment amounted to an eight-week program of weekly 70-
minute one-to-one mindfulness sessions and a follow-up session three months later. 
In line with the approach of MBCT (Segal, Teasdale & Williams, 2002) the client 
was encouraged to view his obsessive thoughts as mental events, adopting a 
decentered perspective on his intrusive thoughts in order to remind him that he is not 
his thoughts and his thoughts are not facts. In addition, a deliteralization exercise 
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was borrowed from Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT) to decrease the role of 
evaluation and encourage the client to adopt a nonjudgmental, observer stance in 
relation to the distressing and disturbing intrusive thoughts he struggled with.  
 
At pre-treatment assessment, his YBOCS score was 22 indicating a moderate level 
of OCD. Halfway through his treatment his score decreased to 17 and at post 
treatment his score was 13 indicating a mild level of OCD.  On the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale  (TMS; Bishop et al., 2006) he indicated an increase in score 
from 18 to 27 in his capacity to evoke a state of mindfulness. His self-report 
measures reflected perceived benefits as well as areas where his mindfulness 
practice could be developed. He explained that he felt more grounded after 
mindfulness practice and better able to detach from his intrusive thoughts.  
 
At a three-month follow-up interview he explained that he was continuing with his 
mindfulness practice at least two or three times a week. He reported less distress in 
relation to his OCD, an improvement in symptoms and an increase in awareness of 
symptom patterns and fluctuation in intensity. He did however say that he needed to 
develop his ability to bring mindfulness to everyday OCD. Nevertheless he was able 
to return to full time work. Overall, the client reported that mindfulness practice has 
improved his ability to tolerate and manage his OCD.  
 
There were several limitations in this study. Firstly, being a case study, the sample 
size was restricted to one participant. Secondly, experiential session practice of 
MBSR and discussion of practice and assessment of treatment fidelity are scarce 
(Patel et al., 2007) making it hard to identify the extent to which the intervention 
was faithful to the main elements of MBSR. It was mentioned in the study that some 
of the sessions were adapted to incorporate psycho education about OCD and 
knowledge about ways to cope with it so it is possible that these interventions were 
more effective than the mindfulness ones. Finally, the independent evaluator who 
assessed the outcome for this case was not blind to treatment condition.   
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There has only been one case control study of mindfulness therapy for OCD 
published to date. This was a quantitative controlled pilot study conducted by 
Handstede, Gidron & Nyklicek (2008) among a non clinical sample of seventeen 
Dutch students who scored much or very much on at least one item of the obsessive-
compulsive inventory-revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Anyone scoring above 32 
on the OCI-R was excluded.  
 
Participants with OCD symptoms, 12 women and five men, received either 
mindfulness training or formed a waiting-list control group. The mindfulness 
intervention included eight one-hour group sessions which incorporated training in 
meditative breathing, a four-step sequence for responding to psychological 
experiences, body scan (Miller, Fletcher & Kabat-Zinn, 1995) and mindful daily 
living, applied to OCD. The intervention was found to have a large significant 
reduction on the participants’ OCD symptoms after the treatment (as measured by 
the OCI-R) in comparison to the control group. Furthermore, those participants in 
the mindfulness intervention group showed significant improvement in mindfulness 
(as measured by the letting go subscale of the SMQ; Chadwick et al., 2008) and 
thought-action fusion (as measured by the TAF scale; Shafran et al., 1996) compared 
to participants in the control group. This may be the first controlled study 
demonstrating that a mindfulness intervention reduces OCD symptoms. 
 
However, there were study limitations. Firstly, of the ten participants who began 
the mindfulness training, two discontinued, representing 20 per cent of the total. It is 
possible that attrition rates for mindfulness therapy for OCD may be higher than for 
other mental health conditions. The participants in the mindfulness intervention 
group had higher levels of OCD before treatment, as reflected by the OCI-R, than 
the control group, though this was not significant (Hale, Strauss & Taylor, 2012). 
According to Burns, Formea, Keortge & Sternberger (1995) it is of value and 
importance to use analogue OCD samples when attempting to explore and 
understand OCD. This study would be strengthened if replicated in a larger 
analogous clinical sample combined with a follow-up period to explore participant-
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maintained psychological gains. 
 
That aside, it seems that if the findings of this study were to be replicated in larger 
and clinical samples, mindfulness training might prove to be an alternative therapy 
for OCD.  
 
Fairfax (2008) explored the use of mindfulness in OCD and its application and 
integration into existing treatment. The initial rationale to integrate mindfulness into 
the treatment of OCD with CBT was founded on the assumption that it could 
encourage a way of sitting with obsessional thoughts. It was also hypothesized that it 
would provide a way to identify thoughts for what they are. For instance, using 
mindfulness of breath the individual notices then describes the thought, such as “I 
am having an obsessive thought that the tap is not turned off” or “I am having a 
compulsion to put all my shoes in a straight line”.  
 
By not engaging with it he is able to return his attention to the breath. Though 
people with OCD may continue to think things or perform rituals they learn to 
accept this and not judge themselves because of it. It was hypothesized that 
mindfulness could complement CBT for OCD in some of the following ways: 
teaching different ways to relate to thoughts; helping to sever the link with 
conditioned behaviour and automatic thoughts; providing a method to challenge 
TAF; breaking reliance on having to think or act one’s way out of it; and, enabling 
the client to feel in control of thinking and behaviour. 
 
The application of the mindfulness-based approach was explored within a set of 
OCD groups. The first three weeks were devoted to understanding and challenging 
thoughts and several sessions were also dedicated to managing moods. In the 
following week clients were given a brief description of mindfulness and were 
invited to join a five-minute mindfulness-of-breath exercise. The group then 
discussed this with an emphasis on acknowledging reflections about the nature of 
thoughts, control of attention and awareness of state in general. Clients were also 
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given related homework.  
 
A qualitative outcome measure was completed at a three-month follow- up review 
meeting of OCD groups run by a local Community Health Team (CMHT).  This 
outcome measure, which was designed by the researcher, asked clients to describe 
what it was they found most useful from the group, what they found helpful when 
challenging OCD and how they did it. Mindfulness was a significant feature in the 
clients’ evaluation of the group. The clients also scored the various interventions on 
a five-point Likert scale. When ranked on an individual basis, mindfulness was 
consistently in the top three preferences out of 14. When ranked on a group basis it 
was second. Similar results were obtained in two other OCD groups (Fairfax et al., 
2008). It was concluded that if applied correctly, mindfulness not only complements 
traditional CBT interventions but also could increase its efficacy and maybe prevent 
relapse.  
 
It was hypothesized that integrating mindfulness-interventions to CBT would help 
individuals challenge TAF. Although TAF has some empirical support, it is still a 
hypothetical model of how OCD may occur in some individuals (Fairfax, 2008). 
More studies need to be conducted investigating the role of TAF in OCD. A 
randomized control trial could have compared mindfulness alone and CBT with 
controls. 
 
A second case study conducted by Firouzabadi and Shareh (2009) used a single-
subject experimental trial of A-B type conditions to explore the effectiveness of 
detached mindfulness techniques in the treatment of a particular case of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD). Detached mindfulness techniques were conducted on a 
participant with OCD who was assessed at both stage A (baseline) and stage B (final 
session) by the Y-BOCS scale, Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) (Goodman et 
al., 1989), Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 
2004), Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21) (Lovibond, 1995) and General 
Self Efficacy Scale (GSES) (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). The Y-BOCS and 
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DASS-21 were completed at the end of the treatment sessions and also at a follow-
up session. The participant’s Y-BOCS score decreased from 36 in stage A to 12 at 
the end of the treatment sessions and to ten in the follow-up session. The 
participant’s TCQ score indicated a significant reduction in punishment and worry 
subscales, score reduction in subscales of the MCQ, DASS-21 and score increases in 
the GSES. It appears that the detached mindfulness techniques were effective for 
this participant.  
 
A mixed methods A-B-C replication case series design was conducted by 
Wilkinson-Tough, Bocci, Thorne & Herlihy (2010) to investigate whether 
mindfulness-based therapy was beneficial for individuals experiencing obsessive 
intrusive thoughts. Five participants began treatment though two dropped out 
leaving a sample size of three white participants, two male and one female, aged 
between 30 and 48. The participants had undergone previous CBT therapy for their 
OCD.  
 
They underwent a two-week no-intervention monitoring phase, a subsequent two 
to three week relaxation control intervention phase followed by six sessions of 
mindfulness-based intervention emphasizing daily practice. The mindfulness 
intervention incorporated a focus on bodily sensations, otherwise known as body 
scan, combined with thought observation exercises (Linehan, 1993).  
 
Following therapy all three participants demonstrated reductions in Y-BOCS 
scores to below clinical levels. Two also demonstrated a reliable change in their Y-
BOCS scores from the end of the relaxation phase to the completion of the 
mindfulness intervention phase. This indicates that the effects of mindfulness 
training were over and above the benefits of simple relaxation and two participants 
maintained their improvement at a two-month follow-up. Qualitative analysis of post 
therapy feedback suggested that mindfulness skills such as observation, awareness 
and acceptance were seen as helping in the management of thought-action fusion 
and suppression.  
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The study was not without methodological limitations however. Though the use of 
a relaxation control condition was beneficial and helped to strengthen the findings, 
the order of presentation - relaxation followed by mindfulness - could not be 
counterbalanced, as participants would not have been able to unlearn their 
knowledge and experience of mindfulness. Furthermore, the mindfulness 
intervention phase was longer than the control phase, which may have also 
contributed to the benefits of the mindfulness intervention. 
 
As we have seen, the study was conducted on a small sample. One participant 
dropped out after two sessions as they found it hard to engage with mindfulness, and 
another had withdrawn because he found the time commitment of the mindfulness 
intervention too challenging. These two explanations for participant withdrawal 
from the study indicate that mindfulness based therapy may not suit everyone with 
OCD. Finally, it is possible that the use of alternative measures might have yielded 
different results. 
 
Though the participants’ mindfulness skills appeared to increase with the 
mindfulness intervention, as measured by the Kentucky inventory of mindfulness 
skills assessment (KIMS) (Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004) the use of different measures 
may have generated different results. The KIMS measures four different components 
of mindfulness compared to measures that provide a uni-dimensional score such as 
the Mindful Awareness Attention Scale (MAAS) (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the 
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI) (Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, 
Kleinknecht & Schmidt, 2006). The KIMS has been criticized for not representing 
all facets of mindfulness (Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, Kleinknecht & Schmidt, 
2006) and it is possible changes in mindfulness skill may have been more or less 
evident with the MAAS or FMI.  
 
Overall, despite the documented methodological limitations, results of this study 
do provide some preliminary quantitative and qualitative evidence that mindfulness 
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therapy for intrusive thoughts may be valuable.  
  
Another study was conducted by Liu, Han & Xu (2011). Their aim was to 
investigate the effectiveness of mindfulness-based cognitive-behavioural therapy 
(MBCBT) on six clients with OCD. In a single-case multiple-baseline design six 
OCD clients received MBCBT. The Y-BOCS and the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ) (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer & Toney, 2006) were 
used as measurements. Results revealed that there was a decrease in OCD symptoms 
that was maintained at follow-up. It was concluded that mindfulness-based 
cognitive-therapy might be effective in OCD but that further investigations with 
randomized and controlled conditions are needed.  
 
Hertenstein et al. (2012) used a qualitative approach to assess the subjective 
experiences of clients with OCD who participated in mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (MBCT) in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The aim of the study was 
to investigate whether MBCT represents a feasible and effective complementary 
treatment option for clients with OCD who are familiar with the principles of OCD 
including ERP. They set out to explore: i) subjective changes of experience and 
behaviour within an eight-week period; ii) helpful and problematic aspects of 
MBCT; and, iii) suggestions for the adaptation of the program to the specific needs 
of clients with OCD.   
 
Sixteen participants who met the DSM-IV-TR (2000) criteria for OCD and had 
completed a behavioural therapy with ERP within a two-year period prior to the 
study were included. Four dropped out during the first three treatment sessions. Of 
the remaining twelve, six were on medication; these were mainly selective serotonin 
re-uptake inhibitors and the participants’ medication status had been stable for at 
least ten months prior to inclusion. Three participants fulfilled criteria for avoidant, 
histrionic and paranoid personality disorder.  
 
The intervention program was adapted from MBCT for depression as described by 
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Segal, Williams & Teasdale (2002). Cognitive elements of the manual were adapted 
for OCD with the objective of providing a preferably disorder-specific treatment. 
Mindfulness elements were adapted from the original MBCT manual. MBCT was 
delivered in eight two-hour sessions once a week, each session including a brief 
report of the previous week, a review of weekly homework, guided in-session 
mindfulness practice and exchange within the group as well as a preview of the 
homework for the following week. Participants were also given session handouts 
and instructions for mindfulness exercises to practice at home. All MBCT 
practitioners were experienced cognitive behavioural therapists with several years’ 
expertise in mindfulness practice.  
 
As there is a lack of literature available on the subjective experiences of people 
with OCD undergoing mindfulness training, an interview schedule was used to 
structure conversations. An inductive data-driven approach was adopted for data 
analysis and subsequently a system of five categories and two sub-categories drawn 
up. In addition the researchers collected some quantitative data by administering 
their self-developed questionnaire with a five-point Likert scale, assessing the 
frequency of mindfulness practice and the participants’ satisfaction with the 
individual mindfulness exercises.  
 
All 12 participants completed the eight-week program and claimed it had enriched 
their lives. Nine participants stated that during the time of the MBCT they had 
developed a new way of managing their OCD, reporting an increased willingness to 
tolerate even unpleasant emotions when performing mindfulness meditation. Three 
participants, who reported that feelings such as sadness and pain occurred during the 
body scan, said they had been able to accept these feeling without trying to dispel or 
change them. Four claimed MBCT had helped them to live more actively in the 
present moment. They also described a reduction in their tendency to worry and 
ruminate with an increased ability to engage in and value pleasant activities and 
experiences. Some even reported improved sleep.  
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Nevertheless, four out of 12 participants reported that they did not observe any 
improvement of OCD symptoms after MBCT, with three reporting that OCD 
symptoms significantly interfered with their mindfulness practice during and beyond 
sessions. One reported finding it almost intolerable sitting in a room with other 
participants and described feeling suffocated by participant OCD. However, by the 
end of the therapy she noticed less compulsion to count during the sessions and 
found it easier to restrain herself from engaging in rituals during the eights weeks, 
though she continued to suffer with some obsessive concerns.  
 
Another participant struggled with a compulsion to repeat the trainer’s instruction 
over and over again during the mindfulness exercises. Other struggles were also 
reported such as mismatch between their wish to override their OCD as quickly as 
possible and mindfulness being a long-term, non-goal orientated therapy.  
 
Concerning helpful elements of MBCT, patient reports indicated that the three-
minute breathing space, a mini-meditation which can help those practicing it to 
reconnect with the present moment, might be a particularly helpful element of 
MBCT in OCD, at least short-term.  
 
One participant repeatedly became aware of unpleasant emotional and physical 
states during the body scan. However, as he stated, this was not a purely undesired 
outcome, as he tried to embrace these states as opportunities to relate differently to 
unpleasant feelings and sensations. He reported that the body scan sometimes even 
brought to light inner struggles that had been rather unconscious. This helped him 
clarify problems he was currently dealing with. 
 
Another component of MBCT that participants perceived as helpful was the 
acceptance of private experiences and self-acceptance. The patients reported that 
after MBCT, they were able to handle their emotions more flexibly and with an 
increased willingness to experience unpleasant states. This seems especially relevant 
for patients with OCD since obsessive-compulsive symptoms frequently serve as 
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processes that regulate unpleasant emotions (Veale & Wilson, 2005). The accepting 
attitude did not exclusively relate to emotions; some participants also reported that 
they had learned to relate to their obsessions in a different way, e.g. recognizing 
them as fluctuating events of their mind and letting them pass by without devaluing 
themselves  
 
Qualitative methodology remains a rather subjective approach, reflecting, as it 
does, the experiences of the studied subjects only. It is also prone to researcher bias. 
Interpretability and generalizability of the reported findings were further limited by 
the lack of a control group, the small sample size and the unbalanced gender ratio. 
Furthermore, the patients’ reports may have been inflated by a tendency to answer in 
a socially desired manner. The fact that interviews were conducted directly after the 
course limits the statements to a short-term perspective, lacking information about 
long-lasting effects of mindfulness training in OCD. However, scheduling 
interviews directly after the course probably precluded memory bias. 
 
In the most recent study conducted on mindfulness for OCD, Wahl, Huelle, 
Zurowski & Kordon (2013) used an experimental study to test the efficacy of a 
mindfulness-based instruction compared to distraction during brief exposure to 
obsessive thoughts in obsessive-compulsive clients.  
 
Thirty-six participants diagnosed with OCD were recruited at an inpatient clinic 
specializing in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for OCD. Four of the 
recruited participants did not meet the inclusion criteria and two did not complete 
the experimental procedure satisfactorily. There were no significant differences in 
any of the participants’ characteristics between the experimental and control group. 
 
The participants were asked to listen to their own obsessive thoughts through 
headphones during three stages: baseline, during an experimental condition and 
during a return to baseline.  
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During the experimental condition they were told to tackle their obsessive 
thoughts using either a mindfulness-based strategy or a randomly allocated 
distraction strategy. Mindfulness-based coping and distraction instructions were 
presented on a series of presentation slides. Instruction for the mindfulness coping 
strategy consisted in three statements, namely: i) thoughts are thoughts and not facts; 
ii) become aware of your thoughts at the moment; and, iii) let your thoughts pass 
like clouds in the sky. In contrast, the three distraction instructions were: i) at the 
moment your thoughts are causing you distress; ii) distract yourself from your 
thoughts; and, iii) silently count backwards in sevens from 700. 
 
The dependent variables were anxiety accompanied by an urge to neutralize and 
were assessed on visual analogue scales (VAS) at three time points within the three 
phases. Anxiety was rated on a 0-100 scale with 0 being “no anxiety at all” and 100 
“the most anxious I have ever felt”. Urge to neutralize was rated on a 0-100 scale 
with 0 labelled “no urge to neutralize at all” and 100-labelled “extreme urge to 
neutralize”.  
 
Data was averaged for three time points during each condition and a 3 x2 
ANOVA, with phase (baseline, experimental condition, return to baseline) as the 
within-subject factor and experimental condition (mindfulness versus distraction) as 
the between subject factor was conducted on anxiety and urge to neutralize. In 
addition, T tests for independent samples were calculated to analyze differences in 
compliance and perceived helpfulness with instructions for the different conditions. 
No significant differences were found.  
 
As predicted, participants experienced a greater decline in anxiety and urge to 
neutralize after having engaged in a mindfulness-based strategy than those who 
engaged in distraction. Results are unlikely to be accounted for by the different 
levels of compliance with the instruction between groups, as there were no 
significant differences between groups regarding compliance measures. 
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Data from this study replicates and extends findings by Marcks & Woods (2005) 
and Najmi, Riemann & Wegner (2009) who investigated the management of 
naturally occurring intrusive thoughts in the laboratory. In both studies, the use of a 
mindfulness-based strategy had an immediate beneficial effect (reduction in anxiety) 
in healthy individuals (Marcks & Woods, 2005) and also in patients diagnosed with 
OCD (Najmi, Riemann & Wegner, 2009). Wahl, Huelle, Zurowski & Kordon’s 
(2013) research extends these findings, revealing that individuals also benefit from a 
mindfulness-based strategy when applied during brief exposure to obsessive 
thoughts.  
 
Results from Wahl et al.’s study (2013) demonstrate that intentionally focusing on 
one’s obsessive thoughts and then imagining them passing by like clouds in the sky 
is an effective way of managing anxiety and the linked urge to neutralize. However, 
the mechanisms of change through which a mindfulness-based strategy reduces 
anxiety and urge to neutralize during brief exposure are obscure and can only be 
imagined. It is possible that it was the focused attention towards the obsessive 
thought that was helpful not the metaphor of letting it go. Moreover, applying 
metaphors such as clouds in the sky may simply act as a distraction from the 
immediate distress of the thoughts.  
 
The researchers did however control for this by selecting a counting backward 
task in the distraction group intending to distract participants to the same degree as 
the mindfulness-based strategy had. Nevertheless, if the mindfulness intervention 
had not distracted participants, these participants would still have undergone more 
exposure to their obsessional thoughts than those in the distraction condition.  
 
Future studies will need to be conducted to explore whether a mindfulness-based 
intervention is better than brief exposure alone for OCD. Additionally, only short-
term effects of mindfulness intervention were assessed. Replicated studies with 
follow-ups are needed to assess longevity of therapeutic effects. A further 
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methodological weakness was the use of subjective reports of anxiety and urge to 
neutralize on VAS scales. Results could have been strengthened by additional use of 
valid and reliable psychometric properties. Lastly, the implementation of brief 
aspects of mindfulness in experimental studies is not representative of the multi-
faceted construct of mindfulness as incorporated into mindfulness training and 
practice over a period of several weeks.  
 
To conclude, the results indicate that a mindfulness-based strategy during brief 
exposure to obsessive thoughts may be more beneficial compared to a distraction 
strategy in the case of OCD. These results are consistent with other studies 
documented in this review (Handstede et al., 2008, Patel et al., 2007 and Wilkinson 
et al., 2010) and a meta-analysis on the effects of mindfulness-based therapy on 
anxiety and depression (Hoffman, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010) as noted by Wahl et al. 
(2013).  
 
Summary of the empirical research  
 
The benefits and otherwise  
 
Though the studies varied in their aims and methodological designs they were 
more uniform in that overall they appeared to point to mindfulness-based 
interventions being a helpful therapeutic intervention for OCD. Studies that 
measured OCD symptoms with psychometric tests demonstrated reduced OCD 
symptoms in participants as a result of mindfulness-based therapy. Qualitative 
studies also bought about an improved tolerance to the participants’ OCD and an 
overall progression in their ability to manage it.  
 
It appeared that the following interventions were effective for OCD sufferers: 
body scan, mindful daily living, letting thoughts pass like clouds in the sky, focusing 
on intrusions instead of trying to distract oneself from them, mini-meditations, 
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accepting feelings without trying to dispel or change them and the recognition that 
thoughts are not facts. 
 
The above interventions appeared to assist participants with OCD in feeling more 
grounded, improving their ability to detach themselves from intrusive thoughts, 
reducing feelings of distress about the OCD, reducing urges to indulge in 
neutralizing and reassurance-seeking reinforcing behaviours, enriched living, ability 
to live in the present, increased ability to tolerate unpleasant emotions and even 
improved sleep. 
 
Though the overall results suggest mindfulness-based therapy for OCD is 
effective, there are also findings that revealed it was not helpful for some. As quite a 
few of the studies were of a qualitative nature, some clear examples of what 
participants found unhelpful were voiced and less helpful aspects of mindfulness-
based therapy were not missed or hidden in a pool of ordinal data. 
 
For some, OCD symptoms interfered and compromised their ability to engage in 
mindfulness practice. For others, the mindfulness interventions were found to be too 
challenging as accepting unwanted and distressing thoughts and feelings seemed to 
exacerbate distress; being surrounded by other OCD sufferers proved to be an 
uncomfortable and oppressive experience. Others perceived difficulty implementing 
mindfulness in everyday life.  
 
 It also appeared from the studies that what may have been helpful to one 
participant was not helpful to another. Some found the focus and acceptance on 
unwanted intrusions distressing. Others found it helpful. Some felt able to complete 
the mindfulness interventions alone. Others felt the need for ongoing assistance and 
guidance.  
 
The limitations  
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Since most of the studies were of a qualitative design, many of the results cannot 
be generalized and may have been unique to the participants included in the 
research. The low number of recent studies conducted on mindfulness-based therapy 
for OCD, as well as the low number of participants in them, excluding Wahl et al.’s 
(2013) study with 30 participants, furthermore significantly restricts their reliability. 
Statistical analysis on studies has been limited and restricted by the study designs. 
Moreover, some of the studies were described as pilot studies intending them to be 
incorporated into larger scale studies. Nevertheless, the pilot studies will have 
provided the researchers with opportunities to replicate the investigations on larger 
samples to find more reliable results. 
 
There is some evidence that mindfulness may act as a neutralizing or even 
distracting strategy in OCD (Wahl et al., 2013). However, (Baer, 2003) has noted 
that by bringing full awareness to experiences, individuals can identify the transient 
nature of thoughts and that this alone may assist individuals in letting go of them and 
understanding that they will pass. In this case it would not be akin to a safety 
behaviour where one might look for solutions to override, challenge or ignore them. 
Furthermore, it should be recognized that implementing brief aspects of mindfulness 
in experimental studies might not be representative of the broad and complex 
spectrum of mindfulness-based therapy, which is typically incorporated into 
intensive training over an extended period of time. Finally, participant drop out rates 
were documented in every study reviewed suggesting attrition rates may be higher 
than Ma & Teasdale (2004) stated.  
 
Future research  
 
Further research on the effects of mindfulness-based therapy for OCD may benefit 
from a clarification of the mechanism of change through which mindfulness based 
strategies reduce anxiety and the urge to neutralize.  
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As it is not clear whether it is focused attention towards unwanted thoughts or 
urges, amounting to exposure, that are the moderating factors in mindfulness-based 
interventions for OCD, it would appear that further case control studies would make 
a beneficial contribution to the mindfulness-based therapy for OCD literature.  
 
As it stands only one has been conducted by Handstede in 2008, albeit not with 
analogue samples. Overall, more studies with analogue larger samples, more 
psychometric testing, longer follow-up periods and identification of mechanisms of 
change are required to move the mindfulness literature for OCD forward beyond 
these preliminary findings.  
 
Overall conclusions 
 
Again, whilst the findings from the studies are interesting and generally indicate 
positive effects of mindfulness-based therapy for individuals diagnosed with OCD 
the small samples and study limitations make it difficult to draw any firm directive 
conclusions. It would seem that mindfulness-based therapy might be valuable for 
people experiencing intrusive thoughts and urges to neutralize. It seems that the use 
of short meditations and brief mindfulness interventions helps people to cope with 
their obsessions and compulsions. Furthermore, it appears that mindfulness could 
successfully be integrated into existing treatments of OCD. It was suggested by 
Fairfax (2008) that mindfulness could help access to the meta cognitive perspective 
in CBT treatment for OCD and Liu (2011) found mindfulness-based cognitive 
behavioral therapy effective for OCD.   
 
However, any conclusions are provisional and further research needs to be done. 
The evidence to date is however inspiring to me as practitioner and I plan to adopt 
some of the mindfulness interventions highlighted in this review into my practice 
with those clients diagnosed with OCD.  
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APPENDIX B - CORE FORM
APPENDIX C – PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
 
STUDY ON FIRST TIME EXPERIENCES OF DEPRESSION 
 
My name is Vanessa Pilkington and I am looking for participants for my 
doctoral research in counselling psychology at City University. 
 
My research question is "how do people experience emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnosed as a first episode of depression" 
 
It is a qualitative study, requiring a semi-structured interview to explore 
the in-depth experience of first time experiences of depression. I am 
looking for adults between the ages of 18 and 65 who have been 
diagnosed with a first episode of depression by a GP or Psychiatrist and 
been treated for it at least 3 months prior to participation in the study. I 
will be conducting 1 hour interviews at a private clinic in Harley Street, 
London, W1 9QD and paying participants a £10 Amazon voucher for 
taking part in the study. 
 
Obviously all information received within the interview, will be treated 
with complete confidentiality. 
If you are interested in participating, or would like more information, 
please contact me via email (or on ). My email address is: 
 
 
Many thanks 
Vanessa 
 is a charity and a company limited by 
guarantee. Registered in England no. 986761. Registered Office: 103 
Borough Road, London SE1 0AA. 
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APPENDIX D – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
 
Interview Shedule (Guide) 
Hello, thank you for being here. During the next hour I will ask about when 
you first recognized that you had what we might call depression. Some of 
the questions I might ask you will be looking at broader themes such as 
low self esteem, self dislike, self worth, loss of identity, feelings of  
punishment and shame, indecisiveness, and your feelings about your past, 
present and future.  
How do you feel at the moment? Just relax. Please answer as honestly as 
you can. I may make some notes for reference. Is that okay with you? 
Could I ask your age?  
Gender?  
Background? 
 
Subjective experience 
Can you tell me about the first time you felt something was not quite right?  
 
Where were you?  
 
What were you doing? 
 
Can you describe what you felt? 
 2 
What was your reaction to that feeling? 
 
What did you think was happening to you? 
 
How did you react to it? 
 
What sort of things went through your mind when this was going on? 
 
What was your understanding of what was happening to you? 
 
Did you experience anything such as a desire to punish your –self? If so, 
how did this manifest? 
 
Did you experience any feelings of shame? If so, how? 
 
Did you experience any changes to your self –identity and any related 
feelings of loss? If so, how? 
 
Did you feel you had lost anything? If so what and how? 
 
 3 
How did you feel about your future at the time? 
 
How did you feel about your past? 
 
How long did the feelings persist?  
 
What was the experience of meaning in your life at the time?  
 
How did others respond to your experience of emotional suffering that we 
might call depression? 
Causes 
Had something changed in your relationships before your suffering began? 
If so, how? 
 
Had something changed in your work? If so, how? 
 
Treatment 
What did you do about your emotional suffering? Did you approach anyone 
for help? 
 
 4 
Who did you talk to? 
 
How long did you suffer before you seeked help? 
 
Diagnosis 
 
What was your emotional suffering diagnosed as? 
 
What did the diagnosis mean to you? 
 
What do you consider to be the triggers for your emotional suffering 
subsequently diagnoses as depression?  
 
Treatment 
What did you do to help you cope with your emotional suffering? 
 
Was this linked to your treatment in any way? 
 
After your depression diagnosis did you decide to start any treatment? If 
not why? 
 5 
 
What treatment helped you and how? 
 
Depression terminology 
What was your understanding of depression before you were diagnosed? 
 
How would you describe depression now? 
  
APPENDIX E – CONSENT FORM 
 
                                Consent To Audio & Transcription. 
 
 
Vanessa Pilkington C.Psychol, City University 
 
 
I understand that this study involves the audio taping of my interview 
with the researcher Vanessa. I am aware that neither my full name nor 
any other identifying information will be associated with the audiotape 
or the transcript. Only the researcher or the researcher’s supervisor will 
be permitted to listen to the tapes. 
 
I understand that the tapes may be transcribed by the researcher and 
erased once the research is complete. Transcripts of my interview may 
be reproduced anonymously in whole or part for use in presentations or 
in written products resulting from this study. 
 
I further understand that I can withdraw from the study or have my 
recorded interview erased at any time with no explanation as to why and 
no adverse consequences.  
 
 
Participant’s signature                                            Date 
 
 
I hereby agree to abide by the participant’s above instructions  
 
 
Researcher’s signature                                           Date                                           
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APPENDIX F – PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
‘PSYETH(UPTD) 11/12 113’ 
Participant information sheet  
 
 
My name is Vanessa Pilkington and I am a chartered counselling psychologist working in 
private practice and currently conducting some PhD research. My research will explore 
people’s experiences of a first time diagnosis of depression. I am especially interested in 
chartering the journey people undergo from feeling that something is not quite right all 
the way up to diagnosis. I aim to investigate how a first episode of depression affects 
people’s life experiences, feelings, thoughts, behaviour, values, opinions, knowledge, 
work and relationships.  
 
I intend to recruit participants through support and service user websites. I will interview 
adults between the ages of 18 and 65 who have had a first time diagnosis of depression 
by a GP or psychiatrist and been treated at least 3 months prior to participation in the 
study. All participants will be interviewed at my private practice where a receptionist and 
other professionals will be present in the building.  
 
I intend to interview volunteering participants for approximately 1 hour. In this time I will 
ask participants to read and sign a consent form that will explain the confidentiality 
conditions of the interview and the study you may partake in. If you agree to the 
conditions and sign the consent form you will agree to be interviewed about your 
experience of a first time diagnosis of depression for this research. I will inform you 
about the research I am conducting and you are welcome to ask me any questions. 
 
Participants will be asked to sign their first name only on the consent form. All data will 
be treated in the strictest confidence and kept in a locked cabinet for which only I will 
have the code. The names or any descriptions of the participants will not be attached to 
the study. All comments used in the study will be presented anonymously or with a 
pseudo name. Participants will have the right to withdraw from the study at any time with 
out providing a reason as to why with no adverse consequences for the treatment of the 
participant. 
 
In addition to signing the consent form I shall also ask you to complete a short 
standardised psychological questionnaire (PHQ-9)) that assess depression. As I am a 
recruiting participant who will have been treated for depression so I do not anticipate that 
scores will reach a clinical range. However, in the unlikely event that anyone does I shall 
still provide you with your full hour allocated for the interview to discuss how and where 
you will be able to seek professional help if you choose to. As a fully qualified charted 
counselling psychologist running my own private practice this is something I am fully 
trained to discuss with anyone in need.  
 
All interviews will be recorded for transcript purposes only and will be seen only by the 
researcher and the research supervisor. The recorded interviews will be destroyed after 
the research is complete.  I have a deadline of 4 years to complete the research but I am 
registered to complete it in September 2013.  
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The consent forms will be signed by all participants and myself prior to the start of each 
interview. You may request to see a copy of the final transcript after and a final copy of 
the report.  
 
APPENDIX G – EXAMPLE OF TYPED TRANSCRIPT 
 
You were talking about you felt around other people. How did you find people 
reacted to you at the time? 
I think I was kind of standoffish but also very polite and warm to people, so 
people would think “Right, here's someone I can talk to,” and then all the walls 
would kind of come up, so I think people found it very awkward. I think that's 
something which continues to this day in varying degrees in places I've worked. I 
like to think I'm very approachable, I'm quite a warm person, easy to get on 
with – all those kind of things – and I do all that. I do all the social niceties and 
then I just throw up a brick wall, so it's like “Actually no, you're not coming any 
nearer ((0:09:06.3?)) that's fine. People are like “Then why are you being 
pleasant? Why are you starting all this stuff off and then not following it up with 
more regular social behaviour?”  
What goes through your mind when you get that feeling to just wall up and detach? 
It's kind of detachment isn't it? 
Yeah it is and I’ve never really kind of criticised it much when I was younger. 
It's only now I look at it just annoys me now. It's just very irritating. It's a battle 
to undo it. 
Right, so it's not necessarily a choice, it's just something that kind of happens. 
Yeah, it's a defence mechanism I guess and it's something I haven't thought 
about for absolutely ages, to be honest. 
There seems to be something about detachment here and that you were saying you 
felt like an alien, you felt this kind of divide between you and them, and talking now 
about you're sort of getting to know people and then kind of just pushing 
((0:10:05.6?)) 
I guess your original question, I was very accepting of it when I was younger. I 
just kind of felt that's the way it's going to be, that’s fine.  
So you just kind of surrendered to it? 
Yeah, totally because I had work to get on with. I had stuff to do, learn and 
etcetera and that's why I was there and I wasn't meant to have a good time. So, 
so what? 
 
APPENDIX H - CODED TRANSCRIPT
recognition body social withdrawnxiety thoughts control anger body missing
p1, 13 p6, 3 catatonic p11,1,2 p7,28 taking conp6, 19,20 p1, 1,2 p1,16 no joy
awareness rumination p12,14 powerlessp6,24 irritable crying p6, 3 nothing
p4,24,25 noise p13,4 violencep12,22 rockingp7,19
p12,7-10 awareness challenged p11,4-6 p19,1
acknowledged worry, obsessions empty
p17,15 p11,13 cogntive repetition loss body control
p17,24 terror
p12,28 terror
p13,18 paranoia
p14,29 ocd
acknowledgment length sufferingstructure can't childhood instability
affirmation
validation fantasising
numb
just low mood diagnosis
means to an end
affirmation identity self esteem façade self doubt dissociation blame alienation change
p3, 8, self hate p1,3 questioning p7,10,11 p,11 20 self blamp1, 11 different
p4, 4, self doubt, 7,8 self question p1, 19
p4,18-21, inadequacy despondent detached guilt p9, 12,13 lonely
p5, 17 p1, 19 apart p2,6,7,8,9 p12,30
p7,19 void, cold
p9,23 apartness,shame
p1, 6,7,8,9
dissapoinment
APPENDIX I - DEVELOPING THEMES WITH SUPPORTING TEXT (excerpt)
loss B4 DEP loss ES 1st episode physical negleca cumalationsafety denial destiny bullied b4 dep
p2, 3 p5, 14 p3, 13,14 persecu
p12,12 p12,12, persecuti
 control
displaced survival separation
health normalised invaded sexual assult
empathy pointless troubed relationships
support loss voice low mood
overwhelmed gender issues hatred communication
mistrust distraction projection choice self preservation
body dissatisfaction raw
comparisons escape structure hiding stuck pressure acceptance confused normalised
p1,10,17 p6,8 p7.4,5,6 p14,7 façade p11,27
p2,2,3 p7,28, self harm
difference destructive helpless belong
p1, 9 self harm
p13,3,4
p13,7-9 self harm connections
protection dep pereceptio
p7,10,11 p2,33
persecution differentiates betw
p17, 15
p17,24
p18,8,9
p18,14 low mood
p18,19 a reason
p18,25 her exper
reason p18,28-30
p19,15
abuse
uncertainty
ication absent
servation
ocd
present vicarious
Major Themes Subsidiary Themes joe Tulula Jumania elias alessadnro anna
Belief in a higher force Destiny p8,10 p3,28.p12,9,10 p13,17 p2,21
Deserving p15,6 p5,13,14p6,34p2,19,20 deservi
Spirituality p9,8,9 p3,9.p2,37,38.p5,29
Avoidance tactics Escape p8,5.p14,34 p3,drinking.p4,6.p10,6 p6,13,22 p12,34.14,32.p21,20
Denial
Hiding p8,9, p9,4. P10, p3,29 p14,13,22.p1,14.p5,hiding it fro
Façade p8, 22, p8,22.p9, 18-21,p15,31p9,pretending top16,26 p1,14.p4,1,2.p7,p3,1-3 pressure 
Detachment p4,16, p11,19 isop5,4 p2,8 p3,11
Disassociation p4,14 p4,33 p3,29.p,10 p3,11-13,self ha
not included Destructive p5,7.p6,21
not included Projection p3,18 p2,6,14,16
Self defence Protection p2,20,23.p3,25 p5,35 p4,10.p13,17 p3,20
Social withdrawal p3,17,20 p2,8.p8,35.p9,10p2,9
Self –preservation
Detachment p8,35
Dissociation p6,10.p5,16.p4,depersonalisation.p5,4,6
Survival
Surrender p3,20
Discipline Control p8,4. P11,13 p2,4,23.p4,22.p73,19.p8,22.p9,19.p12,4,22.p12,23p6,22p9,14p7,13,24
Structure p1,6 p1,32.p3,36.p4,3p2,2p3 establihsing routine.p8,h
not included Permission p15,3
not included Responsibility p7,30.p10, pressure and respon
not included Medication p2,13.p8,27 p12,20,21
Stability p1,5
Connections Belong p4,9,10, 36 p2,26 p2,13.p12,40.p4,32 p4,9-11need to be
Detached p6,13 p5,4 p3,30,33 p2,32.p3,35
Alienation p4,15 p3,38-40.p10,8.p,34.p17,11 alone p2,10,p3, f
not included Abandoned p1,1-4
not included Displaced
Troubled relationshipsp11,21, p17,3,4p9,20 p3,30 pg1,27,p2,14-16
Vicarious p2,2.p6,19 p2,22 kept going 
not included Bullied
Persecuted
APPENDIX J - SUPERORDINATE & SUBORDINATE THEMES (excerpt)
APPENDIX K – SUBMISSION OF CASE STUDY 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
I write to certify that the account that Vanessa Pilkington has provided in 
her case study is true to the work she has conducted with the client 
referred to as H. The client was seen by Vanessa in a therapeutic 
capacity in her private practice in 2011. I have supervised Vanessa's 
clinical practice over the last three years.  
 
 
SusanVS 
Susan van Scoyoc 
Consultant Psychologist 
